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‘We think, each of us, that we're much more rational than we are. And we think that we make 
our decisions because we have good reasons to make them. Even when it's the other way 
around. We believe in the reasons, because we've already made the decision’. 



















Real life decision-making depends on a complex interplay between cognitive and emotion-
based processes.  Damasio (1994) developed the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) arguing 
that emotion-based processes guide decision-making by directing individuals towards 
alternatives that have been previously ‘marked’ as positive or guide them away from the 
negative options. The primarily used test-bed of the emotion-based learning is Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT, Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, & Anderson, 1994). The SMH makes three 
assumptions about the IGT behaviour: (a) somatic markers have a negative connotation and 
bias decision-making covertly in the absence of explicit knowledge, (b) there is a limited role 
for cognitive procesesing during IGT performance, especially during the initial stages of the 
task, and (c) anticipatory somatic markers guide decision-choices away from the bad options 
as participants are able to anticipate the good and the bad options. This thesis tested the SMH 
using a combination of psychophysiological methods (Eye-tracking, Pupillometry, Heart Rate 
and Blood Pressure measurements), behavioural measurements and psychometric measures of 
individual differences in combination with the IGT. The systematic review, meta-analyses and 
the experiments described in this Thesis explored the validity of these assumptions and found 
that they are not accurately manifested in behaviour during IGT performance. A novel 
methodology not previously employed was used to capture somatic markers through pupillary 
responses. Explicit learning was also assessed by the eye-tracking methodology in testing IGT 
performance in normal conditions and under stress.   The results from the first two experiments 
indicated that explicit processing and knowledge about the task are more critical factors during 
the early stages of the game than previously suggested. Although there were some indicators 
of the existence of somatic markers, it was found that cognitive reflection, conscious awareness 
and increased cognitive processing occurred early in the game and guided behaviour on IGT.  
The results from the final experiment revealed that IGT performance in healthy individuals is 
not always optimal; stress levels impaired performance whereby a lack of, or insufficient 
cognitive processing early in the game may create a somatic signal that interferes with IGT 
performance. Furthermore, attentional processing, cognitive reflection and conscious 
awareness can be disrupted by stress resulting in non-optimal decision-making strategies that 
consequently interfere with performance on the IGT.  Taken together, these results challenge 
the basic premises of the SMH and could be best explained within the dual-process framework 
(e.g., Brevers, Bechara, Cleeremans, & Noel, 2013). If somatic markers do not play a 
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Rationale & Context 
Making decisions in uncertain or ambiguous situations is a key function in everyday life. Most 
of the decisions people make involve some uncertainty and psychophysiological arousal 
(Starcke & Brand, 2012). Risky choices that may carry extensive financial consequences or 
different rewards or punishments are physiologically arousing. A long tradition of research in 
decision-making stemming from the Bayesian maximisation of expected utility theory (e.g., 
Von Neumann & Morgenstern, 1944) argued that uncertain decision is based on logical, 
cognitive processes that require rational thought and cost-benefit calculations. It was further 
assumed that emotions and emotional states have a detrimental impact on judgment and 
decision-making, whereby they hinder reasoning processes, influence the accuracy of decision-
making and increase people’s tendency to take risks (Pham, 2007).  
In the 1990s, however, a concept of bounded rationality resurfaced, and decision-making 
models gradually acknowledged the importance of emotional processes during decision-
making. The groundbreaking SMH developed making a compelling case that emotional factors 
and arousal play a pivotal role in decision-making (Damasio, 1994).  SMH postulated that 
decisions are guided by subjective ‘gut feeling’ (akin to intuition) about the inherent ‘goodness’ 
or ‘badness’ of future choices. These somatic markers direct individuals towards alternatives 
that have previously been positive, or guide them away from the negative options, thus creating 
a platform for emotion-based learning. Early research evidence from the patients with lesions 
of limbic structures, neurological diseases or psychological disorders emphasised the 
importance of emotional processes in deciding advantageously during decision-making (e.g., 
Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, Damasio, 1997; Bechara, Damasio, Damasio, 
& Lee, 1999; Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000). This was evidenced through 
psychophysiological measurments (e.g., skin conductance response; SCR), where anticipatory 
SCR (aSCR) bias advantageous decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997).  Thus, it was 
suggested that implicitly acquired somatic markers guide future choices and may significantly 
contribute to advantageous decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994, 1997).  In contrast, 
reasoning processes were regarded as having much less importance. 
Despite the popularity of SMH, many fundamental issues remain unresolved. For instance, 
psychophysiological evidence (i.e. aSCR) in support of the SMH is equivocal. There has been 






somatic markers may be imperfectly represented by SCR (e.g., Dunn, Dalgleish, & Lawrence, 
2006). Bechara et al. (1994) developed the IGT that is often used as an experimental task and 
a clinical assessment tool for testing the development of the emotion-based learning. They 
proposed that a healthy control chose optimally on the IGT because they are able to develop 
somatic markers, compared to the clinical population that shows impairment in IGT 
performance due to the absence of somatic markers. However, the IGT performance of healthy 
participants is characterised by substantial variability and individual differences, with healthy 
participants often failing to develop somatic markers (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2013; 
Steingroever, Wetzels, Horstmann, Neumann, & Wagenmakers, 2013). This contradicted 
Bechara et al.’s original assumptions that healthy participants learn to prefer the good options 
over the bad options because of the implicitly acquired somatic markers that signal the bad 
option and therefore promote the avoidance of the bad choices. A second assumption that 
conscious awareness develops as a result of the somatic markers late in the game and have little 
impact on overall IGT performance was also challenged (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 2005). 
Several studies have shown that cognitive processes and conscious awareness influence the 
development of somatic markers, and therefore challenge the basic premises of the SMH (e.g., 
Maia & McClelland, 2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2006; Fernie & Tunney, 2013). This is line with 
research suggesting that cognitive processes may be implicated earlier in the IGT than 
previously suggested (e.g., Hinson, Jameson, & Whitney, 2002; Jameson, Hinson, & Whitney, 
2004; Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand 2011;  Simonovic, Stupple, Gale & Sheffield, 
2016, 2017) thus, challenging a third assumption that the cognitive processes are implicated 
late in the game (e.g., Brand, Recknor, Grabenhorst & Bechara, 2007)      
Recently, a dual-process account of decision-making has been developed to account for the 
cognitive processes involved during IGT performance, where a potential conflict in decision-
making or the ‘disagreement’ between the cognitive processing and the development of 
somatic markers was identified (e.g., Brevers et al., 2013). Brevers et al.’s account maps on to 
the dual-process framework of reasoning and decision-making that contrast intuitive, effortless, 
emotional and unconscious (Type I processing) with effortful conscious and controlled 
characteristics (Type II, e.g., Kahneman, 2011). This proposal has been linked to SMH 
whereby the Type 1 processes include a range of intuitive processes such as emotional 
responses or gut feelings that can be measured through physiological techniques (Glockner & 
Witteman 2010). This also corresponds to Brevers et al.’s (2013) recent suggestion that ‘cool’ 






affective choices relatively early during IGT performance. Hence, the emerging evidence 
suggests that there is a complex interplay between Type I and Type II processes in determining 
the outcome of the decision-making process and that the basic assumptions of the SMH may 
need some re-evaluation.  
This thesis examined cognitive processes and somatic markers during IGT performance and 
argued that these processes represent a part of a broader learning complex such as implicit 
learning, explicit learning and risk-taking behaviour. A robust methodology not previously 
utilised was used to capture somatic marker signals implicated in implicit and explicit learning. 
Hence, eye-tracking methodology and hemodynamic measures of physiological arousal were 
used (Finapres medical system) to test the basic assumptions of the SMH framework.  
Furthermore, as recent evidence indicated that both types of processing work interchangeably 
during decision-making, this thesis explored the view that there is an interplay between 
emotion and cognition during decisional choices, where cognitive functions serve as mediators 
for emotion-based learning (e.g., Schiebener et al., 2011; Brevers et al.,  2013; Simonovic et 
al.,  2016, 2017).   
A systematic review including two meta-analyses and three experimental studies were 
conducted to examine: evidence of the psychophysiological arousal during decision-making in 
uncertain context; cognitive and emotional types of processing; and the effect of stress on 
adaptive decision-making. The current evidence suggested that there is conflicting evidence in 
support of the SMH and that the key assumptions about the performance of the healthy 
participants warrant closer scrutiny (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Steingroever et al., 2013). 
Furthermore, there is a possibility that Type II processes play a more prominent role during 
decision-making on IGT than the somatic markers and these hypotheses need examination 
(Simonovic et al., 2016, 2017).    
This thesis used a combination of psychophysiological methods (i.e. Eye-tracking, 
Pupillometry, Heart Rate and Blood Pressure measurements), behavioural measurements and 
psychometric measures of individual differences (i.e. Cognitive Reflection Test, CRT1); 
Active Open-minded Thinking (AOT); Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI); Consideration 
of Future Consequences (CFC); Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI); and Test of Awareness) not 
previously used to test assumptions made by SMH. A standard experimental paradigm for 
assessing emotion-based learning was employed (IGT; Bechara et al., 1994). The studies herein 






novel  measuring techniques to capture emotion-based signals; (ii) using a combination of 
psychophysiological and behavioural measurements to assess implicit learning and cognitive 
interaction; (iii)  using a stress manipulation to examine beneficial and  detrimental emotional 
effect on decision-making.  
The first chapter discusses different theoretical models (i.e. Expected Utility Theory, SMH and 
Dual-process theory) and their underlying contributions to understanding decision-making. 
Specifically, decision-making, implicit learning and cognitive and emotional types of 
processing during decision-making were discussed within the theoretical assumptions and 
explanation of the SMH and a dual-process account of decision-making. The basic assumptions 
of the SMH were outlined and evidence examined.   
The second chapter examines and discusses psychophysiological evidence in support of SMH. 
Despite its relevance to scientific research and practice, evidence in support of the SMH 
remains elusive and poorly understood. A systematic review with two meta-analyses was 
conducted to examine the evidence presented in support of the SMH and the role of aSCR in 
predicting IGT.  The quality and reliability of current psychophysiological measurements were 
discussed. 
In the third chapter, a novel and faster physiological measurement (e.g., eye-tracking 
methodology) was used to capture emotion-based signals (i.e. somatic markers). The currently 
employed SCR methodology is not without limitation and pupil dilation could serve as an 
alternative physiological marker. This is only the second study that measures pupil dilation 
during a performance on the original IGT. The study also explored the interplay between 
cognitive and emotional processes during decision-making on the IGT by using pupil dilation 
and a measure of cognitive reflection (Extended version of CRT; Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 
2014). The CRT1 is constructed to measure peoples’ aptitude to engage in reflective thinking, 
whereby the more reflective people are, the more likely they are to inhibit the initial response 
to a problem and engage in finding an alternative solution to a problem. The previous research 
utilised the original CRT version (Frederick, 2005) during the decision-making on IGT and 
showed that reflective thinking plays a prominent role during IGT learning (Simonovic et al., 
2016), thus contradicting previous research on IGT (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994, 1977).  
The fourth chapter considered the possibility that the performance on the IGT is best 
understood within a dual-process framework (e.g., Brevers et al., 2013). Many studies related 






processes. However, there is evidence that Type I processes include a range of intuitive 
processes such as emotional responses or ‘gut feelings’ that may be important for decision-
making in uncertain condition. Eye-tracking movements were recorded to examine the nature 
and organisation of reasoning processes. Specifically, the active role of attention during 
inspection time was examined as it represents a possible explanation for the cognitive processes 
involved in the decision-making preferences (e.g., Krajbich, Lu, Camerer, & Rangel, 2012). 
Continuous, non-invasive cardiovascular measurement by Finometer (Finapres Medical 
System, Amsterdam, Netherlands) was also used to measure blood pressure and heart rate 
variability. Previous research indicated that there is substantial variability in IGT performance 
in healthy participants because of the physiological arousal during decision-making on IGT 
and this warrants further examination (e.g., Steingroever et al., 2013). In addition, to examine 
individual differences, critical thinking aptitude and dispositions were also assessed during the 
IGT performance (CRT1; Toplak et al., 2014; REI, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier 1996; 
AOT, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013; CFC, Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994; 
and ASI, Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986). Finally, to assess participants’ level of 
knowledge throughout the IGT a sensitive test of awareness was used (e.g., Maia & 
McClelland, 2004). To the best of my knowledge this is the first study that examines attentional 
processing and critical thinking aptitude and dispositions during IGT performance with the 
eye-tracking methodology.      
The fifth chapter introduced stress as an additional element. The complexity of everyday life 
elicits many stressful situations where it is of great importance for an individual to remain calm 
under pressure with relatively sound judgment to decide advantageously. Hence, the influence 
that stress has on the quality of a decision needs better understanding. Simonovic et al. (2016) 
showed that stress hinders IGT performance and impedes reflective thinking, as measured by 
the original CRT; and   cognitive reflections can be implicated in learning during stress 
(Simonovic et al., 2016). Hence, the aim of the final experiment was to further explore 
Simonovic et al.’s previous findings. An extended version of the CRT was used (CRT1, Toplak 
et al., 2014). Blood pressure and heart rate variability were again measured by Finometer. In 
addition, inspection time (eye-tracking) and participants’ conscious awareness (Maia & 
McClelland, 2004) was examined during IGT performance. This is the first study that examines 
the effect of stress on inspection time, reflective thinking and conscious awareness during the 






In the final chapter, potential implications of the findings on theory and practice of real-life 
decision-making were discussed, and suggestions were made that the eye-tracking measures 
offer strong promise in investigating emotion-based and cognitive processes. The implications 
of each experimental results were discussed in relation to SMH and dual-process theory. 
Possible caveats of the results were also discussed. 
1.1. Introduction 
People make countless decisions every day; this process ranges from simple decisions (‘What 
should I have for dinner today’) to highly complex ones (‘The economy is going downhill 
should I invest or save my money?’), and these choices often involve judging probabilities. 
Furthermore, any decision that people make usually include degrees of beliefs and/or desires 
that need fulfilling. In most of our everyday lives, probabilities are uncertain, and the outcomes 
of our choices are unknown. For instance, taking an umbrella out depends on judging the 
probability that it will rain (based on the limited and ambiguous forecasting information) and 
whether you want to avoid getting wet. The final decision to take the umbrella out should  pass 
through several stages: Extracting meaning from ambiguous information in order to construct 
a mental representation (interpretation process); evaluating the evidence, estimating the value 
and likelihood of the occurrence of differing outcomes (judgment); and finally, drawing 
inferences and selecting from the available options (choice) (Blanchette & Richards 2010). 
Obviously, these processes are complex and rely on a number of cognitive processes such as 
attention, memory activation, object recogntion etc. Thus, cogntiive processes play an 
important part during decision-making choices.  
Ever since Descartes’s quest for what is true, cognition has been identified as the ability to be 
logical, rational and good in mathematics (Gintis, 2007). Logic and mental arithmetics were a 
hallmark of a ‘rational thought’ and good decision-making.  Conversely, emotions are thought 
to be irrational and have little to do with cognition. Indeed, emotions were usually identified 
as a ‘nuisance’ that can contaminate rational thought (Damasio, 1994).  Although the Cartesian 
dualistic view is no longer prominent, it has had a profound impact on Western culture’s 
theoretical understanding of human rationality and decision-making. For example, a long 
tradition in decision-making theory emerging in the 1960s emphasised means-end reasoning 
based on a cold, rational logic with little regards for emotional input (Fishburn, 1970).  The 
classical treatment of decision-making postulated that people have simple preferences that are 






faced with the decision choice, people are assumed to calculate the choice’s expected utility, 
by estimating and weighing all possible outcome of occurrence, and to decide based on the 
highest expected utility. Furthermore, it is assumed that people have stable preferences and 
make rational choices based on the calculation of probabilities (e.g., Barseghyan, Prince, & 
Teitelbaum, 2013). The idea was based on Von Neumann and Morgenstern’s (1944) expected 
utility (EU) theory which proposed that people act rationally by endeavouring to maximise 
their EU.  
According to the EU optimisation paradigm, people's preferences during decision-making 
should be stable, linear and not affected by circumstantial inconsistencies because the overall 
aim is to maximise subjective utility. However, people’s decisions can be affected by nuances 
in the decision context, whereby people’s preferences happen to be constructed in a non-linear 
manner (e.g., Slovic, 1995). Furthermore, EU theory’s suggestion that emotions, triggered by 
the decision-making situations, are epiphenomenal and detrimental for the decision-making 
(e.g., Lopes, 1995) is refuted by evidence where emotions can be beneficial for learning and 
decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997). For instance, the affective input may improve 
decision-making strategies while suppression of the emotions can hinder it (Pham, 2007). 
Additionally, emotional experience may assist reasoning by redirecting cognitive processing 
towards prioritised concerns during decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al., 1997). This 
important suggestion indicates that emotional arousal can be beneficial for decision-making 
when integral to the task. Moreover, emotional responses may represent a good assessment tool 
of decisional choices because they are faster than cognitive evaluation of the decision-making 
choices and they provide information that may enhance the perception of wrong or correct 
decisional choice (Bargh, 1984; Todd & Gigerenzer, 2000).   
Recently, the relationship between emotion and cognition has received extensive attention in 
the field of decision-making and it has been argued that emotion can guide higher cognitive 
processes and successful decision-making (e.g., Damasio, 1994; Dolan, 2002; Thagard, 2006). 
An influential account of the relationship between emotion and cognition is advanced by the 
SMH (e.g., Damasio, 1994). This theory still provokes debate among cognitive scientists. For 
instance, a specific point in question is related to the emotional influence on decision-making 
and whether somatic markers may guide successful decision-making on the primary. This point 
further raises a question of whether the somatic markers are acquired and guide decision-
making implicitly or explicitly. These issues are explored in next subsections and the basic 






1.2. Development of the SMH   
Damasio (1994) developed the SMH arguing that emotional processes play a central role in 
risky decision-making. SMH postulates that decisions are guided by subjective ‘gut feelings’ 
(e.g., bodily representations) of the inherent ‘goodness’ or ‘badness’ of future choices. These 
somatic markers, direct individuals towards alternatives that have been previously positive or 
guide them away from those that were previously negative options. This occurs particularly in 
uncertain conditions; response options are marked with an emotional signal, ‘which may be 
consciously perceived as good or bad options, or processed unconsciously’ (Bechara & 
Damasio 2005, p. 343). According to this view, the emotion-based intuitive system (EBI), helps 
bias the options and plans for action. The EBI system incorporates emotion as an index of 
embodied changes in  brain state whereby a somatic marker reflects activities of the body 
proper (the ‘body’ loop) or activities in the body based on the brain state signals (the ‘as-if 
body loop’) (Bechara & Damasio 2005; Dunn et al.,  2006). The brain state signals operate 
covertly (an individual is not aware of bodily changes associated with a particular choice) or 
overtly (an individual is consciously aware of the bodily change associated with a particular 
choice). According to SMH, the brain constructs a model of behaviour based on individuals’ 
experiences that can automatically respond to a decision-making challenge without the 
cognitive appraisal of the decision choice. Thus, in uncertain cognition, where cost-benefit 
analysis is not possible, somatic markers can ‘predict’ a good decisional choice based on prior 
subjective ‘gut feelings’ about the ‘goodness’ or the ‘badness’ of a choice.  
Evidence for the SMH hinges on three main assumptions which will be briefly specified then 
examined in the subsequent sections. The first assumption comes from a suggestion that 
somatic markers bias decision-making covertly, in the absence of the awareness of deck 
contingencies. This cognitive impenetrability is central to the claim that IGT can only be 
completed through learning via somatic marker signals because participants learn how to 
discriminate choices by developing a feeling that certain choices are better than others (Bechara 
et al., 2000).  The empirical claims for this proposition are based on evidence that learning deck 
contingences involves covertly acquired somatic-biasing signals that precede explicit insight 
on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 2000). Bechara et al. (1997) claimed that participants 
could develop aSCRs before they can express conscious knowledge regarding deck 
contingences. This claim assumes that a type of implicit learning precedes conscious 






evidence indicated that participants are not fully aware of the deck contingences and that 
somatic markers contribute to the development of cognitive processes (e.g., Bechara, Damasio, 
Tranel & Anderson, 1998; Bechara, Damasio & Damasio, 2000a; Bechara & Martin, 2004). 
This is however disputed with recent evidence showing the involvement of conscious 
awareness early in IGT indicating that cognitive processes rather than somatic markers could 
guide optimal IGT performance (e.g., Fernie & Tunney 2006; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Maia & 
McClelland, 2004).  
The second assumption comes from a suggestion that there is a limited role for cognitive 
proceses and working memory (WM) during IGT performance (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000a). 
Bechara et al. argued that IGT performance is relatively independent of WM. This notion is 
based on evidence from patients with lesions to ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMpfc), 
whereby despite the intact WM and general intellectual abilities they performed poorly on IGT 
because they were not able to express emotion and experience feelings (Bechara et al., 1994, 
1997, 1999, 2000). This led to a speculation that these changes in VMpfc patients’ inability to 
experience emotion were the cause of decision-making problems (e.g., Damasio, 1994; 
Bechara et al., 2000). However, several studies with healthy participants have shown that there 
is a role for WM during IGT performance and WM processes could contribute to the 
development of emotion-based signals (e.g., Hinson et al., 2002; Jameson et al., 2004).   
The final assumption is based on evidence that once it is acquired, implicit knowledge informs 
somatic markers (as evidenced by aSCR) that guide future decision-making choices by 
anticipating options (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994; Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 2000).  
Hence, somatic markers guide decision-choices away from the bad options as participants are 
able to anticipate the good and the bad options. This assumption was based on the interpretation 
of the evidence related to the behaviour of healthy controls and VMpfc patients during IGT 
performance (Bechara et al., 1997; Bechara et al., 1999). Bechara et al. showed that healthy 
participants’ aSCRs differentiate between the good and bad decks during IGT performance; 
this was absent in VMpfc patients. This was taken as evidence that aSCRs changes relate to 
expectancies about reward/punishments before a deck has been selected and guide successful 
learning and IGT performance.   
Before further discussing the SMH assumptions it is necessary to give a short account of the  
key paradigm to investigate the SMH, the IGT (Bechara et al., 1994). In the IGT, participants 






notional rewards and punishments. The overall aim of the task is to make as much notional 
money as possible over the course of the task. Participants are free to select different options 
as often as they wish and in any order. Advantageous, ‘good’, decks (C and D) offer moderate 
rewards and small punishments whereas disadvantageous, ‘bad’, decks (A and B) offer larger 
rewards but substantial penalties, which result in an overall loss. Each card selection from deck 
A or B gives a large reward ($100), whereas selections from deck C or D give small rewards 
($50). However, the penalties in A and B are also larger, meaning the cumulative losses surpass 
cumulative gain, such that after ten cards selection the cumulative loss is on average $250.  
Conversely, selection of C and D will lead to a cumulative gain of $250 over ten cards (Table 
1.2.1.).  In addition to these varying rewards across the good/bad decks, the probability of loss 
varies across the good and bad decks. In a ten-card selection sequence from deck A, the 
negative expected value is distributed over 5 cards (0.5 loss probability; punishment range 
$150-$350), whereas in deck B there is only one loss of $1250 in ten cards selection (0.1 loss 
probability). Similarly, the losses on decks C and D mirror the losses on A and B with the 
reduced magnitude (deck C; 0.5 loss probability; punishment range $25-$75 deck D; 0.1 loss 
probability; punishment $200). There is some evidence that because of the different gain-loss 
probability distribution, participants’ choices can be governed by gain-loss frequencies and not 
the long-term outcome of the game (e.g., Chiu & Lin, 2007; Lin, Song, Chen, Lee, & Chiu, 
2013). This is however, disputed with evidence showing that the long-term outcome remains 
the primary governing factor for participants’ decisions (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994, 2000, 
2000a). Thus, based on Bechara et al.’s (1994, 1997, 2000) findings that participant’s decision-
making is less influenced by the gain-loss frequency than the long-term outcome, the positive 
final outcomes (C+D) – (A+B)) are thought to be the primary guiding factor during IGT for 
the healthy participants. 
Table 1.2.1  
 
Payoff scheme of the Iowa Gambling Task 
 Deck A Deck B Deck C Deck D 
     
Gain per Card  $100 $100 $50 $50 
Loss per 10 Cards $1250 $1250 $250 $250 
Gain per 10 Cards $1000 $1000 $500 $500 
Outcome per 10 Cards -$250 -$250 +$250 +$250 






The following sections specifically discuss the first two assumptions while the third assumption 
is discussed in chapter 2.  In particular, evidence in support of these assumptions is considered 
and discussed. The first subsection discusses the first assumption related to the covert bias 
influence of somatic markers that guides successful IGT performance in the absences of 
conscious awareness. The second subsection discusses the second assumptions and evidence 
related to the WM involvement in IGT performance. At the end of this chapter an alternative 
theoretical framework is proposed as a possible approach to deconstructing decision-making 
processes involved in IGT (dual-process framework; Brevers et al., 2013; Stanovich, 2009) and 
the final objectives and aims of this thesis are established.  
1.2.1. The Covert Bias of Somatic Markers  
Bechara et al. (1994) made specific claims implicating covert somatic markers generation in 
successful IGT performance. The ‘cognitive impenetrability’ of the IGT claim, is associated 
with a suggestion that emotion-based learning, via somatic marker signal, guides successful 
decisional choice early in the game (Bechara et al., 1994). Thus, in healthy people covert, 
unconscious biases guide conscious reasoning and decision-making; and emotion-based 
learning is sufficient to guide decision-making behaviour in the absence of conscious 
knowledge and cognitive processing (Dunn et al., 2006). A major concern for these claims is 
which trial of the task participants adopt an advantageous strategy and whether this knowledge 
is guided by unconscious signals or congitive procesing. For example, Simonovic et al. (2016, 
2017) suggest that the learning phase includes the first 20-30 trials; Schiebener et al. (2011) 
suggest it includes the first 40 trials; Bechara et al., (1997) suggest 50 trials, whereas Preston, 
Buchanan, Stansfield, & Bechara (2007) argue for 60 trials.  
In an empirical test of these claims, Bechara et al. (1997, 2000) suggested that healthy 
participants learn to adopt an advantageous strategy (to pick from the good and to avoid the 
bad decks) before they can consciously express the knowledge about the goodness or badness 
of their choices early in the game. They describe participants undergoing three specific periods 
during IGT performance such as a ‘pre-hunch’ period (punishment not encountered, and the 
knowledge is incomplete); a ‘hunch’ period (some punishments encountered, and the 
knowledge is emerging); and a ‘full conceptual knowledge’ (punishments encountered several 
times and the conscious awareness is complete). The healthy participants entered the “hunch” 
period after trial 50, (although the range was between trials 30 and 80) and the “conceptual” 






studies is that a difference in aSCRs precedes participants’ capacity to explicitly express 
knowledge about the IGT.  This is later supported by Tranel, Bechara and Damasio (1999) and 
Peters and Slovic (2000) who proposed that unconscious biases play a central role in decision-
making and that conscious knowledge is sometimes not enough to guide decision-making in 
uncertain conditions. Peters and Slovic (2000) developed an alternative task based on IGT. In 
this task, two decks have higher gains (B, D) and two higher losses (A, C) but decks A and B 
have a negative expected value, whereas, decks C and D have a positive expected value. They 
found that loss probability affects learning and that knowledge about the task is not complete. 
However, conscious knowledge was not assessed in this study, thus their results only provide 
limited support for the SMH. Nevertheless, their result suggests that affective processing can 
provide some contribution to IGT performance.  
The proposal that unconscious biases guide decision-making in the absence of conscious 
knowledge has been criticised on the basis of shortcomings in the questions that Bechara et al. 
(1997) used to assess conscious awareness. Bechara et al. (1997) interrupted participants after 
the first twenty trials and then after every subsequent ten trials and asked them: ‘Tell me all 
you know about what is going in the game’ and ‘Tell me how you feel about the game’ 
(p.1293). Their analysis revealed that the participants went through three periods before they 
could consciously express the knowledge of the game and reach ‘conceptual’ period. The key 
finding was that in ‘pre-hunch’ period participants developed somatic markers (as manifested 
by aSCRs) for advantageous decks that were maintained until the end of the game, indicating 
that implicit knowledge precedes conscious understanding. Maia and McClelland (2004) have 
challenged this assumption demonstrating that Bechara et al.’s (1997) aSCRs results were not 
statistically significant and claimed that conscious knowledge occurs earlier than Bechara et 
al. (1997) suggested.  
Analysis by Maia and McClelland (2004) indicated that somatic markers could be generated 
by conscious knowledge of the deck's payoffs and showed that awareness of the advantageous 
and disadvantageous deck picks develops early (after only 20 trials). This meant that conscious 
knowledge guided participants’ selection choice and they were aware of the selection 
consequences. Other studies have supported Maia and McClelland (2004) (e.g., Bowman, 
Evans, & Turnbull, 2005; Cella, Dymond, Cooper, & Turnbull 2007; Evans, Bowman, & 
Turnbull, 2005; Fernie & Tunney, 2006, 2013); however, their results were disputed by 
Bechara, Damasio, Tranel and Damasio (2005a). Bechara et al. (2005a) noted that in Maia and 






despite claiming explicit knowledge.  They further noted that Maia and McClelland had not 
recorded SCRs and the possibility that both unconscious and conscious knowledge is acquired 
in the IGT could not be ruled out. Therefore, somatic markers provide a plausible explanation 
as to why learning continues until the advantageous strategy is developed. Nevertheless, the 
evidence suggests that conscious knowledge emerges early in the task and aSCRs sometimes 
do not precede the development of the conscious knowledge which challenges the basic 
assumption of the SMH (e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Evans et al., 2005; Fernie & Tunney, 2006, 
2013).   
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) explanation provides a parsimonious account that in an 
environment of uncertainty participants need to balance exploration and exploitation trade-offs. 
Thus, selecting from the disadvantageous decks facilitates learning through the exploration of 
the alternative choices. However, the tipping point in exploration needs to be reached for a shift 
in choices that will lead to optimal exploitation of the advantageous decks. This raises the 
possibility that somatic marker reflects emotional responses that are elicited by conscious 
knowledge in the exploration phase; assuming the possibility that knowledge emerges during 
the period of exploration and that the period of exploitation is related to performance. This 
suggestion offers a plausible explanation of decision-making, whereby in any decision-making 
environment, in which there is uncertainty, a good balance between the exploration and 
exploitation is needed for an optimal decision-making performance (Maia & McClelland, 
2005). Therefore, given that learning develops through exploration it is not surprising that 
participants continue to select from disadvantageous decks until they reach a point at which 
they have gathered enough information.  
Persaud, McLeod and Cowey (2007) indicated that Maia and McClelland’s (2004) assessment 
method might be intrusive because the nature of the questionnaire may alter participants’ 
awareness of the nature of the task. They also pointed out that there is difficulty when 
interpreting verbal reports suggesting that Maia and McClelland’s test should only include a 
nonverbal method for assessing awareness. To address this issue Persaud et al. (2007) asked 
the participants to make a wager of £10 or £20 after each deck selection. The reward and 
punishment schedule of each deck was modified to accommodate wagering option. They had 
three groups of participants wagering where the second and the third group had to provide 
verbal assessments (Bechara et al., 1997; Maia & McClelland, 2004) respectively. They 
reported that all three groups performed similarly, however only the third group showed an 






methods can affect explicit knowledge during IGT performance which raises a possibility that 
awareness tests may provide clues that make participants aware of the task. Nevertheless, even 
if a question remains about the suitability of different awareness tests, there is little convincing 
evidence in support of the claim that IGT performance is dissociable from conscious 
awareness.  
Taken together the evidence presented in this section indicates that, although it is plausible that 
implicit learning informs somatic markers that guide optimal decision choices, the somatic 
marker may represent an effect rather than a cause of explicit knowledge. For instance, 
Gutbraud et al. (2006) reported aSCRs discrimination between the advantageous and the 
disadvantageous deck picks at about trial 80, even though the participants favoured the 
advantageous deck picks after trial 40. Indeed, this is similar to Bechara et al.’s (1997) study 
where it was found that aSCRs were not significant during the hunch period. Nevertheless, 
Bechara et al. (2005) challenged this suggestion and argued that unconscious biasing signals 
can be triggered simultaneously, where the stronger signal emerges to consequently bias 
decision-making. This suggestion is not in line with presented evidence showing that 
participants acquire conscious knowledge early in the IGT and the interpretation that somatic 
markers covertly influence decision-making needs to be reconsidered. However, it is in line 
with the proposition that conscious knowledge guides successful decision-making in the 
absence of somatic markers (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2013). This is also in line with a number 
of studies that have implicated higher cognitive processes with optimal IGT performance (e.g., 
Hinson et al., 2002; Jameson et al., 2004; Simonovic et al., 2016, 2017). Some of this evidence 
is described in the next section and cognitive processing is specifically tested in the second and 
the third study of this thesis (Chapters 4 and 5).   
1.2.2. The Assumption of WM 
The assumption that performance on the IGT involves conscious awareness early in the game 
raises the possibility that explicit learning may play a more prominent role in knowledge 
acquisition on IGT. Optimal performance on IGT requires participants’ awareness and 
calculation of the long-term outcomes of the available alternatives.  Some studies have 
investigated the possibility of WM involvement during decision-making on IGT and showed 
that WM processes contribute to the development of somatic markers and optimal IGT 
performance (e.g., Hinson et al., 2002; Jameson et al., 2004). This is contrary to the original 






between decision-making and WM. However, it is debatable if these findings are problematic 
for SMH since one of the functions of somatic markers is to signal the badness and goodness 
of the deck choices, whereby attentional processing and WM resources are then needed for 
further evaluation (e.g., Damasio, 1994).    
To test WM involvement on IGT Bechara et al. (1998) used 2s delayed responses  and delayed 
nonmatching to sample task (DNMS) in three groups of participants (healthy control; VMpfc 
patients; and patients with lesions to dorsolateral/high mesial prefrontal cortices, DLpfc). The 
delayed responses condition involved seeing four cards that appeared on the computer screen 
for two seconds. Two of the cards were face up and two of the cards were face down. The 
participants were asked to select two matching cards after paying attention to the cards for two 
seconds. The DNMS task was similar to the delayed responses task, except that only one card 
appeared initially for two seconds.  The VMpfc patients group was separated according to more 
anterior or posteriors lesions respectively, where only the posterior lesion group displayed 
impairment on the DNMS WM task. The posterior lesion group also showed sub-optimal 
performance on IGT. The DLpfc patients were not impaired on the IGT, and only the patients 
with right hemisphere lesions were impaired on the WM test. Bechara et al. (1998) concluded 
that the VMpfc has special importance in emotion-based learning and decision-making and is 
dissociative from the WM specific roles. Similar results were obtained in individuals with 
substance addiction (Bechara & Martin, 2004). Bechara and Martin tested healthy participants 
and participants with substance addiction on IGT and DNMS WM task.  Their results showed 
a similar asymmetric dependence between the decision-making and WM, where the poor 
performance of the participants with substance addiction was related to the deficit in the WM 
executive processes. However, even though DNMS task was not a significant factor some of 
the executive processes were implicated (e.g., response inhibition) suggesting that some 
aspects of WM are involved in the IGT.  
Hinson et al. (2002) investigated the relationship between the WM load and somatic markers 
in IGT. They used secondary tasks, in the form of digit load and random number generation to 
load WM during the IGT. Their results indicated that retaining the order of a string of digits 
loaded WM and impaired IGT performance on a modified version, relative to the no WM 
condition.  This version had three choices where one choice was the best, one was intermediate, 
and one was bad. The probability nature of gains and losses were retained based on the original 
task. The WM load in these studies not only inhibited IGT performance but also interfered with 






study, Jameson et al.  (2004) replicated their findings and suggested that WM load disrupts 
central executive processes. These studies have been criticised because they did not use the 
original IGT and the possibility that learning occurred through the cognitive mechanism 
because of the nature of the task cannot be generally agreed upon. However, WM involvement 
on IGT is somewhat problematic for the SMH because it appears to be an important explanatory 
mechanism for hypersensitivity to reward and punishment (Bechara et al, 1999; Bechara, 
Dolan, & Hindes, 2002; Bechara & Damasio, 2002).  In some respects, the involvement of WM 
mechanisms for non-optimal performance on the IGT reflects the complexity of the system that 
must deal with real-life decisions. Furthermore, if knowledge is required for beneficial 
performance on IGT then WM must also be involved (e.g., Patterson, Ungerleider, & 
Bandettini, 2002) because of the activation of the same brain network.    
The involvement of central WM and executive processes is also suggested by Turnbull, Berry 
and Bowman’s (2003) study. Turnbull et al. (2003) developed the Firefighters Task (FT) as a 
descriptive analogue of the IGT. The participants are asked to evaluate the performance of four 
firefighters, whose behaviour lead to good, bad or neutral outcomes, by evaluating their daily 
logbook entries. The logbook entries are analogues to rewards and punishments in IGT because 
they contain examples of good and bad behaviour. An example of a good logbook entry would 
be ‘This morning, I removed an unconscious man from his smoke-filled kitchen and carried 
him to a waiting ambulance, where he regained consciousness’. In contrast, a bad logbook entry 
would be ‘I’ve been incredibly careless. I carried a boy down the long ladder, but he slipped 
and fell to his death. I must have failed to clip him to my harness’. The participants were told 
that they must assess the quality of the performance of four trainee firefighters. The rating 
values were based on a good/bad valence value on a scale from +3 to -6 that equates to the net 
win or loss on every deck in IGT.  The main difference from the original IGT is that participants 
experience punishments and rewards indirectly. Hence the participants would not be able to 
rely on, or develop somatic markers and must perform the task presumably through the explicit 
awareness by using episodic memory.  Participants on the FT showed no learning effect as 
opposed to the participants performing IGT. Turnbull et al. (2003) argued that this may be 
because the FT is more impersonal and no emotion-based learning occurred to aid decision-
making. However, since no actual physiological measurements were taken the interpretation 
of the study results is difficult. Furthermore, it could be argued that a memory load in the FT 






Conversely, Turnbull, Evans, Bunce, Carzolio and O’Connor (2005) suggest IGT performance 
is relatively independent of WM. Turnbull et al. (2005) tested three group of participants on 
standard IGT. In the first group, random number generation was used to load executive 
processes; in the second group, they used a non-executive articulatory suppression task; and 
the last group had no secondary task. A key finding from the study showed that learning rate 
between the groups was not significantly different. This result indicated that IGT performance 
is not dependent on WM, but rather emotion-based learning processes. Furthermore, these 
authors also indicated that emotion-based signals have much in common with the processes 
associated with intuition and implicit learning. However, this suggestion is debatable because 
it was not tested directly in this study and there was a tendency for best performance in the no 
secondary task condition which might undermine this interpretation. Nevertheless, they raised 
an interesting point that cognitive load created by the traditional executive task (e.g., number 
generator) do not overlap with the emotion-based learning which raises the possibility that 
different parts of the executive function (EF) may have a different impact on IGT performance.  
Indeed, there is evidence that different parts of the executive processes may account for optimal 
performance on IGT, depending on the trial Blocks (e.g., Brand et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2007; 
Brand, Heinze, Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2008; Brand, Laier, Pawlikowski & Markowitsch, 
2009; Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, & Brand 2011). For example, the Game of Dice task 
(GDT; Brand et al., 2005) was used to tap both executive functioning and feedback learning 
on IGT (Brand et al., 2005, 2008). Similarly, the Probability-Associated Gambling task (PAG; 
Sinz, Zamarian, Benke, Wenning, & Delazer, 2008) was used to assess probability-based 
decision-making and IGT performance (e.g., Schiebener et al., 2011). Both tasks are assumed 
to measure decision-making under risk conditions. Schiebener et al. (2011) used both, GDT 
and PAG task and examined IGT performance. The GDT is a decision-making task where 
participants gamble in 18 trials to decide amongst the 14 alternatives with different winning 
probabilities. The GDT has been found to highly correlate with executive processes such as 
categorization, cognitive flexibility and rule recognition (e.g., Brand et al., 2008, 2009). In the 
PAG task, participants need to decide between gambling on a lottery or taking a safe gain. The 
decision to gamble or not lies on the winning probability shown in each trial. Performance on 
the task depends on the categorization and probability-based decision-making (e.g., Sinz et al., 
2008; Zamarian, Sinz, Bonatti, Gamboz, & Delazer, 2008). Both tasks are assumed to measure 
decision-making under explicit risk conditions where the probabilities are known (Brand et al., 






the IGT and suggested that implicit learning from feedback and propensity to make good, 
probability-based choices have a rather small effect on decision-making under explicit risk. 
They further indicated that the IGT involved learning the probabilities of gains and losses rather 
than requiring trade-offs of short-term versus long-term outcomes. They concluded that 
learning from feedback may involve implicit and intuitive processes.  
This claim cannot be fully dismissed until it is determined when implicit/explicit knowledge 
emerges. For example, some theorists argue that higher cognitive processes are implicated later 
in the game when participants learn the rules of the IGT (e.g., Bechara et al., 2005; Brand, 
Labudda, & Markowitsch, 2006; Brand et al., 2007). They further argued IGT is a complex 
task that involves decision-making under ambiguity where the outcomes are unknown (the first 
60 trials) and decision-making under risk (the last 40 trials) (e.g., Brand et al., 2007). The 
proposed distinction is usually examined with the tasks that provide explicit information about 
the probabilities (e.g., GDT; PAG) that correlate with IGT performance only in the later trials 
and not the early trials (e.g., Brand et al., 2006, 2007). Thus, it is assumed that the learning 
process shifts from decision-making under ambiguity to decision-making under risk. It is also 
likely that this switch is gradual and subject to individual differences (Bechara et al., 2005). 
However, it is also possible that this switch is observed as a function of the type of measures 
used to probe the learning effect. For example, Simonovic et al., (2016) used a measure of 
cognitive reflection (the original CRT; Frederick, 2005) and found significant correlations 
between the analytic thinking and IGT performance in early Blocks (Block 2) which are 
considered to be involved in decision-making under ambiguity. Thus, this is in contrast with a 
proposition that somatic markers inform explicit knowledge and instead suggest that higher 
cognitive processes are needed to disambiguate the deck's contingences. This assumption is 
tested in all the studies of this thesis (Chapters 3, 4 and 5).  
The IGT depends on multiple processes such as learning and evaluation of long-term and short-
term contingencies and deciding between alternative courses of action. The first two 
assumptions of the SMH postulates that people interact with the environment during decision-
making and make alternative choices based on previously learned experience, relatively 
independent of WM and conscious awareness influence. However, emerging evidence 
indicates that such decision-making processes are consciously governed processes implicating 
higher cognitive processes in learning IGT (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Simonovic et al., 
2016, 2017). This is line with research that emphasises the importance of integration of 






deficit in a clinical population (e.g., Cella, Dymond, Cooper & Turnbull, 2012; Fridberg et al., 
2010). Some authors also argued that the explicit knowledge (emotion-mediated) may 
represent a poorly formed ‘hunch’ or a ‘gut feeling’ that is laden with somatic markers and 
subserves the phenomenon that has been long described as intuition (Turnbull, Bowman, 
Shanker, & Davies, 2014, p.3). This intuitive process is described in dual-process theories of 
decision-making as fast and spontaneous ‘gut feeling’ that arises without conscious awareness 
(e.g., Kahneman, 2003). The next section discusses dual-process account of decision-making 
as an alternative framework that could be used to investigate decision-making on IGT.  
1.3. Dual-Process Theories  
Dual-process models assume that when reasoning and decision-making, people rely on either 
intuitive (autonomous, unconscious, implicit Type I processes,) or deliberate (explicit, 
conscious, Type II processes), or a combination of both processes (e.g., Evans, 2008; Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). This conceptualisation can potentially provide a better explanation of IGT 
performance than the SMH because of the suggested complex cognition/emotion interplay 
during the task (e.g., Brevers et al., 2013; Turnbull et al., 2014). Type II processes include 
controlled, reflective evaluation of decision-making choices, whereas Type I processes operate 
automatically, outside the conscious awareness. Most of the Type I processes are instigated 
promptly and their appropriateness is related to peoples’ relevant experience (e.g., Evans, 
2008). If, however, the prompted answers are inappropriate and fail to meet the choices set 
when the decision matters, an intervention with reflective, Type II processes is warranted 
(Stanovich, 2004). Stanovich (2009) suggested the tripartite model of processing (Figure 1.3.1) 
making a clear distinction between the types and the modes of processing. Modes of processing 
represent different cognitive styles (thinking disposition) encompassed by Type II processing, 
while type I processing depend on the environment, previous experience and available 
information. This classification is pertinent for SMH, because of the suggestion that 
automatically evoked somatic markers captures decision-making processes akin to Type I 























Figure 1.3.1.  The locus of continuous individual differences in Stanovich’s tripartite model of the mind 
(Stanovich, 2009, p. 58) 
Stanovich (2009) argued that Type I processes encompass a set of systems in the brain that 
operates autonomously in response to prompting cues. The Autonomous Set of Systems 
(TASS) automatically triggers, unconscious responses that do not require the analytic system 
(algorithmic mind). However, the final output of TASS may involve the Type II, reflective 
processing. Hence, instead of looking at the two types of processing as separate systems this 
module postulates that between the two processes there are certain hierarchies of control. TASS 
processes are triggered automatically and include processes of affective arousal, associative 
leaning, implicit and instrumental learning and information integration (Toplak, Liu, 
Macpherson, Toneatto, & Stanovich, 2007). In contrast, Type II processes incorporate the 
algorithmic and reflective processing and have a defining feature of cognitive decoupling 
(Stanovich, 2009). Override of the TASS involves interruption of TASS response tendencies 
and may depend on higher cognitive processes (e.g., Hasher, Lustig & Zacks, 2007; Aron, 
2008). However, the generation of alternative responses is also needed through hypothetical 
reasoning and cognitive stimulation that may play an important role in the creation of an 
alternative, better responses (e.g., Evans, 2010). The key function of the algorithmic level of 
This figure is removed for copyright reasons Please see the original paper 
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processing is to maintain decoupling among different alternative choices and exhibit 
supervision of TASS responses when/if needed. On the other hand, a reflective level of 
processing is involved in the generation of the alternative responses and is captured through 
thinking disposition and individual differences.   
Recently, a dual process account of self-regulation has been proposed as an explanation for 
IGT performance albeit related to addictive disorders such as gambling and alcohol dependence 
(e.g., Giancola, Godlaski, & Roth, 2012; Brevers et al., 2012; Brevers et al., 2013). Brevers et 
al. (2013) argued that optimal decision-making activates two neural systems: an impulsive 
system that is consistent with automatic behaviour activation, and a reflective system that is 
consistent with inhibitory functions. The reflective system incorporates EFs and is under 
conscious control. The action of the reflective system depends on a ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ elements 
of the EFs (Brevers et al., 2013). The ‘cool’ system is further described as a process involved 
in abstract thinking, reasoning and monitoring of behavioural choices and may exert inhibitory 
control over the ‘hot’ system. The ‘hot’ system is laden with affective tags or ‘gut feelings’ and 
it depends on previous experience (e.g., Giancola et al., 2012). This distinction is, however, 
based on the limited research that relates a drug or a food reinforcer to habitual responding as 
evidenced by studies on animals or self-reported measures in humans (e.g., Dickinson, Wood, 
& Smith, 2002; Giancola et al., 2012; Miles, Everitt, & Dickinson, 2003). For example, 
Giancola et al. (2012) used self-reported measure of Behaviour Rating Inventory of Executive 
Function-Adult version (BRIEF-A; Roth, Isquith, & Gioia, 2005) and tested a group of healthy 
social drinkers on nine scales related to EFs such as Inhibition, Shifting, Emotional Control, 
Self-Monitoring, Initiation, WM, Planning/Organizing, Task Monitoring, and Organization of 
Materials.  They argued that ‘specific EFs to be a key moderator of the alcohol-aggression 
relation’ (p. 7), even though the BRIEF-A is not designed to capture the ‘hot-cold’ systems 
distinction. Furthermore, the ‘hot’ system resembles Type I processes and it is not clear what 
criteria were used to define the ‘hot’ systems in this way. Thus, it is very likely that the ‘hot’ 
and ‘cold’ processes map on the Type I and Type II processes suggested in above mentioned 
dual-process model and that Brevers et al.’s conceptualization needs further clarification.       
Brevers et al. (2013) review reported no association between ‘cool’ executive function and IGT 
performance but suggested a monitoring function of the ‘cool’ system over the ‘hot’ system. 
For example, in a study related to problem gambling, Brevers et al. (2012) reported that 
disadvantageous strategies adopted by problem gamblers may be explained by impaired ‘hot’ 






trails. Conversely, Roca et al. (2008) examined IGT performance and motor response inhibition 
of twelve problem gamblers. They used a GO/NO-GO task as a measure of inhibitory impulses 
and reported the importance of ‘cool’ reflective processes in the inhibition of disadvantageous 
choices in early trials. Thus, the deficit in cognitive reflective processes may be in part 
responsible for the impairment of IGT performance. This is in line with Kertzman et al.’s 
(2011) study that reported similar results. In addition to a GO/NO-GO task, Kertzman et al. 
(2011) used a Stroop test and tested problem gamblers in the early and late trails. They 
suggested impaired inhibition may be a result of WM and cognitive flexibility deficit. Whilst 
problem gamblers showed impairment after the first two trials and failed to shift to 
advantageous decisions, the performance of the healthy control improved after the second 
Block onwards that was correlated to the inhibitory mechanisms.  This indicates that ‘cool’ 
reflective processing may be at play early in the game which challenges SMH assumption that 
the IGT performance is not related to cognitive processes. Furthermore, Brevers et al. do not 
assume any roles for somatic markers in their conceptualisation but nevertheless suggest a 
conflict between the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ systems one presumably mediated by affective emotional, 
processes and the other by cognitive, reflective processes. This is somewhat debatable since 
they do not provide specific evidence for the existence of the ‘hot’ system. An alternative 
account would be that the affective components of this system fit within the Type I processes, 
whereby a potential conflict between the Type I and Type II processes creates emotional 
arousal.   
Indeed, evidence from reasoning literature indicates that the conflict between the two types of 
processes can be psychophysiologicaly arousing (e.g., Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2005; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008; De Neys, Moyens, & Vansteenwegen, 2010). The important 
question for the decision-making theory that the dual-process theories dichotomy underline is 
whether learned experiences from intuitive impressions of the world can be organised and 
logically assessed and whether encoding of the information through Type I processes lead to a 
change in people’s behaviour and influence expressible knowledge (Osman, 2004). More 
importantly, if there is a conflict between the two processes during decision-making, how do 
people resolve it, and are they aware of such conflict? Examples of reasoning, judgment and 
conflict detection research find that people often provide contradictory responses, one 
presumably mediated by emotional, intuitive processes and the other by cognitive, reflective 
processes (e.g., Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008). 






heuristics responses and contributed to the prevalent beliefs that logic and cognitive evaluation 
play a major role in reasoning. De Neys further proposes that people have intuitive ‘gut’ 
feelings and hold implicit knowledge, related to logic and probabilistic reasoning. Simply put, 
people possess logical intuition, whereby the intuitive system prompts a logical response. This 
is supported by recent evidence that sensitivity to violations during logical and reasoning tasks 
(Stupple & Ball, 2008; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) are accompanied by a strong autonomic 
response that signal erroneous intuitive responses is not logically affirmed (e.g., Franssens & 
De Neys, 2009; De Neys et al., 2010). This relatively new suggestion amplifies intuitive 
processes and suggests that the conflict between the two types of processes creates arousal, 
manifested through subjective ‘gut feeling’ that something is not right, and signals that the 
Type I responses are not fully warranted.  
The important aspect of De Neys’s suggestion is the acknowledgement that emotional/intuitive 
‘gut’ feeling, implicitly acquired, guides successful conflict resolution between the two 
processes by creating an affective biasing signal. This idea is similar to SMH and may resolve 
some of the issues identified within the SMH theory. For example, the dual-process framework 
may integrate certain aspects of the Type I processes (e.g., emotion) with cognitive reasoning, 
whereby intuitive processing captures decision-processes that reflect imprecise somatic marker 
signal that triggers Type II processing (Turnbull et al., 2014). Furthermore, Stanovich’s (2009) 
dual-process framework accounts for the conceptual components of Type II processes related 
to the individual difference in cognition, thinking disposition and/or cognitive styles. 
Individual differences in IGT performance were identified as a very important explanatory 
factor, whereby thinking dispositions and cognitive styles may be more pertinent to IGT 
performance than measures of SCR. Furthermore, impaired performance on the IGT may be 
attributable to different cognitive styles, thinking disposition and cognitive abilities or failure 
of Stanovich’s (2009) TASS processes because they include processes of instrumental and 
affective/implicit learning and emotion regulation. If that is the case then the mixed findings 
regarding higher order processing and IGT performance association may epitomize an artefact 
of different thinking dispositions, cognitive styles (e.g., Harman, 2011) and the individual 
differences in higher cognitive processes (e.g., Jameson et al., 2004).  
Thus, the aim of this thesis was to examine the effect of cognitive processes and somatic 
markers on IGT performance. There were several objectives and this thesis aimed: 






(ii) To test a ‘novel’ methodology (eye-tracking methodology) to record somatic 
markers (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) and to examine cognition/emotion effect on IGT by 
using a measure of cognitive ability not previously used (CRT1; Toplak et al., 2014) 
(Chapters 3, 4 and 5).  
(iii) To examine cognitive processes (attention, cognitive ability and conscious 
awareness; Chapters 4 and 5) and the effect of thinking dispositions and individual 
differences on IGT performance (Chapter 4).  
(iv) To examine the effect of stress on IGT performance and cognitive processing 






















This chapter addresses objective (i) of the Thesis and aimed to examine the final assumption 
of SMH, whereby it is assumed that implicit knowledge informs somatic markers and the 
decision-maker is able to anticipate options (as evidenced by aSCR) that guide successful 
decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 2000a). Thus, participants generate aSCRs 
during the IGT performance when they receive punishment or reward. As they become 
experienced with the deck contingences they generate aSCRs before picking any cards, 
presumably while they are considering from which deck to pick a card (Bechara & Damasio, 
2005). These aSCR signals are more pronounced before making a choice from the 
disadvantageous decks (A + B) when compared to the advantageous decks (C + D). Hence, 
aSCR guide decision-choices away from the bad options associated with disadvantageous 
decks. This assumption is based on the evidence from VMpfc patients who often fail to develop 
aSCRs in reaction to reward or punishments compared to the healthy control (Bechara et al., 
1997). Thus, healthy participants’ aSCRs differentiate between the good and the bad decks 
during IGT performance while this was absent in VMpfc patients. There has been limited 
evidence in support of the key aSCR data on IGT in healthy participants (e.g., Carter & 
Pasqualini, 2004; Guillaume et al., 2009;  Wagar, & Dixon, 2006). Thus, the goal of this chapter 
is to address objective (i) of the thesis and to systematiclly examine the evidence of an aSCRs 
effect on IGT. First, the aSCRs evidence is dicsussed followed by a systematic review with 
two meta-analyses to examine the reliability and the strengths of the evidence presented in 
support of the SMH. The first analysis examined the effect of overall aSCRs on IGT 
performance. The second analysis examined the differences in aSCRs between the 
disadvantageous and advantageous decks.  The quality and reliability of current 
psychophysiological measurements are also discussed. Systematic reviews and meta-analyses 
provide a very useful summary of evidence where the results of several studies are combined 
to provide systematically disciplined approach intended to reduce the potential for bias that 
arises from conflicting or inconclusive results (e.g., Bartolucci & Hillegass, 2010). Since there 
are limited examination and replication of aSCRs findings in healthy participants and studies 
often yield contradictory findings (e.g., Dunn et al., 20006), a systematic review and meta-
analyses may provide a statistical synthesis of the results by means of increasing precision of 






2.1. Introduction  
A substantial strength of the SMH rests on the specification of its neural architecture. Damasio 
(1994) argued that somatic states can be generated from primary and secondary inducers. 
Primary inducers are innate or learned stimuli that induce unpleasant or pleasurable states. 
They usually elicit an automatic response through amygdala. For instance, seeing a snake 
would trigger a critical substrate in the neural system connected to the amygdala and induce an 
obligatory response (fight or flight response). Conversely, secondary inducers of somatic states 
are generated by thoughts and memories recall of a hypothetical state (i.e. a memory of seeing 
a snake). The recalled memory also induces automatic, involuntary responses, but contrary to 
the primary inducers, the responses are generated through a substrate in the neural system 
related to VMpfc (Bechara & Damasio, 2005). The proposed neural systems are 
interconnected, and Damasio (1994) links the VMpfc to several bio-regulatory systems of the 
brain including the basal forebrain, hypothalamus, anterior cingulate and the amygdala. 
Through these links, VMpfc has direct connections to areas responsible for chemical and motor 
responses of the brain (Ongur & Price, 2000).     
Consistent with the SMH neural architecture, evidence from the studies on patients with lesions 
to the VMpfc and bilateral damage to amygdala suggest that an absence of physiological 
activity and the development of somatic markers impairs decision-making (e.g., Bechara et al., 
1994; Bechara, Tranel, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996; Bechara, et al., 1999; Bechara et al., 2000; 
Tranel, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 1996). An absence of emotion-based learning has been 
observed in patients with lesions to the VMpfc while performing the IGT, and it correlated 
with the absence of aSCRs during decision-making (Bechara et al., 1994, 1996). The original 
papers reported that patients with VMpfc damage do not generate aSCRs prior to selecting 
from disadvantageous decks, while healthy control does (Bechara et al., 1994, 1996, 1997). 
This provided support for SMH framework that the absence of somatic markers leads to poor 
learning and consequently performance on IGT. Consistent with these results, amygdala 
patients exhibit a similar behaviour pattern and inability to develop somatic markers for 
disadvantageous options on the IGT (Bechara et al., 1999). Thus, there is support for SMH in 
that the absence of somatic markers (as measured by aSCR) is associated with poor decision-
making. This support mainly comes from clinical studies where patients show none or a very 







For example, Bechara et al. (1999) tested three groups of participants that included healthy 
control (n=13), patients with the damaged amygdala (n=50) and VMpfc patients (n=5). The 
VMpfc patients displayed the same aSCRs deficit responses as amygdala-damaged patients. 
However, aSCRs of the VMpfc patients were delayed compared to amygdala-damaged patients 
indicating that feedback SCR responses (after selecting a card) may occur in the later trials. 
Interestingly, one VMpfc patient performed advantageously, and three healthy participants did 
not choose advantageously indicating that not all of the VMpfc patients show impartment in 
the development of somatic markers and that not all of the healthy participants develop somatic 
markers. In a comparison of early and late trials of aSCRs development, only healthy 
participants showed the constant increase in aSCRs. The problem with this explanation is that 
early and late trials were not defined and statistically examined. Bechara et al. (1999) 
acknowledged this limitation and in a subsequent study (Bechara & Damasio, 2002)  tested a 
substance dependent population, VMpfc patients and healthy control  during the four stages 
analysis of aSCRs that included, the “pre-punishment” (trials 1 – 10), “pre-hunch” (trials 11 – 
20), “hunch” (trials 21 – 60) and “conceptual” (trials 61 – 100). They replicated previous 
findings where for the disadvantageous decks, aSCRs occurs in early trials (Blocks 1 and 2) 
and then stay constant for healthy participants.  However, this result interpretation may be 
questionable because the authors failed to report observations for the advantageous decks. 
Furthermore, a similar increase in aSCRs was observed for the impaired participants. This 
suggests a possibility that a risk-taking behaviour overrides weak somatic-markers, or that 
impaired participants do not respond to the somatic markers in the same way as unimpaired 
participants. Thus, one interpretation indicates a possibility that somatic markers alone are not 
sufficient to explain decision-making performance. It is also possible that aSCRs signals in 
healthy participants reflect the development of learning and understanding of the IGT. 
While most published studies with the clinical population have replicated SMH theoretical 
suggestion that the absence of the somatic markers leads to impaired decision-making; and that 
there is a difference in aSCRs between the disadvantageous and advantageous options, the 
replication with healthy population have often found different results. For example, Crone, 
Somsen, Van Beek and Van Der Molen, (2004) investigated the pattern of aSCRs and heart 
rate variability (HRV) on an analogue of the IGT. In three groups of participants, split between 
the bad, good and moderate behavioural performance, they found an effect of slow HRV and 
high aSCRs on disadvantageous deck selection compared to advantageous decks selection for 






Furthermore, larger HRV and SCRs were observed in post-feedback responses (after the card 
is chosen) related to frequent punishment from disadvantageous decks for the bad group. This 
indicates that a behavioural choice rests on a positively or negatively valanced somatic markers 
where a bad option reflects a negative state that signals avoidance. 
Indeed, Tomb et al. (2002) changed the deck's contingences scheme (advantageous decks had 
a higher magnitude of punishments and rewards than the disadvantageous decks) and 
demonstrated the importance of elevated aSCRs to advantageous deck selection, and thus, both 
positive and negative feedback contribute to subsequent performance. Their data showed that 
somatic markers may serve to record long-term negative and positive consequences of a certain 
choice option. Although impressive, Crone et al. (2004a) and Tomb et al. (2002) studies’ results 
cannot discount the possibility that conscious knowledge precedes or works in parallel with the 
somatic markers. Furthermore, Crone et al. indicated that post-feedback skin conductance 
(fSCR), response may be more important than aSCRs for the reward and punishments 
disambiguation on disadvantageous decks. Moreover, they also reported that the best 
performing group had better conscious knowledge than the poorer performing group.  
Crone et al.’s (2004a) suggestion is similar to Suzuki, Hirota, Takasawa, and Shigemasu’s 
(2003) study  that showed SCR to feedback (fSCR) is more important to IGT performance than 
SCR in anticipation of deck selection during the IGT performance, but less so when 
contingencies have been learned. However, they found no relationship between aSCRs and 
overall performance. In contrast to Suzuki et al. (2003) study, Carter and Pasqualini (2004) 
results related strong anticipatory somatic marker response with optimal decision-making and 
faster learning. No correlation between the fSCR and optimal performance was found. The 
results of these studies indicate that SCRs are associated with optimal performance on IGT, 
however the direction of this association is unclear. This may be problematic for SMH because 
the fSCR emerges following knowledge about rewards (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2013). Hence, 
it could be argued that aSCR changes also reflect the emergence of knowledge or expectancies 
or reward and punishment (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Fernie & Tunney, 2013).    
The timing and the interpretation of psychophysiological data are something that Dunn et al.’s 
(2006) review finds challenging. They argued that although SMH is an elegant account of how 
emotion influences decision-making, it lacks sufficient corroborating evidence. There is 
evidence that anticipatory markers correlate with successful performance on the task (e.g., 






advantageous decks (e.g., Crone et al., 2004; Bechara & Damasio, 2002). However, replication 
of key aSCR findings on the IGT in healthy participants is lacking. Furthermore, even if 
replication is successful, it remains uncertain what these SCRs epitomise. They may be 
indicators of learning (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004), response to feedback (Suzuki et al., 2003), 
or a signal of how bad or good a potential choice is (Crone et al., 2004).   
Hence, despite the wealth of literature utilising the IGT as a clinical tool, the interpretation of 
psychophysiological results and IGT data is complex and not without criticism. Thus, a 
systematic review was conducted to establish whether the effect of aSCRs is genuine and 
consistent. Systematic reviews are very useful for assessing research-based evidence 
performance (e.g., Smith, Cipriani & Geddes, 2016) and to the best of my knowledge this is 
the first systematic review related to aSCR and IGT.  The current review aims to systematically 
examine two hypotheses related to psychophysiological evidence of aSCR and IGT 
performance in healthy individuals. First, that the strength of aSCR correlates with successful 
IGT performance; and second, that there are differences in aSCR for disadvantageous and 
advantageous decks. Finally, the review aims to assess the quality of evidence of aSCR during 
the IGT. 
2.2.  Systematic Review  
2.2.1. Methods  
Search protocol and inclusion/exclusion criteria 
Extensive searches of the following psychology databases were conducted to pinpoint research 
studies for inclusion: PsycARTICLES, PsycINFO, Business Source Premier, CINAHL Plus, 
MEDLINE and Web of Science. The content lists of the following key journals were also 
reviewed: Cognition and Emotion, Cognitive, Affective & Behavioral Science, 
Psychophysiology, International Journal of Psychophysiology, Journal of Psychophysiology 
and Frontiers in Psychology. Additionally, reference lists of included studies were examined 
for additional studies. Key authors were contacted to obtain details of relevant unpublished 
studies in an attempt to address publication bias. Key terms (‘Somatic Marker Hypothesis’, 
‘SMH’, ‘Emotional Based Learning’, ‘EBL’) were combined with terms related to 
psychophysiological measurements (‘Psychophysiological Response’, ‘Skin Conductance 
Response’, ‘SCR’, ‘Skin Resistance’,’ SR’,’ Autonomic Response’,’ Heart rate’,’ HR’,’ Heart 






behavioural task (‘Iowa Gambling Task’,’ IGT’) with a standardised protocol using Boolean 
rules to identify the most  significant literature. Searches were limited to healthy human 
participants.  
Only English language studies that included psychophysiological measurements with IGT 
performance where included. Papers were excluded if they used clinical participants, if they 
did not use psychophysiological measurements or if they modified IGT to such an extent where 
the important properties of the IGT were not maintained (e.g., frequencies of reward and 
punishments on 4 decks). Electronic database searches yielded 3,999 results (IGT), 244 (SMH) 
and 20,046 (psychophysiology measurements). These results were combined generating 84 
study titles that were then filtered through the search process summarized in Figure 2.2.1. 
Forty-three studies were initially included for review. Thirty-three were excluded because: they 
had not included psychophysiological measurements (N=25); had used a clinical sample 
(N=1); had not used the IGT (N=2); had not retained key features of the IGT (N=4), or had 
used a different methodology (N=1). Four studies were identified from the reference lists of 
included studies. In total, 14 studies were included in the review.  
Quality assessment  
Quality criteria were developed to assess the quality of all included studies to account for 
potential biases that could result from combining studies using different methodologies, which 
might lead to a misleading conclusion. Quality criteria were developed based on 
recommendations made by the Cochrane Collaboration (2011) and included: 
psychophysiological measurements used, clarity of measurements taken, psychophysiological 
methodology and procedure used, aSCR measurements taken, IGT methodology followed, 
original IGT used,  description of the study that allows replication, clear aims, appropriate 
analysis used, effect sizes used, information related to participants’ demographics, 
inclusion/exclusion criteria included, outcomes provided and details of timing of measures  A 
score of 0-2 was awarded for each element (0= no details, 1= insufficient details, 2= complete 
































 Figure 2.2.1. CONSORT diagram - Overview of the search process, identification of studies and data extraction  
Data extraction 
Data were extracted using a standardized extraction sheet. A second (DS) and a third reviewer 
(ES) independently reviewed extracted data to ensure accuracy and reliability, with reviewers 
meeting to confirm agreement of extraction and to establish reliability. Where there were 
discrepancies, these were resolved by discussion. Fourteen published research studies were 
included and evaluated. The extraction sheet included: a) identifying information (e.g., type of 
study, source references and research questions); b) inclusion criteria (e.g., healthy, normal 
participants performing IGT while physiological measurements were taken) and exclusion 
24,205 excluded on title not relevant 
for current review 
Studies included in systematic 
review (n=18)  
Initial hits: 3,999 (IGT), 244 (SMH), 
physiological measurements (20,046); 








Book related to emotions (n=1)  
Studies on animals (n=2)  
Participants with head injuries studies (n=3) 
Studies with pathological gamblers (n=3) 
Studies under stress (n=4) 
Neuro imaging studies (n=5) 
Review on emotions and rationality (n=3) 
Clinical population studies (n=20) 
 
 
84 titles included for review of 
abstracts  
43 included studies for full review 
33 excluded: 
Have not utilised psychophysiological measurements (n=25) 
Used only 1 participant with amnesia (n=1) 
Did not use the IGT (n=2) 
Did not retain key features of IGT (n=4) 






criteria (e.g., patient population, evaluation of behavioural tests of awareness, absence of 
physiological measurements and different gambling tasks); c) study details (e.g., type of IGT 
and IGT procedure, number of participants and participants’ details such as age and ethnicity); 
d) physiological measurements (e.g., types and details of measurements); e) results (e.g., 
statistical techniques used, p values and effect sizes); f) comments on the paper (e.g., the 
authors comments, reviewers comments and suitability for inclusion). The aforementioned 
details are discussed in the review and included in the quality assessment of the studies, but 
only the number of the participants and the effects sizes were included in both meta-analyses. 
Data analysis and synthesis  
Hak et al. (2016) suggest the use of a fixed effects model when there is little variance in effect 
sizes between studies whereby, the random effects model automatically converges into a fixed 
effects model. Thus, the fixed effect model was used for both meta analyses because 
heterogeneity was low. The reported studies had similar aims and utilized similar 
psychophysiological measurements; 13 studies measured skin conductance response activity 
(SCR), and one study measured both SCR along with Heart Rate Variability (HRV).  
2.3. Results 
Participants  
The eighteen included studies recruited 440 healthy, normal participants in total. The age of 
participants ranged from 17 years (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004), to 85 years old (Denburg, 
Recknor, Bechara & Tranel, 2006). Three studies did not report the age of participants 
(Guillaume et al., 2009; Visagan, Xiang & Lamar 2012; Wagar, & Dixon, 2006). Four studies 
were conducted in the UK  (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Jenkinson,  
Baker, Edelstyn  & Ellis, 2008; Visagan et al., 2012), three were conducted in the USA 
(Denburg et al., 2006; Hinson, Whitney, Holben & Wirick, 2006; Hinson et al., 2002), one was 
conducted in Germany (Werner, Duschek  & Schandry, 2009), Japan (Suzuki et al., 2003), 
Belgium (Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012), Taiwan (Yen, Chou, Chung & Chen, 2012), France 
(Guillaume et al., 2009), Romania (Miu, Crisan,  Chis,  Ungureanu, Druga  & Vulturar, 2012) 
and Canada (Wagar, & Dixon, 2006). The prevalence of female participants ranged from 30% 
(Suzuki et al., 2003) to 100 % (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004). Two of the studies did not report 
gender (Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Yen et al., 2012). Only six studies included inclusion/exclusion 
criteria for study participation (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Guillaume et al., 2009; Jenkinson et 






 Quality assessment of included studies  
The quality of the studies was good overall (Table 2.3.1). There were procedural and 
methodological differences between studies and no study provided information about statistical 
power to detect effects. Eight studies had insufficient demographic information about their 
participants (Guillaume et al., 2009; Hinson et al., 2006; Hinson et al., 2002; Miu et al., 2012; 
Suzuki et al., 2003; Visagan et al., 2012; Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Yen et al., 2012). Four studies 
did not measure fSCR (Hinson et al., 2006; Hinson et al., 2002; Denburg et al., 2006; Yen et 
al., 2012). Four studies used a standardised protocol for measuring SCR (Fernie & Tunney, 
2013; Werner et al., 2009; Visagan et al., 2012; Denburg et al., 2006).  Eight studies stated they 
ensured IGT protocol and procedures were followed (Jenkinson et al., 2008; Carter & 
Pasqualini, 2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Guillaume et al., 2009; Werner et al., 2009; Visagan 
et al., 2012; Denburg et al., 2006; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Six studies either used a modified 
version of the IGT or did not provide sufficient details of the IGT protocol (Mardaga & 
Hansenne, 2012; Miu et al., 2012; Hinson et al., 2006; Hinson et al., 2002; Suzuki et al., 2003; 
Yen et al., 2012). Only two studies reported effect sizes (Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; Miu et 
al., 2012).  
Table 2.3.1 
Quality assessment of included studies 1. 
Quality criteria          Scores 
Study references 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 
Participant’s 
details                                   
2 2 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 
Inclusion/exclusion 
criteria                      
1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 1 
Original IGT                                                 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 
IGT procedure                                            1 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Psychophysiology 
procedure                   
2 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 2 1 
Exact statistic 
reported                                 
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
                                                          
1 The studies were numbered as follow: (1) Mardaga & Hansenne (2012); (2) Carter & Smith-Pasqualini (2004); 
(3) Fernie & Tunney (2013); (4) Guillaume et al. (2009); (5) Jenkinson et al. (2008); (6) Hinson et al. (2006); (7) 
Hinson et al. (2006a); (8) Hinson et al. (2006b) (9) Hinson et al. (2002); (10) Hinson et al. (2002a) (11) Miu et al. 
(2012); (12) Suzuki et al. (2003); (13) Visagan et al. (2012); (14) Werner et al. (2009); (15) Denburg et al. (2006); 







Effect size                                                     2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Power analysis                                             0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Reliable measure 
of outcome                  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Details of timing of 
measures                  
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
Total score/20                                          15 16 14 15 14 12 12 12 12 12 15 11 16 15 16 14 14 11 
 
Method and Findings 
The studies used similar statistical methods to assess the research questions (e.g., ANOVA, 
ANCOVA and t-test) which were ascertained to be suitable for the study designed. The results 
are summarised in Table 2.3.2. One study used Wilcoxon signed-ranks test (Denburg et al., 
2006). Several studies’ results associated higher aSCRs with picks from disadvantageous decks 
(Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; Guillaume et al., 2009; Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Yen et al., 2012). 
One of the studies reported a borderline association (Jenkinson et al., 2008), one reported no 
association (Denburg et al., 2006) and six studies did not separately report aSCRs results for 
disadvantageous/advantageous decks. Significant interactions were found between aSCR 
amplitude and IGT performance in five studies (Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; Carter & 
Pasqualini, 2004; Guillaume et al., 2009; Miu et al., 2012; Wagar & Dixon, 2006) while one 
study found no interaction (Fernie & Tunney 2013). One study associated aSCRs with picks 
from advantageous decks (Denburg et al., 2006). High fSCRs responses were evident in one 
study after encountering feedback from a punishment/reward sequence (Suzuki et al., 2003). 
Two studies’ results suggested an interdependency between conscious knowledge and the 
appearance of somatic markers (Guillaume et al., 2009; Hinson et al., 2002). However, in 
Hinson et al.’s study, conscious knowledge suppressed the development of somatic markers, 
while in Guillaume et al.’s study performance correlated with both aSCRs and conscious 
knowledge. One study found that aSCR is not necessary to succeed on IGT: in the absence of 
a significant aSCR participants still learnt and selected advantageously (Fernie & Tunney, 
2013). Hinson et al. (2006) showed that pre-experimental emotion-laden words briefly held in 
WM influenced deck choices; participants’ choices were facilitated by the preexisting affective 
state, whereby a positive affective load enhanced the quality of decision- making, and negative 
load reduced the quality.  Finally, one study found no direct relationship between the aSCR 






the aSCR parameters were significantly related to threat-anxiety and emotion regulation, which 
were in turn associated with IGT performance. 
All studies analyzed aSCR amplitude for disadvantageous versus advantageous decks. Ten 
studies analyzed both aSCR and fSCR amplitude for disadvantageous and advantageous decks 
(Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Guillaume et al., 2009; Jenkinson et al., 2008; Visagan et al., 2012; 
Miu et al., 2012; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; Werner et al., 2009; 
Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Suzuki et al., 2003). Three studies analyzed aSCR but not fSCR 
amplitude (Hinson et al., 2006; Hinson et al., 2002; Yen et al., 2012). There were differences 
in timing and quantification of aSCR peak amplitudes. Eight studies defined anticipatory and 
feedback responses within a 5 second window both before and after  deck selection (Wagar & 
Dixon, 2006; Guillaume et al., 2009; Jenkinson et al., 2008; Visagan et al., 2012; Miu et al., 
2012; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Yen et al., 2012; Hinson et al., 2006). Two studies used 5-
second aSCR and 10-second fSCR for quantifying responses (Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; 
Hinson et al., 2002). Three studies defined aSCR and fSCR responses within 1-7 second 
(Werner et al., 2009), 1-9 second (Carter & Pasqualini, 2004) and 10 seconds (Suzuki et al., 
2003) before and after the participants chose a deck. Ten studies quantified aSCR peak as a 
mean response within their proposed time frame and then averaged mean amplitudes across 
100 trials (Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Guillaume et al., 2009; Jenkinson et al., 2008; Miu et al., 
2012; Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Yen et al., 2012; Hinson et al., 2006; Mardaga & Hansenne, 
2012; Werner et al., 2009 Hinson et al., 2002 ). In contrast, three studies calculated the largest 
SCR amplitude or the first SCR peak amplitude and designated the responses as aSCR or fSCR 
(Visagan et al., 2012; Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Suzuki et al., 2003).  
Table 2.3.2  
Characteristics of included studies (N=18) 




Type of IGT Psychophysiological 
measurements  
Outcome  






53. (Mean = 29.7, 
SD = 8.39). 
 Bechara et al. 
(1994). Two 
conditions: fake 
vs. real money. 
Performance and 
beneficial SCR 
interaction (IGT scores 
as DV); SCR and 
learning rate per block. 
Correlation 
between aSCR 
and money won on 





80 healthy, older 
adults, aged 56- 
85. 40 participants 
sampled from the 
previous study 




two different groups.  
Effect of aSCR for 
disadvantageous 
decks in one 
group. *** 
                                                          











males (Mean age 
25.68, SD = 1.22). 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*. 
Knowledge 
probed (Maia & 
McClelland 
2004).   
SCR anticipative 
response amplitude 
(effect of decks); SCR-
awareness interaction. 
No effect of aSCR 
on IGT. Effect of 
knowledge of the 
task contingencies. 





30 participants (11 
male). 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*. 
Knowledge 
probed (Maia & 




interaction (IGT scores 
as DV).  
Effect of aSCR for 
disadvantageous 
deck selection. ** ; 
***  
(5) Hinson et 
al. (2002) 
USA 
Study 2: 45 
students, aged 18-
24.  58% female 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*. Overall 
payoffs are less 
extreme.  
Anticipatory SCR; SCR 










Study 3: 47 
students, aged 18-
24.  58% female 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*. Overall 
payoffs are less 
extreme. 
Anticipatory SCR; SCR 
amplitude as DV. 
 
No effect of aSCR. 
Working memory 
connected to the 
development of 
somatic markers. 
**   
(7) Hinson et 
al. (2006) 
USA 
Study 1: 70 
students, aged 18-
25. 60% female. 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*.  Affective 
reaction 
manipulated. 
SCR and learning rate 
per block. Positive and 
negative (emotionally 
charged) word load was 
used and related to 
learning rate per block.  
 












Study 2: 40 
students, aged 18-
25. 55% female. 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*.  Affective 
reaction 
manipulated. 
SCR and learning rate 
per block. Positive and 
negative (emotionally 
charged) word load was 
used and related to 
learning rate per block.  
 
Effect of aSCRs 
for advantageous 
decks. ** 




Study 3: 70 
students, aged 18-
25. 60% female. 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*.  Affective 
reaction 
manipulated. 
SCR and learning rate 
per block. Positive and 
negative (emotionally 
charged) word load was 
used and related to 
learning rate per block.  
 
Effect of feedback 
SCR (post deck 
selection).  SCR 
effect on IGT score 







18- 28 (M = 20.5, 
SD = 2.8; 11 male, 
30 female). 
Bechara et al. 
























males) aged 19 -
34 (mean = 22.9, 
SD = 4.03) 
students. 
 









Appraisal SCR; SCR 
amplitude; Performance 
and beneficial SCR 
interaction (IGT scores 
as DV). 
 
Effect of aSCR for 
disadvantageous 
decks selection. ** 
 
                                                          
3 Note all ** Testing hypothesis 1 (relationship between overall aSCR and IGT performance) 






(12) Miu et al. 
(2012) 
Romania   
135 students, (118 
women) aged 16-
42, (M= 21.6) 






interaction (IGT scores 
as DV). 
Effect of aSCR. 
SCR mediated IGT 
performance. ** 
(13) Suzuki et 
al. (2003) 
Japan 
40 students, (27 
men and 13 
women) aged 18-
23, (M= 19.9, SD= 
1.29) 




No effect of aSCR. 
Effect of feedback 
SCR (post deck 




33 students, (15 
men, 18 women) 
aged 20-40, (M= 
22.2, SD= 3.7) 
Bechara et al. 
(1997)*. 
Anticipatory SCR; SCR 
and learning rate per 
block 
No effect of aSCR. 
***  












interaction (IGT scores 
as DV). 
Effect of aSCR for 
disadvantageous 
decks. ** : ***  












interaction (IGT scores 
as DV). 
Effect of aSCR for 
disadvantageous 
decks. ** : *** 
(17) Werner et 
al. (2009) 
Germany 
64 students, (32 
men, 32 women) 
Bechara et al. 
(1994)*. 
SCR and HR 
anticipative response 





and IGT. ** 













expected risk; intuition 
and conceptual phases). 
Effect of aSCR 




All analyses were performed using Meta-Essentials (Van Rhee, Suurmond, & Hak, 2015). The 
meta-analysis calculator was used to compute R statistics (Lyons, 2004). Three studies were 
excluded:  one because of the consistency of IGT and SCR methods used (Yen et al.,2012) and 
two because of insufficient data (Denburg et al., 2006; Visagan et al., 20125). Accordingly, 
eleven studies were included in the meta-analysis. Two separate meta-analyses were performed 
testing hypothesis 1 (the relationship between overall aSCR and IGT performance) and 
hypothesis 2 (differences between good and bad decks). 
                                                          
5 Note that Denburg et al. (2006) and Visagan et al. (2012) studies are not included in meta-analyses because of 








 Anticipatory SCR and IGT performance  
First, analyses were conducted and effect sizes calculated for each study (Table 2.3.3). 
Specifically, we calculated r and Confidence Interval (upper and lower) for studies that found 
an effect of aSCRs in relation to IGT performance. Then a combined effect size was calculated 
and examined by using Forest plot (Figure 2.3.2). The Forest plot revealed a combined effect 
size of r = 0.22 (CI 0.16 to 0.29, p<0.00001) representing a small to medium effect (Table 
2.3.4). The overall effect size was also homogenous Q (13) = 10.97, p<.0001; I2 = 0.00 thus 
indicating that there are no heterogeneity issues. Publication bias analyses were undertaken 
first by calculating fail-safe N (Rosenthal, 1979). The fail-safe N was 137, suggesting that even 
if a great number of additional relevant studies with null results were included, the overall 
effect size would remain significant. However, because fail-safe N is biased towards 
overestimating the number of null studies required to render the overall effect size 
nonsignificant (Carson, Schriesheim, & Kinicki, 1990), a funnel plot of the standard error by 
the standard mean differences was generated (Figure 2.3.3). The distribution is symmetrical, 
suggesting no issues regarding publication bias.  
Table 2.3.3 
Effect sizes of included studies in meta-analysis related to aSCR correlates with successful IGT performance 
Study ID    N R     95% CI      Weight 
Carter & Pasqualini (2004) 30 .49     .14, .73  4.59% 
Guillaume et al. (2009) 30 .38    .01, .66  4.59% 
Hinson et al. (2006)a † 70 .15    -.09, .38 11.39% 
Hinson et al. (2006)b † 40 .19    -.14, .48  6.29% 
Hinson et al. (2006)c † 70 .16    -.08, .38 11.39% 
Hinson et al. (2002) † 45 .10    -.21, .39  7.14% 
Hinson et al. (2002)a † 47 .07    -.23, .36  7.48% 
Mardaga & Hansenne (2012) 32 .30    -.07, .60         4.93% 
Miu et al. (2012) 135 .29     .13, .44           32.20% 
Suzuki et al. (2003) 40 .00    -.32, .32           6.29% 
Wagar & Dixon (2006) 12 .40    -.30, .82          1.53% 
Wagar & Dixon (2006)a 12 .60    -.04, .89          1.53% 
Werner et al. (2009) 64 .25     .00, .47         10.37% 
Note: * all p significant at .05 








Figure 2.3.2. Forest plot. Combined effect size (CI with SE bars) of Studies correlating aSCR and successful 
IGT performance (meta-analysis 1) 
Table 2.3.4 
Summary of meta-analysis related to aSCR correlates with successful IGT performance  
All studies             
K            N 
Combined 
effect size (r) 
95% CI Combined z Combined   p I2 
 

































Anticipatory SCR for disadvantageous decks  
First, analyses were conducted and effect sizes calculated for each study (Table 2.3.5). 
Specifically, r and Confidence Interval (upper and lower) were calculated for studies that found 
an effect of aSCRs in relation to disadvantageous deck picks. Then a combined effect size was 
calculated and examined by using a Forest plot (Figure 2.3.4). The Forest plot revealed a 
combined effect size of r = 0.21 (CI 0.07 to 0.34, p=0.009) representing a small to medium 
effect (Table 2.3.6). The overall effect size indicated low heterogeneity (Q (6)=13.65, p=.009; 
I2=0.08)).  Publication bias analyses were undertaken first by calculating fail-safe N 
(Rosenthal, 1979). The fail-safe (N = 17) indicated that if a relatively small number of 
additional studies with null results were included, the overall effect size would not remain 
significant.  However, because fail-safe N is biased towards overestimating the number of null 
studies required to render the overall effect size nonsignificant (Carson et al., 1990), a funnel 
plot of the standard error by the standard mean differences was generated (Figure 2.3.5). The 
distribution is not symmetrical, confirming issues regarding publication bias. 
Table 2.3.5 
Effect sizes of included studies elated to aSCR differences between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks 
Study ID    N R     95% CI      Weight 
Fernie & Tunney (2013) 32 -.06    -.41, .31         20.71% 
Guillaume et al. (2009)* 30 .05    -.36, .36 20.71% 
Jenkinson et al. (2009)* 32 .22    -.15, .54 20.71% 
Suzuki et al. (2003)* 40 .12    -.15, .54           26.43% 
Wagar & Dixon (2006)* 12 .73     .19, .93          6.43% 
Wagar & Dixon (2006)a* 12 .77     .28, .94          6.43% 










Figure 2.3.4. Forest plot. Combined effect size (CI with SE bars) related to aSCR differences between the 
disadvantageous and advantageous decks (meta-analysis 2). 
Table 2.3.6 
Summary of meta-analysis related to aSCR differences between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks 
All studies             
K            N 
Combined 
effect size (r) 
95% CI Combined z Combined   p I2 
 




Figure 2.3.5. Funnel Plot of Standard Error by Effect Size for Studies correlating aSCR differences between the 





























In summary, this systematic review identified eighteen studies in healthy populations for 
inclusion. All of the studies included in the systematic review used SCR measurements and 
predominantly Bechara et al.’s (1994) original IGT. Eleven studies were included in two meta-
analyses testing the overall aSCR effect on IGT performance differences and aSCR responses 
between the good and the bad decks. The first meta-analysis revealed a small to medium 
significant relationship between aSCR and IGT performance. The results provide support for 
SMH, however, the effect size indicates that other factors are important during decision-
making. The second meta-analysis revealed a small to medium significant effect of aSCR 
between the good and the bad decks. However, the overall effect size was not homogenous, 
and the distribution was not symmetrical indicating that there is no clear aSCR distinction 
between the good and the bad decks.   
The studies provide consistent evidence that overall aSCR correlate with successful 
performance on the IGT (Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; Guillaume et al., 2009; Carter & 
Pasqualini, 2004, Wagar & Dixon, 2006; Werner et al., 2009; Miu et al., 2012). The results are 
reliable although interpretation may be complicated due to a number of factors. For instance, 
aSCRs found on IGT may be the result of the expectancies about reward and punishments after 
a deck has been chosen rather than an anticipatory signal of how good or bad a particular deck 
is (e.g., Hinson et al., 2006; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). It is also plausible that the somatic marker 
develops after good IGT performance and is driven with the risk associated with a specific deck 
(e.g., Hinson et al., 2006; Suzuki et al., 2003; Wagar & Dixon, 2006).  For example, Suzuki et 
al. (2003) reported that psychophysiological response to feedback (post deck selection) rather 
than anticipation is more important for successful performance on the IGT. They suggest that 
fSCR rather than aSCR of deck selection, may be more important for mediating IGT 
performance. This feedback response was related to punishment encountered when choosing 
from the disadvantageous decks (Suzuki et al., 2003). This is an important suggestion since 
their results relate optimal performance on the IGT to participants’ expectation of punishments 
and rewards, only after a deck has been selected and is driven by the higher variance of the 
deck (Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Thus, it appears that there may be an issue when quantifying 
SCR measurements. Levinson, Edelberg and Bridger (1984) suggest that any SCR that begins 
between 1-3s following stimulus onsets can be considered to be elicited by the stimulus. This 






when quantifying aSCRs is when a response is elicited before a preceding response has had 
time to recover. The amplitude of the second response may be distorted by being superimposed 
on the recovery of the first response. This may explain fSCR and emphasizes the necessity for 
logarithmical data transformation to remedy this issue or that there is sufficient latency to avoid 
response distortion. 
Indeed, Lykken and Venables (1971) proposed standardised techniques of SCR measurement 
where the correction procedure (e.g., computing the logarithm of SCR) can significantly reduce 
errors in measurements. Although most of the studies reviewed here have used some form of 
the computational logarithm, it is noticeable that they are not standardised. Furthermore, it has 
been noticed that room temperature and handwashing with soap and water may create errors in 
SCR measurements (Venables & Christie, 1973). Venables and Christie (1973) recommended 
handwashing with nonabrasive soap before having the electrodes attached and a constant room 
temperature of 23°C. However, only two studies reported that they had controlled room 
temperature (Guillaume et al., 2009; Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012) and none of the studies 
reported asking participants to use nonabrasive soap hand washing.    
The results from a second meta-analysis indicate that there is a difference in aSCRs signals 
between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks selection. It should be noted that I2 
indicated low heterogeneity suggesting small variability between studies and that the variance 
of true effects is small. The I2 describes the percentage of total variation across studies that is 
due to heterogeneity rather than chance and it is a useful approach that quantifies the effect of 
heterogeneity (Higgins, Thompson, Deeks, & Altman, 2003). However, the I2 needs to be 
interpreted with caution because the estimates of I2 are unlikely to be completely accurate 
unless the number of studies in the meta-analysis is substantial (Ioannidis, 2007). 
Some studies reported aSCR differences in response to disadvantageous decks selection and 
not advantageous deck selection (e.g., Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012; Guillaume et al., 2009; 
Wagar & Dixon 2006). This is consistent with Damasio’s (1994) original proposition that 
aSCRs for disadvantageous decks lead to a shift in choices preferences from bad to good decks.  
However, there was evidence of a correlation between the aSCR related to the advantageous 
decks’ selection and successful performance on the task (e.g., Denburg et al., 2006). This raises 
a possibility that it is not the intensity of aSCRs signals before the bad decks that is important, 
but the contrast between this signal and the signal that develops before the good deck choices 






between the positive and negative aSCRs, and so these studies fail to provide definitive data 
about the aSCRs signals. This accords with the argument that SCR is influenced by the 
activation of the neuropsychological, behavioral inhibitory system implicated in responding to 
punishment, frustrated non-rewards and passive avoidance, and is difficult to interpret SCR as 
being based on negative outcomes alone (e.g., Fowles, 1988).  
Thus, the meta-analyses results show support for the involvement of somatic markers in 
decision-making. While there is agreement that there is a correlation between the strength of 
overall aSCRs signals and IGT performance, it is difficult to differentiate what SCRs for bad 
and good decks actually represent. Dunn et al. (2006) review pointed out that the SCR signal 
may be ‘a response to feedback, an indicator of risk, a marker of post- decision emotion state, 
or a signal of how good or bad a particular response option is’ (p. 251). Furthermore, the 
absence of the SCRs signals can lead to a good IGT performance and aSCR activity is not 
necessary to succeed on the IGT (Fernie & Tunney, 2013). Fernie and Tunney (2013) showed 
that the participants learn to select advantageously on the IGT and develop knowledge of the 
task contingencies sufficient to guide behavior after approximately 40 trials without developing 
SCR. Furthermore, the post-knowledge difference in fSCRs indicate that the choices could 
have been made based on conscious knowledge. This is in line with suggestion that 
performance on IGT may be guided by two pathways; aSCR may represent somatic markers 
that guide successful decision-making during the IGT (Bechara et al., 1996); or SCRs represent 
a proxy of good performance and are caused by conscious knowledge (e.g., Guillaume et al., 
2009; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Thus, it appears that there is a 
complex interplay between the emotion-based signals and conscious knowledge during the task 
and the relatively slow time course of SCR signals makes it difficult to separate different SCR 
signals in a clear manner.  
Studies included in the review are not without limitation. Most of the studies had more female 
than male participants, and this may skew the results. A recent review suggested that there is a 
difference in performance between male and female participants when performing the IGT (van 
den Bos, Homberg & de Visser, 2013). Van den Boss et al., (2013) emphasized that due to sex 
differences, female participants tend to be more loss-aversive and typically outperform male 
participants. There was also a mixture of studies using original IGT following the exact 
procedure or using the alternative IGT. It could be argued that different IGT methodologies 






could explore the effect of potential mediators, such as age and gender, on the aSCR and IGT 
performance.  
Notably, the IGT is a complex task and possibly involves an intrinsic affective shift, whereby 
an affective evaluation of choices guides future decision-making. For the optimal performance, 
this evaluation needs to evoke both positive and negative evaluation, potentially causing a net-
weighted (expectancy-valence; heuristic-based) approach (Busemeyer & Stout, 2002). Since 
the SCR has a relatively slow time course, it is possible that a distinct somatic marker cannot 
be distinguished by conventional SCR measurements (Newell & Shanks, 2014). Furthermore, 
some authors argue that the actual SCR level is not, on its own, very informative or easy to 
derive (Bouscein et al., 2012). Moreover, there is a possibility that the SCR is not particularly 
sensitive in discriminating between negative and positive valence (e.g., Bradley, Codispoti, 
Cuthbert & Lang, 2001). This has the potential to make the measurement procedure and 
interpretation of the results considerably more complicated because it is difficult to capture 
valences of an unconscious emotion-based signal. Thus, this would undermine the utility of the 
SMH as a test of emotion-based learning.   
Conclusion  
This chapter addressed objective (i) of the thesis, and the results suggest that SCR may 
represent a good indicator of somatic markers. Nonetheless, the possibility that somatic marker 
can be imperfectly represented by SCR cannot be excluded. The somatic markers may 
represent an anticipatory, affective reaction before the choice had been made, however, they 
may also represent an affective reaction after the choice had been made and when a person has 
enough knowledge of the task to predict a choice. Thus, the somatic marker may represent a 
reflection of good performance rather than a cause of it. Using faster sources of emotion 
feedback that can be measured including heart rate and blood pressure with an 
electrocardiogram (ECG) or pupil dilation using eye trackers may disentangle this issue. For 
example, using pupil size as a somatic marker would help in differentiation of the somatic 
markers on potential options and provide a relatively clearer picture about the role of the 
emotion-based learning during the IGT. The use of an eye-tracker may help to distinguish 
between somatic reactions on each possible option before and after a decision has been made. 
This is particularly important because the aSCR captured during the IGT performance may 
represent a part of a broader response complex such as attentional bias, implicit learning and 






Furthermore, an eye-tracker can encapsulate a preconceptional period of decision-making that 
precedes the development of the somatic markers. This could reveal if implicit learning occurs 
and is then strengthened by the somatic markers or both processes run in parallel. For instance, 
Bierman, Cleeremans, Ditzhuyzen and van Gaal (2004) used the eye-tracking methodology 
and an artificial grammar learning task to test SMH. They discovered that the intuitive 
decisions involve several processes: Participants first learn implicitly about the features of a 
task, then, the implicit learning and positive/negative feedback create an association that result 
in somatic marking. Furthermore, Lavin, San Martin and Jubal (2014) showed that pupil 
dilation changes represent a marker of learned uncertainty and may be used as a marker of 
noradrenaline activity, which has been associated with reward prediction errors. This is 





















As discussed in Chapter 2, an important finding for SMH is that anticipatory somatic markers 
of emotions occur before a decision is made, and guide successful decision-making (e.g., 
Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 2000). The systematic review showed that there is some evidence 
linking anticipatory somatic markers (as evidenced by aSCR measurements) with IGT 
performance. This finding can be interpreted as demonstrating the importance of emotions for 
optimal decision-making. However, there is a possibility that anticipatory somatic markers are 
imperfectly represented by the SCR measurement and they are not sufficiently sensitive in 
discriminating between negative and positive valence (Dunn et al., 2006). Although it is 
possible that positive or negative somatic markers guide successful decision-making, 
interpretation of the SCR measurements clouds this distinction. Furthermore, a major 
assumption regarding somatic markers is that they operate unconsciously, particularly in 
situations of high uncertainty (beginning of the task) whereby repeated feedback from 
punishment frequencies creates a loss aversion for disadvantageous decks (e.g., Bechara et al., 
1997).  If that is the case, then a greater effect of negative somatic markers (disadvantageous 
decks) than the positive (advantageous decks) should be expected. However, the review results 
showed that there is no clear aSCR distinction between the disadvantageous and the 
advantageous decks. Thus, one of the recommendations from the systematic review is that 
faster physiological measurement should be employed in an effort to capture this distinction 
and provide further insight into the cognitive processes during IGT decision-making.  
Furthermore, some authors have argued that somatic markers reinforce learning early in the 
IGT (ambiguous stage) while the later stages of the task are informed by conscious knowledge 
and higher cognitive processes (e.g., Brand et al., 2007; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). However, 
contrasting evidence indicate that conscious knowledge and higher cognitive processes guide 
decision-making early in the IGT (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Maia & McClelland, 2004; 
Simonovic et al., 2016).  This violates a principle regarding the engagement of higher cognitive 
processes during the game and is tested in this chapter’s experiment by using a measure of 
cognitive reflection (CRT1; Toplak et al., 2014). Thus, this chapter addressed objective (ii) of 
the Thesis and details the first experiment that examines alternative physiological 
measurements for detecting somatic markers (eye-tracking methodology) and a direct measure 







Eye-tracking methodology  
Eye-tracking methodology records pupil dilation, eye positions and eye movements and is often 
used in decision-making research (Glockner, & Witteman, 2010). Eye-tracking systems usually 
monitor eye-movements, gaze direction and pupil movement in a non-intrusive manner and 
has been recognized as a reliable method that can capture automatic, deliberate, conscious and 
nonconscious processes related to the decisional choices (e.g., Glockner & Herbold, 2011). 
Evaluation of the pupillary responses to light stimulation and dilation is often used as a measure 
of affective and cognitive processes (e.g., Granholm & Steinhauer, 2004; Nassar et al., 2013; 
Piquado, Isaacowitz, & Wingfield, 2010). The effect of affective and cognitive stimuli on pupil 
dilation (PD) has been attributed to the direct stimulation of the parasympathetically mediated 
sphincter muscle by different brain regions linked to the affective and cognitive processing of 
the stimuli (e.g., Steinhauer & Hakerem, 1992). PD has been linked to amygdala activation, 
dorsolateral prefrontal activity (connected to executive control), anterior cingulate cortex 
(related to error detection and outcome monitoring) and the activation of the Locus- Coeruleus 
(LC) and noradrenergic system (related to learning and surprise) (e.g., Hewig et al., 2011; 
Preuschoff, Marius ‘t Hart & Einhauser, 2011; Siegle, Steinhauer, Carter, Ramel, & Thase, 
2003). Thus, there is a wide spectrum of brain activity that can be encapsulated by PD 
measurement that is related to the specific decision-making problems.   
The increase in PD has been linked to LC and uncertainty signals. The LC – norepinephrine 
theory suggests that when an outcome of a choice comparison indicates the presence of a 
significant arousing element, a burst of norepinephrine is delivered to attentional brain regions 
via LC to enhance subsequent learning and processing of that outcome (Nieuewnhuis, Aston-
Jones, & Cohen, 2005; Aston-Jones & Cohen, 2005). Thus, LC may be important in developing 
a person’s ability to learn in uncertain conditions because it mobilizes a para-sympathetic 
vigilant response to negatively valenced stimuli (e.g., Yu & Dayan, 2005; Jepma & 
Nieuwenhuis, 2011; Costa & Rudebeck, 2016). The LC – norepinephrine is also important for 
learning to distinguish the important negative emotional signals which are further implicated 
in associative learning and memory consolidation (e.g., van Stegeren, 2008).  For instance, 
Einhauser, Koch and Carter (2010) used PD to predict the timing of choices for reward and no 
reward options distinguished by a button press. They found that, in ambiguous situations, 






attention and increasing cognitive demand.  This suggestion may be linked to the SMH’s 
underlying assumption that the affective biases, experienced at the moment of losses from 
disadvantageous decks, are used to evaluate and direct decision-making. Furthermore, 
according to the SMH, the response to negative stimuli should evoke emotional arousal (a 
preparatory affective bias signal for avoiding the bad outcomes) that consequently creates loss 
aversion to the bad outcomes (e.g., Shiv, Loewenstein, Bechara, Damasio, & Damasio, 2005). 
Thus, measures of PD could provide a parsimonious clarification of the physiological path 
between the negative emotion arousal, delivery of norepinephrine and consequent avoidance 
of the bad decks during IGT performance.  This could reveal if the emotionally aroused loss 
aversion (as evidenced by PD) requires heightened cognitive attention for the bad choices in 
the face of conflicting cognitive information during the IGT performance (e.g., Dunn et al., 
2006). 
Bechara et al.’s (2005) suggestion that negative affective bias underpins adaptive strategy on 
IGT coincides with evidence suggesting that negatively valenced events are more likely to 
impact decision-making than the positively valenced (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Finkenauer & 
Vohs, 2001); Baumeister et al. referred to this concept as the negativity bias. This is similar to 
Kahneman and Tversky’s (1979) argument that increased physiological responses following 
losses generate a behavioural basis of loss aversion, where a decisional choice leads to instant 
outcomes evaluation and consequently avoidant behaviour of the bad outcomes. This view is 
supported by the evidence from brain imaging studies that reveal greater functional cortical 
changes in the prefrontal cortex (PFC) following losses compared to gains (e.g., Gehring & 
Willoughby, 2002; Christakou, Brammer, Giampietro, & Rubia, 2009). For example, a 
neuroimaging study showed that the processing of losses in IGT occurs in the VMpfc and the 
DLpfc, whereby the processing of accumulated losses shifts decisions away from bad choices 
(Christakou et al., 2009). This coincides with evidence that relates loss aversion sensitivity to 
punishment cues and the decision shift towards the good options in healthy population (e.g., 
Weller, Levin, & Bechara, 2010). Hence, loss aversion may be pertinent to Bechara et al.’s 
(1994, 1997, 2000) explanation as to why greater physiological responses are expected from 
the disadvantageous decks.  
Loss aversion provides a reasonable explanation for IGT performance. However, evidence 
from different experience-based studies suggests that during decision-making people exhibit 
both loss neutral and non-loss averse behaviour (Hochman, Glockner, & Yechiam, 2010; 






in PD and heart rate in response to losses than gains, but this was not associated with loss 
aversion. The authors observed the gap between the autonomic arousal and choice behaviour, 
where autonomic arousal lead to attentional orientating responses. They suggested that 
attention may be drawn to losses just to increase demand for cognitive processing during 
decision-making task. This suggestion indicates that attention to the bad choices instigates 
cognitive processing that is important, not only to the loss component but the whole outcome 
patterns.  Therefore, unexpected losses signal a potential threat that needs to be cognitively 
processed after an initial signal and physiological arousal. Thus, unexpected losses may be 
interpreted as a surprise signal that initiates cognitive processes (e.g., de Gee, Knapen, & 
Donner, 2014; Preuschoff et al., 2011; Satterthwaite et al., 2007). For instance, Preuschoff et 
al., (2011) measured PD while participants performed an auditory gambling task. The cards 
were drawn from a deck of ten, where before hearing the cards values, the bets were placed on 
whether the first or the second drawn card is higher. They found that an increase in PD signals 
errors and surprise in assessing uncertainty. This was interpreted as evidence that noradrenaline 
plays an important role in judging uncertainty. This suggestion can be linked to IGT. Although 
it is possible that loss aversion underpins avoidance of the bad options, it is more likely that 
the somatic markers initiate cognitive processing of the future choices, where the interaction 
between the two creates anticipatory signals that guide future decisional choices. This is in line 
with SMH assumption that somatic marker influences the decisional choice that is displayed in 
the WM by conveying body information to the WM processing (Bechara & Damasio, 2005).  
The standard interpretation of somatic markers is that a future optimal choice is determined by 
previously encountered negative feelings (e.g., negative feedback during monetary loss) that 
act as ‘covert biases on the circuits that support processes of cognitive evaluation and 
reasoning’ (Bechara et al., 1997, p.1294). Anticipatory emotions from this perspective do not 
depend on the explicit evaluation of the choices and arise unconsciously as a result of the early 
sensory procession of a choice. An alternative explanation, however, could be that emotions 
arise as an outcome of negative surprise and attentional biases that could be measured with PD 
(e.g., Bierman et al., 2004; Lavin et al., 2014; Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Turnbull et al., 2014). 
For instance, Bierman et al.  tested participants on a grammar task analogue to the IGT version 
in two conditions that consisted of a series of symbols and words constructed according to 
grammar rules, A and B. The symbols [, #, * and + were used, whereby words having three 
consecutives ‘#’ and ']' (grammar A) or ‘*’ and '+' (grammar B) characters could not occur 






The PD was also significantly larger when participants looked at the incorrect option. The PD 
was, however, observed only at the beginning of the task indicating that somatic markers only 
partly account for an optimal choice. Although PD per Blocks was not assessed, their results 
indicated that the strengthening of the somatic marker entails cognitive processing.  
To date, only one published study has utilised eye-tracking methodology during the IGT 
performance in a healthy population. Lavin et al. (2014) tested IGT performance and measured 
PD in a sample of 10 participants and demonstrated changes in PD due to learned uncertainty. 
Their results suggest that the changes in PD reflect learned uncertainty about future feedback 
conditions, thus indicating differential processing of unexpected feedback. However, a non-
standard version of the IGT was used, cognitive processes were not assessed, and they did not 
differentiate between disadvantageous and advantageous deck selection. Furthermore, they 
pooled the data into four bins of 50 trials and did not account for learning and performance 
trials as traditionally suggested by Bechara et al. (1997). Hence, the first aim of the experiment 
in this chapter is to extend Lavin et al.’s (2014) finding with an alternative approach to 
measuring anticipatory PD (aPD). The second aim is to replicate Simonovic et al.’s (2016) 
previous findings demonstrating that the cognitive reflection is highly predictive of IGT 
performance. This is discussed in the next section of this chapter.   
Cognitive reflection  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Brevers et al. (2013) proposed a dual-process model that explains 
problem gamblers’ decision-making.  They argued that anticipation of long-term consequences 
in uncertain conditions rely on two neural systems: a ‘cool’ and a ‘hot’ system. Learning and 
optimal decisions depend on the integration of both systems whereby, a ‘cool’ reflective 
process can be critical in monitoring or inhibiting ‘hot’ processes. Brevers et al. further 
suggests that the deficit in ‘cool’ executive processes leads to impaired IGT performance. 
Furthermore, the impact of ‘cool’ processes is higher during the later trials of the IGT and these 
should be evidenced after Block 4 (the first 80 trials) and the ‘cool’ processing should reach 
ceiling after Block 5. However, there is a suggestion that 100 trials are not enough to learn 
about the deck contingences (e.g., Wetzels, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Wagenmakers 
2010). Wetzels et al. showed that participants learn the goodness and the badness of the decks, 
but that requires more than 100 trials. One way of testing this suggestion is to extend the 
number of IGT trails. For example, Bagneux, Font and Bollon, (2013) extended the IGT to 140 






on IGT performance. They showed that extended version of IGT may have an effect on 
learning. Thus, an extended version (140 trials) is used in this experiment to examine Brevers 
et al.’s suggestion that this could improve learning and performance of IGT.      
It was further argued in Chapter 1 that Brevers et al.’s (2013) conceptualisation needs further 
clarification but nevertheless maps on the traditional dual-process models of decision-making 
(e.g., Stanovich, 2009; Evans & Stanovich, 2013). More specifically, this resembles the 
default-interventionist model postulating that Type I processing generates initial responses that 
are subsequently evaluated with reflective Type II processes (Evans, 2008). This model implies 
that the two processes are not completely distinct because the Type I processes represent a 
cognitive continuum that can be observed within the Type II processes (e.g., Evans & 
Stanovich, 2013). Thus, most behaviour is under Type I processes, prompted by default 
responses, that sometimes may recruit reflective, Type II processes when required. The key 
function of the Type II processing is to maintain decoupling among different alternative choices 
and exhibit supervision of the Type I processes. This suggestion maps on to the SMH and the 
argument that the affective bias is likely to inform decision choices, that requires cognitive 
processing of the information provided by affective biases (Stocco, Fum, & Napoli, 2009).  
However, it is not clear if the cognitive evaluation occurs relatively early or in later stages of 
the decision-making processes (e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Brand et al., 2007; Brevers et al., 
2013; Simonovic et al., 2016). Brand et al., tested executive function and IGT performance on 
healthy participants. They used the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (WCST, Heaton, Chelune, 
Talley, Kay, & Curtiss, 1993) of cognitive flexibility in which participants need to sort a deck 
of cards according to a predetermined rule; the Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence 
(WASI) to test overall intelligence (Wechsler, 1997); and the Tower of Hanoi (ToH) to assess 
planning abilities and rule-guided and goal-oriented behaviour (Spreen & Strauss, 1998). They 
found that only last Blocks of IGT trials correlated with WCST while the first trials did not. 
The authors interpreted the results as an indication that IGT measures decisions under 
ambiguous uncertainty (learning phase) and decisions under explicit risks (performance phase). 
Conversely, Simonovic et al. (2016) showed that cognitive reflection is significant in early 
trials, which are considered to be learning phase where participants develop somatic markers. 
Simonovic et al. used the original CRT (Frederick, 2005), as a measure of reflective thinking, 
and tested IGT performance on healthy participants and participants under stress. The results 
showed that reflective evaluation of affective choices occurs relatively early in decision-






three indicating that disadvantageous decks disambiguation depended on the participant's 
analytic ability. Thus, Type II processes occurred early in the game; these results challenged 
the assumption number 2 of the SMH; that somatic markers precede cognitive processes that 
ensue later in the game (e.g., Block 4 and 5).  
The CRT that Simonovic et al. (2016) used is one of the extensively used experimental 
paradigms in the evaluation of dual-process theories that captures heuristic/analytic conflict 
(Frederick, 2005). The CRT was developed to measure the ability to withstand heuristic, 
intuitive responses, thus substituting Type I processing for Type II (Frederick, 2005). The 
original CRT consists of three problems where an intuitive answer must be resisted in order to 
reach the correct solution. For example, a typical item is ‘A bat and a ball costs $1.10. The bat 
costs $1.00 more than the ball. How much does the ball costs?’. The incorrect answer is 10 
cents which is commonly believed to be generated by Type I processing. Conversely, to reach 
the correct response of 5 cents is commonly assumed to engage Type II processing that inhibits 
the intuitive response (Toplak et al., 2014). The original CRT is increasingly being criticised 
and there continues to be a debate about the aspect of Type II processes that the CRT measures 
(Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 2011; Toplak et al., 2014; Stupple, Gale & Richmond, 2013; 
Stupple, Ball, & Ellis, 2013; Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014; Stupple, Pitchford, Ball, Hunt, & 
Steel, 2017). While Toplak et al. (2011, 2014) argued that CRT is related to ‘cognitive 
miserliness’ (a tendency to expend as little cognitive effort as is necessary to complete a task), 
others have associated CRT with WM capacity and the relevant mindware, including numeracy 
skills (Stupple et al., 2013, 2017). 
Toplak et al. (2011, 2014) suggested that poor performance on the CRT is due to cognitive 
miserliness, where people do not engage in deep thinking enough and are unwilling to invest 
cognitive effort to reach a correct answer. This assumption is made on the observation that 
CRT is an independent measure of intelligence, executive function and thinking disposition 
(Toplak et al., 2011). In contrast, Stupple et al. (2013) conducted two experiments examining 
if reasoning response-times, normative responses from two syllogistic reasoning tasks and WM 
capacity predict individual differences in performance on the CRT. The variation in WM 
capacity was the strongest predictor of CRT performance. Conversely, variation in response 
time to reasoning tasks was not a strong predictor, thus providing limited support to a cognitive 
miserliness paradigm. Stupple et al. (2013) acknowledged a possibility that cognitive 
miserliness may be involved in CRT performance, but nevertheless suggested that errors in the 






2009). The mindware terminology refers to the rules and strategies that can be restored by the 
Type II processes and used to remodel decoupled choices (Stanovich, 2004). The mindware 
metaphor describes the mental processes needed for an individual to retrieve knowledge, rules 
and strategies stored in memory. Thus, it could be argued that the learning phase on IGT could 
be thought of as the development of mindware related to deck contingencies, whereby inability 
to reflect and/or cognitively processes deck outcomes may be the result of missing mindware 
as Stupple et al. (2013) suggest elsewhere.   
Indeed, in line with Stupple et al. (2013) results is a suggestion that people may lack the 
required mindware (e.g., numeracy skills) to calculate the correct solution on the original CRT 
(Campitelli & Gerrans, 2014). Campitelli and Gerrans used a mathematical modelling 
approach, based on a sample of 2,019 participants to test CRT performance. Their results 
indicate that although mathematics ability may play a role in CRT performance cognitive 
reflection as a disposition to initiate cognitive processes is also important. Although the CRT 
noticeably requires some degree of numeracy skills, it is thought to also capture the propensity 
to think reflectively and analytically (Cokeley & Kelley, 2009; Pennycook, Cheyne, Koehler, 
& Fugelsang, 2015). That is, participants who do well on CRT are more likely to engage in 
analytic thinking and are less prone to rely on heuristically driven responses.   However, some 
aspects of poor CRT performance may derive from dispositional individual differences and 
misdirected analytic thinking due to a mindware gaps failure (e.g., mathematics ability) to 
generate a correct response (Stupple et al., 2017). For that reason, some researchers suggest 
that self-reported measures of cognitive disposition such as AOT (Stanovich & West, 2007) 
and REI (Epstein, 1994) may provide an additional insight into the task and individual thinking 
predispositions during reasoning and decision-making tasks performances (Campitelli & 
Gerrans, 2014; Pennycook et al., 2015; Stupple et al., 2013). 
The three item CRT has proven to be an effective predictor of performance on expected-values 
gambling tasks, probabilistic prediction tasks, profit maximising strategies, general numeracy 
and gambling tasks (Cokely & Kelley, 2009; Fernbach, Sloman, Louis, & Shube, 2013; Mata, 
Ferreira, & Sherman, 2013; Simonovic et al., 2016).  However, the three items have become 
well known and this casts doubts about whether the original test can continue to be used as a 
valid measure of analytic cognitive style (e.g., Bialek & Pennycook. 2017).  Toplak et al.  
(2014) created four additional questions, thus creating a seven-items extended version with the 
median correlation among the seven items of .27 and Cronbach’s alpha of a .72.  Toplak et al. 






dispositions (Need for Cognition (NFC), AOT, Superstitious Thinking (ST), and CFC)). The 
additional items showed moderate to strong correlations between the CRT and WASI (r=.50), 
NFC (r=.31) AOT (r=.42), CFC (r=.30), Belief Bias and Syllogistic reasoning (r=.57), 
Denominator neglect (r=.42), Temporal Discounting (r=.16), Rational Thinking Composite 
(r=.56), and Thinking Dispositions Composite (r=.41). Thus, the extended CRT1 scale showed 
better predictive values of rational thinking, cognitive ability and thinking disposition than the 
original CRT and the 4 additional questions tested separately. Thus, the extended CRT1 items 
may be very important for IGT learning and performance because they tap into cognitive 
abilities and analytic thinking that may account for variability in individual IGT performance. 
For example, studies employing WASI as a measure of intellectual ability and WM 
performance in relation to IGT performance showed small effect of EFs on the task 
performance (e.g., Brand et al., 2007; Ernst et al., 2003; Toplak, Jain, & Tannock, 2005; 
Johnson, Yechiam, Murphy, Queller, & Stout, 2006). Furthermore, individual differences in 
thinking disposition and IGT performance may provide further explanation about the 
heterogenous performance of the healthy population (e.g., Steingroever et al., 2013). Thus, a 
seven-item CRT1 provides a more comprehensive test than the three items CRT and has been 
used for the purposes of this chapter’s experiment.   
3.2. The Experiment   
The present experiment extends Lavin et al.’s (2014) findings, with a larger sample and an 
alternative approach to measuring anticipatory pupil dilation (aPD). The focus was on the 
period during the IGT where participants had hypothetically developed somatic markers, but 
they were not yet sufficient to extinguish particular card selection. On this basis, PD in the 
500ms time frame prior to the final selection from each deck was measured and it was 
hypothesized that there should be negative anticipation for disadvantageous decks and positive 
anticipation for advantageous decks. Final aPD were measured for the advantageous (C + D) 
and the disadvantageous (A + B) final options. If anticipatory somatic markers play a role in 
IGT performance, then these should be evident prior to the final selection of each type of card. 
It was also expected that if the somatic markers operate on a continuum (e.g., they develop 
slowly) there would be an increase in aPD for both the disadvantageous and the advantageous 
decks. Moreover, a direct measure of deliberative thinking was included to replicate previous 






al., 2016). The extended seven-item CRT1 was used to provide a more comprehensive measure 
than the original three item CRT used in the Simonovic et al. (2016) study. 
The standard analysis of IGT performance across Blocks was extended to test whether 
performance reached ceiling levels in the fifth Block (the final Block in the standard IGT) or 
whether performance continued to improve. This was based on evidence that extended trials of 
IGT may improve learning and consequently IGT performance. Thus, it was hypothesised that 
IGT performance will continue to improve after Block 5. It was also hypothesised that the 
correlations observed by the Simonovic et al., (2016) between CRT score and disadvantageous 
card selections across Blocks would be replicated such that strong correlations would be found 
in early Blocks (e.g., Blocks 2 – 4) because of the importance of analytic processing early in 
the game. According to SMH, somatic markers develop slowly during the IGT and the 
differences in somatic markers reactivity should be observed from the baseline (e.g., Bechara 
et al., 1994, 1997, 2000). Hence, it was hypothesised that there will be an increase in PD 
responses between the baseline PD and last aPD responses for both disadvantageous and 
advantageous decks. Finally, it was hypothesised that the CRT1 and last aPD for advantageous 
and disadvantageous deck picks would predict IGT performance.  
3.3. Method 
Participants 
Thirty male and 39 female,6 healthy students with an age range of 19-29 years, were recruited 
from a UK university. All participants gave informed consent, in accordance with stipulations 
of the local ethics committee. People with severe vision impairment were excluded from 
participation. The participants had normal or corrected to normal vision. After providing 




Bechara et al.’s (1994) computerised version of IGT and standard instructions were used. 
Inquisit 4 programme was used to run the IGT script; participants were required to choose 
                                                          
6 Six participants were excluded from the analysis of the study due to incomplete data (N=4) and extreme 






individual cards from four decks that provide financial rewards and punishments. The gain loss 
frequencies were as follows: Deck A= 5 gains, 5 losses; Deck B= 9 gains, 1 loss; Deck C= 6.25 
gains, 2.5 standoffs, 1.25 losses; Deck D= 9 gains, 1 loss. The overall final outcomes were as 
follows: A= -1000; B= -1000; C= +1000; D= +1000. Bechara et al.’s IGT instructions for 
computerised version were followed.   One hundred and forty trials (seven Blocks of 20) were 
completed to examine whether additional learning trials can improve decision-making (e.g., 
Bagneux et al., 2013).  
CRT1  
The seven-item CRT1 (Toplak et al., 2014) was used to measure the ability to resist and 
override intuitive responses by engaging analytic ability. The score was the total number of 
correct answers. Higher CRT1 scores indicated higher reflective ability. The CRT1 consists of 
problems where an intuitive answer must be resisted to reach the correct solution. An example 
of a new question is ‘If John can drink one barrel of water in 6 days, and Mary can drink one 
barrel of water in 12 days, how long would it take them to drink one barrel of water together?’ 
The correct answer is 4 days and the intuitive answer is 9 days. 
Pupillometry  
Eye movements were recorded with the Eye-gaze binocular system Tobii-X2-30 (Inquisit 4 
milliseconds plugins), with a remote binocular sampling rate of 30 Hz and an accuracy of about 
0.45°. The X2 Eye Tracker is a stand-alone eye tracker, and it was attached to a laptop (Dell, 
Precision M6700, 2.70Ghz). Participants were seated approximately 70 cm from the laptop 
monitor. The Tobii measured 184mm (7.2’’) in length and enabled tracking at close distances 
(up to 36° gaze angle). The eye-tracker used both bright and dark pupil illumination setups to 
calculate the optimal gaze position. During a recording, the Tobii collected raw eye movement 
data points every 16.6ms. The firmware calculated the pupil size by measuring the diameter of 
the pupil on the image and multiplying it by a scaling factor.  Each data point was identified, 
analyzed and averaged across both eyes by a timestamp and “x, y” coordinates. Blinking 
periods were filtered and replaced via linear interpolation (e.g., Siegle et al., 2003). Pupillary 
responses were measured continuously throughout the task 
Procedure 
One consideration in designing this experiment was to replicate Simonovic et al. (2016) with 






to be consistent with the previous study. The CRT1 is easy to administer to participants and is 
not time-consuming for participants to complete. Before the eye-tracking recording was started, 
the participants were taken through a calibration procedure. During this procedure, the eye 
tracker measured characteristics of the participant’s eyes and used them together with an 
internal, physiological 3D eye model to calculate the gaze data. This model included 
information about shapes, light refraction and reflection properties of the different parts of the 
eyes (e.g., cornea, placement of the fovea). During the calibration, the participants were asked 
to look at specific points on the screen, also known as calibration dots. During this period, 
several images of the eyes were collected and analyzed. The resulting information was then 
integrated into the eye model, and the gaze point for each image sample was calculated. When 
the procedure has finished the quality of the calibration was illustrated by green lines of varying 
length. The length of each line represented the offset between each sampled gaze point and the 
center of the calibration dot. During the calibration, both the light and dark pupil methods were 
tested to identify the most suitable for the current light conditions and the participant’s eye 
characteristics. After the completion of the IGT  participants were debriefed. 
Analytic strategy and Scoring 
Before the initiation of the analyses, data were inspected for normality by checking for outliers, 
Skewness and Kurtosis, normality tests and Z-scores to ensure that the assumptions of 
parametric statistics were met before analyses were performed. If parametric assumptions were 
not met the data were log transformed, corrections used, and non-parametric tests used when 
appropriate.  
IGT scoring and CRT1 
Standard scoring was derived by deducting total disadvantageous card picks (A + B) from total 
advantageous picks (C + D. A positive score suggests a more advantageous decision-making 
strategy, whereas a negative score suggests a disadvantageous decision-making strategy. Initial 
analyses focused on checking the IGT performance per Block. Next, bivariate correlations 
between the disadvantageous decks and CRT1 scores were examined.  
Pupillometry  
To determine baseline PD, data were averaged for each participant over the 30 sample of raw 
PD data in the period from 2500 to 500ms before the commencement of the task (e.g., Jepma 






card selection was not included in the baseline period to avoid bias of a potential anticipatory 
increase that is assumed to start 500ms before stimulus onset (e.g., Satterthwaite et al., 2007). 
Next, to create the aPD variable, the anticipatory pupil diameter at the time points of the initial 
and the last pick for each deck was calculated. The pupil diameter 500ms prior to the mouse 
click indicating card selection (y) was subtracted from the pupil diameter at the time point 
when the card was seen (x) and divided by the pupil dimeter when the card was seen (x) 
resulting in an anticipatory pupil change relative to the 500ms period offset (see Preuschoff et 
al., 2011 for further details). Resulting in the following formula (x-y)/x. Repeated measure 
paired t-tests were used to examine the differences between baseline PD and last aPD for 
disadvantageous and advantageous decks.  The last aPD category was defined as pupil dilation 
generated 500ms before the last picks for both advantageous and disadvantageous decks. 
Finally, a multiple regression was conducted to test whether the CRT1 scores and the last aPD 
for disadvantageous/advantageous decks would predict IGT performance. The analysis was 
conducted using IBM SPSS 22 for Windows with an alpha = .05. Six participants were 
excluded from the analysis because of incomplete data and extreme outliers. 
3.4. Results 
Performance across Blocks was tested using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted repeated measures 
ANOVA. There was a main effect of Block condition, F(3.86, 239.12)=25.21, p<.001, η2= .16. 
Bonferroni-adjusted post hoc tests demonstrated that performance improved significantly 
through the Blocks of trials (excluding Block 6). Notably, the nonstandard additional Blocks 6 
and 7 continued to show changes in performance relative to earlier Blocks such that 







Figure 3.4.1. IGT Performance as a function of Trial Block. Error bars are the standard error of the mean 
Correlations between CRT1 score and selection of disadvantageous cards across Blocks were 
conducted (see Table 3.4.1). These demonstrated a significant negative relationship between 
CRT1 score and disadvantageous card selections in all but the first Block of trials. 
Table 3.4.1 
Correlations between Disadvantageous card selections and CRT1 score as a function of Trial Block 
Trial Block   Correlation 
Block 1 r= -.093, p=.467 
Block 2 r= -.363, p=.001 
Block 3 r= -.438, p<.001 
Block 4 r= -.497, p<.001 
Block 5 r= -.488, p<.001 
Block 6 r= -.449, p<.001 
Block 7 r= -.449, p<.001 
Total r= -.583, p<.001 
 
On average, last aPD for disadvantageous decks (M=3.02, SE=.05) did not significantly 


















advantageous decks (M=3.00, SE=.05) did not significantly increase from baseline (M=3.03, 
SE=.05), t(62)=.62, p=.54, r=.07. 
A multiple regression (Enter method) tested the relative predictive strength of last anticipatory 
pupillary responses for disadvantageous (A + B) and advantageous (C + D) deck picks and 
CRT1 scores for performance on the IGT. Data indicated that the three predictors combined 
reliably accounted for 35% of the variability in IGT scores. The Beta for disadvantageous cards 
showed a negative correlation with PD while the advantageous cards showed a positive 
correlation. This indicated that increased aPD on the last pick of a disadvantageous card 
predicted poorer overall performance in contrast with increased aPD for advantageous cards 
which was associated with better overall performance. The CRT1 score was the strongest 
predictor with higher scores on the CRT1 predicting better card selections. 
Table 3.4.2 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Cognitive Reflection Test, Final Anticipatory Pupil Dilation for Disadvantageous 
(AB) Decks, Last Pupil Dilation for Advantageous (CD) decks as predictors of IGT performance 
Durbin Watson= 1.93, VIF= 1.042; 4.965; 4.992  
3.5. Discussion 
Consistent with the first hypothesis, the Block performance analysis demonstrated that IGT 
performance did not reach ceiling at Block 5 and significantly improved in Block 7 after a non-
significant dip in Block 6. The second hypothesis was also supported; correlations between 
CRT1 scores and disadvantageous deck selection broadly replicated findings from the control 
group in Simonovic et al. (2016) but with stronger correlations and evidence that cognitive 
reflection is implicated not only in early Blocks but also later in the task. The third hypothesis 
                                                          
7 B is unstandardized beta value and β is standardized coefficient  
Predictors Results  
Model ‘Enter.' R²=.384, R²adj=.352 F(3, 58)= 12.03, 
p<.001 
CRT1 scores B7=14.29; β= .556, p<.001 
Last aPD (AB) B=-57.50; β= - .463, p=.048 






that there would be an increase in PD from the baseline evident in the last aPD responses was 
not supported. This indicated the possibility that learning occurred without the slow 
development of somatic markers. Finally, the analysis showed that aPDs and cognitive 
reflection were reliable predictors of IGT performance, thus supporting the final hypothesis. 
The results indicated that anticipatory pupillary responses may operate as learning markers and 
these effects differ according to the nature of the decks. More specifically, increased aPD on 
the last pick of disadvantageous cards predicted poorer overall performance, whereas, 
increased aPD for the last pick of advantageous cards was associated with better overall 
performance. This provides some support for SMH and may indicate that differing somatic 
markers develop for advantageous and disadvantageous decks, and that these influence IGT 
performance. However, since there was no increase in PD between the baseline PD 
measurements and last aPD measurements the analysis in support of the SMH cannot be 
definitive. These findings are discussed in turns.  
Results implications  
According to Bechara et al. (1997, 2000), healthy participants should have enough information 
concerning the IGT after the fourth Block (80 trials) that will allow optimal strategy during the 
last Block (last 20 trials) or a ‘performance phase’. Hence, during the performance phase 
selecting from advantageous decks should reach celling after the fourth trial which will indicate 
optimal performance phase. The results from this experiment indicate that optimal learning and 
performance require more than 100 trials. This is in line with Steingroever et al.’s (2013) 
argument that 100 trials are not enough to learn the nature of the decks and they proposed that 
the trial numbers should be extended to improve learning. Administration of 140 trials in this 
experiment showed that learning could be improved by extended trials as participants’’ 
performance did not reach ceiling by the fifth trial. This is in line with evidence demonstrating 
that increased numbers of trials improve learning (e.g., Bagneaux et al., 2013; Humphries, 
Bruno, Karpievitch, & Wotherspoon, 2015; Overman & Pierce, 2013; Reavis & Overman, 
2001; Wetzels, Vandekerckhove, Tuerlinckx, & Wagenmakers 2010). Thus, administration of 
more than 100 trials might reveal important insight into cognitive processes related to the 
performance phase and raises a possibility that some participants may be slow to learn the task 
(e.g., Overman & Pierce, 2013).  
Lavin et al. (2014) suggested that successful performance on IGT depends on positive feedback 






advantageous decks. The differing methodologies between this experiment and Lavin et al.’s 
study make direct comparison difficult. For example, they did not dissociate 
disadvantageous/advantageous decks selection to explain the physiological mechanisms 
responsible for successful IGT performance. Hence, it is not clear if physiological arousal 
differs according to the nature of the decks, which is a central claim to SMH (e.g., Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). Nevertheless, they did find the effect that pupillary responses indicate 
different processing of the positive feedback. This effect, although not conclusive, suggest that 
PD signal surprise if given feedback does not meet expectations. The results from this 
experiment add to this claim, that while positive feedback may be responsible for an increase 
in PD, anticipatory responses of both negative and positive feedback may be important for IGT 
performance.   
While the data indicate that participants’ last aPD responses predict successful IGT 
performance the possibility that these somatic markers are instead markers of cognitive load 
cannot be excluded. This is because pupil dilation can be interpreted in several ways with 
anticipated reward or threat and general cognitive effort all potentially resulting in pupil 
dilation (e.g., Granholm & Steinhauer, 2004; Piquado, Isaacowitz, & Wingfield, 2010).  The 
data showing increased pupil dilation for the advantageous deck is consistent with participants 
anticipating a positive outcome rather than a threat. However, it is possible that an increased 
level of cognitive effort may be in play and this would be consistent with the observed 
correlations with cognitive reflection.  
According to Bechara et al.’s (1997) original proposition, participants slowly develop 
anticipatory markers that are evident after the third Block (around trials 60). Hence a steady 
increase in anticipatory markers should be evident during the IGT performance and Bechara et 
al. claimed that implicit nature of the anticipatory signals is core to the SMH explanation. 
However, this argument is disputed in a later paper claiming that:’ The central feature of the 
SMH is not that non-conscious biases accomplish decisions in the absence of conscious 
knowledge, but rather that emotion-related signals assist cognitive processes even when they 
are non-conscious’ (Bechara et al., 2005, p. 159). This looks like a departure from their 
previous argument that somatic markers are implicitly acquired and would mean that the 
somatic markers arise as a consequence of the explicit knowledge and cognitive processing. 
Irrespective of these interpretations the data from this experiment demonstrate a role for 
somatic markers in performance on the IGT but allow for the possibility that these somatic 






This interpretation would also explain the correlation in early trials with cognitive reflection. 
The CRT1 was shown to be a stronger predictor of IGT performance than the aPD measures, 
with higher scorers clearly outperforming lower scorers. This is clear evidence that Type II 
reflective processing plays a salient role in the task and supports the view that the IGT is best 
understood within a dual-process framework (e.g., Brevers et el.,2013). Brevers et al. suggest 
the monitoring function of ‘cool’ processes over ‘hot’ processes, whereby the ability to control 
emotional reaction related to ‘hot’ processes would allow cognitive processing of positive and 
negative choices associated with choice selections. The CRT1 data presented here are 
consistent with this view and shows that the learning on IGT is indicative of a role for reflective 
monitoring of disadvantageous decks contingencies early in the game. This also raises a 
possibility that the learning phase on IGT could be thought of as the development of mindware 
related to deck contingencies, whereby the inability to reflect and/or cognitively process 
disadvantageous deck outcomes may be the result of missing mindware. According to Evans 
and Stanovich (2013) if the relevant mindware is available for a specific task, the next question 
is whether a person is able to detect the rules of the task and engage in sustained cognitive 
decoupling and hypothetical thinking in order to perform well on the task.  Since most of the 
participants in this experiment began the task by exploring disadvantageous decks (A + B) it is 
possible that they were developing required mindware to disambiguate disadvantageous deck 
contingencies. This would explain early correlation between the CRT1 and disadvantageous 
deck selection, whereby a developing mindware of the task and sustained higher cognitive 
reflection led to prompt learning of the disadvantageous deck contingencies.  
The suggestion that cognitive processing (as measured with CRT1) is associated with IGT 
performance early in the game is inconsistent with previous research that related higher 
cognitive processing with later trials on IGT (e.g., Brand et al., 2005, 2007, 2008). This 
inconsistency could be explained by the type of measures used to probe the learning effect. As 
discussed in Chapter 1, Brand et al. used tasks that measured decision-making under risk (the 
GDT; the PAG). These measures show a high correlation with executive processes such as 
categorization, cognitive flexibility and rule recognition (e.g.,  Brand et al., 2009). Although 
there is some indication that CRT performance may be related to WM (e.g., Stupple et al., 
2013) some authors argued that the CRT measures cognitive reflection that generates 
representations of choices in a complex environment (e.g., Zonca, Coricelli, & Polonio, 2017). 
Zonca et al., argued that cognitive reflection intervenes in the processes of representation 






that is highly accurate in predicting patterns of information related to reward or punishment 
values. In other words, cognitive reflection would not directly improve performance in the 
complex tasks but can influence the ability to form the understating of the complex 
environment, which in turn would predict optimal performance. Thus, it is possible that higher 
cognitive reflection helps learning IGT, by means of understanding the disadvantageous deck's 
contingencies, which in turn forms a representation about the goodness/badness of the decks 
that consequently influence optimal performance.       
These CRT1 data nonetheless need to be interpreted with some caution. The CRT1 was 
administrated prior to IGT and in order to rule out any possible issues with order effects the 
experiment should be replicated with a reversed or counterbalanced presentation order. There 
is also some debate as to whether the CRT1 is a measure of cognitive miserliness or a more 
general measure of analytic thinking or numerical ability and it has been correlated with both 
WM capacity (e.g., Stupple et al., 2013) and risk neutrality (Oechssler, Roider, & Schmitz, 
2009) which could impact on performance or task strategy. Further, Toplak et al.’s (2014) 
extended CRT1 could be criticised on the basis that some of the questions (e.g., number 7 has 
three forced options) are not open-ended and it is possible to generate a correct option by 
chance. Moreover, the dimensionality of the scale was originally not analysed, and it is not 
clear whether different items were considered for the scale. Nevertheless, the scale has been 
successfully used in several studies indicating that is a potent measure of cognitive reflection 
(e.g., Alos-Ferrer, Garagnani, & Hügelschäfer, 2016; Corgnet, Espín, & Hernan-Gonzalez, 
2015; Hertzog, Smith, & Ariel, 2016; Rinaldi, Radian, Rossignol, Kandana Arachchige, & 
Lefebvre, 2017; Ring, Neyse, David-Barett, & Schmidt, 2016).   
To summarise, evidence from this experiment showed that cognitive reflection and anticipatory 
somatic markers both contribute to decision-making, but the anticipatory signal may be of a 
cognitive nature. However, it needs to be noted that the measures used in the present study are 
relatively narrow and further applications of the pupil dilation methodologies are necessary to 
more fully explore the utility of this measure in investigating the IGT and the SMH more 
broadly. Nevertheless, the experiment showed clear implication of Type II processes during 
IGT performance. This is in line with previous research suggesting that higher order cognitive 
processes guide successful decision-making early in the game (e.g., Hinson et al., 2002; Maia 
& McClelland, 2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2013). Thus, there is substantial evidence that explicit 
learning guide IGT learning and performance which challenges SMH. In the next chapter 






because they offer strong potential in investigating the locus of explicit attention as learning 
progresses on the task. Furthermore, measures of conscious awareness and analytic ability were 
























Chapter 4  
Overview 
This chapter addresses objective (iii) of the thesis and details the second experiment that 
examines the effect of cognitive processes (e.g., attention, cognitive reflection and conscious 
awareness), thinking dispositions and individual differences on IGT performance. As discussed 
in Chapter 1, Bechara et al.’s (1994, 1997, 2000) claim that conscious awareness of the game 
develops as a result of somatic markers unconscious signals has been challenged several times 
(e.g., Bowman et al., 2005, Evans et al., 2005; Fernie & Tunney, 2006, 2013; Maia & 
McClelland, 2004, 2005). Conscious awareness may develop early in the game which indicates 
that somatic markers may represent an effect rather than a cause of explicit knowledge (e.g., 
Maia & McClelland, 2004). This is contrary to the suggestion that somatic markers reinforce 
learning early in the IGT (ambiguous stage) while the later stages of the task are informed by 
conscious knowledge and higher cognitive processes (e.g., Brand et al., 2007). Furthermore, 
the results from Experiment 1 (Chapter 3) showed that higher cognitive processes are 
associated with decision-making early in the IGT, thus supporting previous research regarding 
the engagement of higher cognitive processes during the IGT performance (e.g., Hinson et al., 
2002; Simonovic et al., 2016; Turnbull et al., 2003). It was also argued in Chapter 3 that the 
IGT performance is best understood within the dual-processing framework of decision-making. 
Firstly, because of the possibility that somatic markers may reflect intuitive, Type I processes; 
and secondly because a sustained higher cognitive reflection may be important in learning and 
consequent IGT performance. Thus, there is an important role for Type II processes in deck 
contingency disambiguation. In the current chapter, the locus of explicit attention, cognitive 
reflection and conscious awareness were discussed as potentially important explanatory 
mechanisms of the Type II processes that may be implicated in learning the IGT. Furthermore, 
individual differences in thinking dispositions were examined in the current chapter because of 
the suggestion that they could capture reflective level of processing that is involved in the 
generation of the alternative choices during decision-making (e.g., Evans, 2008). Steingroever 
et al. (2013) argued that there is substantial variability in IGT performance in healthy 
participants because of the physiological arousal and thinking dispositions; this proposition 
warrants investigation because only a careful examination of fine-tuned elements of the 






processes involved in learning and performance of the IGT. Thus, the aim of Experiment 2 in 
this chapter is to address the aforementioned issues.    
4.1. Introduction 
As discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, Brevers et al. (2013) proposed that a dual-process framework 
may provide a better explanation for non-optimal IGT performance in a population diagnosed 
with addictive disorders such as gambling and alcohol dependence than SMH. The 
conceptualisation of the ‘cool’ systems maps on Type II processes that are conscious, 
controlled, and involved in abstract and deliberate thinking and reasoning (e.g., Kahneman, 
2003). Hence it is assumed that the ‘cool’ system monitors and corrects affective processes 
triggered by the ‘hot’ system. This is in line with a proposition that, depending on the context 
of the situation, Type II processing may exert influence on Type I processing, thus providing 
alternative answers to the contextual problems (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Brevers et al.’s 
conceptualisation of the ‘hot’ system is somewhat ambiguous. Brevers et al. argued that the 
‘hot’ system (laden with affective tags that depend on previous experience) regulates emotional 
responses and inhibits impulsive reaction, p. 2). Hence, the ‘hot’ system is self-regulatory, and 
it depends on the ability to control emotional responses. If the ‘hot’ system is intact, and the 
control of emotional responses is attained, the ‘cool’ system will engage reasoning and 
problem-solving aspects of EFs. The problem with this conceptualisation is twofold: First, 
Brevers et al. did not provide any substantial evidence to support multiple aspects of the ‘hot’ 
system; and second the ‘hot’ system maps on Type I processes that are based on previous 
experience, implicit knowledge and basic emotions. Thus, it could be argued that the ‘hot’ 
system emulates the Type I processes, because their execution involves processes of emotional 
regulations (e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). This suggestion needs exploring in a ‘normal 
population.   
There is some evidence that ‘cool’ processes, as measured by EF tasks may account for IGT 
performance in later trials (Brand et al., 2006, 2007, 2008). For example, Brand et al. (2007) 
conducted two experiments and tested EFs measured by the WCST, the GDT, WASI and the 
ToH. The WCST the ToH and the GDT tasks moderately correlated with IGT performance 
after the third trial, and there was, however, no effect of intelligence on IGT performance. 
Brevers et al. (2013) interpreted these results as evidence  ‘that individuals with lowered “cool” 
executive functioning (i.e., concept formation, shifting between multiple tasks, and dominant 






activation reactivity associated with an advantageous decision-making profile) exhibited less 
disadvantageous choices in situations of decision-making under ambiguity as compared with 
situations of decision-making under risk’ (p. 665). This is further supported by the evidence 
that the EFs are not associated with IGT performance, (at least not during the ambiguous stage) 
(Toplak, Sorge, Benoit, West, & Stanovich, 2010). Toplak et al. (2010) reviewed 43 studies 
that examined the association between IGT performance and measures of EFs and intelligence. 
They reported small to medium effects where only a small proportion of the studies yielded 
significant results. The focus of the review was on studies that measured inhibition of 
interference of a response, shifting between tasks or mental sets, intelligence, and updating and 
monitoring of WM representations. Overall, the results indicated a lack of correlations between 
the EFs, intelligence and IGT performance, with the majority of studies reporting no 
relationship. However, this lack of correlation could be associated with a mixed studies’ sample 
that consisted of healthy participants, and participants with neurological and psychiatric 
disorders who may have different impairments or intact cognitive abilities (e.g., Sahakian et 
al., 2015). Nevertheless, both Brevers et al.’s and Toplak et al.’s reviews suggested that the 
IGT is best explained within a dual-process framework where attentional processing may be 
pertinent to IGT performance as a prerequisite for activation of inhibitory response preferences, 
presumably through the Type II processes.  
The presence of attentional processing in IGT is explained by the necessity for executive 
inhibition that involves suppression of recently inspected, bad choices (e.g., Fuster, 2008; 
Eslinger & Chakara, 2004). SMH postulates that decision options are determined by 
somatically marked choices consisted of stochastically sampled information (e.g., Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005). Attention is determined by physiological arousal and by the information needs 
that are acquired passively, presumably in the early trials, followed by an active attentional 
online processing in the later trials (e.g., Brand et al., 2007). Gansler, Jerram, Vannorsdall and 
Schretlen (2011) used structural equation modelling (SEM) to test whether the IGT relates to 
attention and processing speed, executive functioning and visual and learning memory. Their 
results indicated that attention may play a special role during IGT performance. Attention was 
a very strong predictor on trials 1-100, and attention and executive functioning were weaker 
predictors on trials 41-100. These are very interesting results because they propose an active 
role for attention rather than the previously assumed passive role. Gansler et al. (2011), 
however, used EF tests that are closely related to the cognitive abilities involved in action 






Furthermore, they used neuropsychological tests to examine attention (e.g., BRIEF, Schretlen, 
1997) and it is difficult to infer stronger conclusion related to the active role of attentional 
processing during IGT performance.  
Recent evidence on attentional processing has challenged the assumptions of passive attention 
which questions the basic premises of SMH regarding automatic attentional information 
acquisition (e.g., Hayhoe, & Rothkopf, 2011; Krajbich, Armel, & Rangel, 2010; Krajbich et 
al., 2012; Orquin, & Loose, 2013). For example, Krajbich et al. (2010) used value-based 
binary-choice and examined inspection time and choice data. They showed that inspection time 
increases with the difficulty of the choices, thus suggesting that inspection time reflects 
cognitive demand and actively construct decision-choice. This is in line with a suggestion that 
attentional online processing reflects active, higher order cognition that could be investigated 
with an eye-tracking methodology and could be related to Type II processes (Orquin & Loose, 
2013). One of the underlying features of Type II processes is a requirement for controlled 
attention, conscious representations of decisional choices and WM resources, compared to 
Type I processes that do not require controlled attention and make minimal demands on WM 
resources (Evans & Stanovich, 2013a). Previous research on IGT has shown that conscious 
awareness develops early in the game, thus indicating a role for higher cognitive processes 
(e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2006, 2013). This is 
further supported by the results from Experiment 1 and previous research that showed the effect 
of cognitive reflection on deck’s contingences disambiguation early in IGT (Simonovic et al., 
2016). Taken together the evidence indicate that there is an active role of Type II processes in 
IGT which could challenge the SMH assumption.  The role for attention during IGT 
performance is assumed, but to the best of my knowledge, not examined yet. The next section 
discussed the locus of explicit attention and the evidence from decision-making studies that 
used the eye-tracking methodology. It is argued that examination of attentional processing 
during IGT may provide an important insight into cognitive processes involved in learning the 
IGT.  
Eye tracking and attention  
Eye-tracking movement in reasoning and decision-making research provides an insight into the 
nature and organisation of reasoning processes. The active role of attention during fixation 
periods is now acknowledged to represent a good explanation for the cognitive processes 






For example, attention plays an important role during information extraction which is encoded 
during a given fixation and inspection time during the choice comparison (Krajbich et al., 
2010). Krajbich et al. (2010) developed a computational model of value-based choices and 
pointed out that fixations guide the comparison processes between the choices. Their model 
implies a causal effect between the fixation processes and choices after comparison processes. 
The model received good support from research that included tasks that involve information 
complexity, reasoning difficulties and time pressure (e.g., Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glöckner, 
2009; Glaholt & Reingold, 2011; Glockner & Herbold, 2011). For instance, Glaholt and 
Reingold, (2011) used images of photographic art and tested stimulus exposure during 
decision-making. They measured the spatial and temporal profile of decision makers’ 
information sampling with an eye-tracking methodology. They reported that the duration of 
inspection-time is related to the encoding of the alternative choices during decision-making. 
Furthermore, they argued that the inspection time not only encapsulates information sampling, 
but also evaluation and comparison of relevant choices alternatives. Although this suggestion 
is still under debate (e.g., Bird, Lauwereyns, & Crawford, 2012; Nittono & Wada, 2009) it is 
generally assumed that inspection time could have an important role in information gathering 
and choices evaluation and comparison (e.g., Lim, O’Doherty, & Rangel, 2011).  
Inspection time is also related to information integration during decision-making that may be 
explained by the different types of processing (e.g., Glockner, 2007; Glockner & Betsch, 2008; 
Glockner & Herbold, 2008, 2011; Horstmann et al., 2009). Glockner and Herbold (2008) 
examined participants’ performance on forty decision tasks and related long inspection time to 
deliberate calculations. They also reported that information search increases if there is a 
decrease in expected value during a gamble. A specific strategy related to the task is then 
needed to circumvent the decrease.  This is in line with earlier experiments on the choice 
patterns of the probabilistic cues (e.g., Glockner, 2007). Glockner used a city size task, where 
participants needed to decide which of the two suggested cities is larger based on probabilistic 
cues. Although the result suggests that a decision can be made promptly (Type I processes), 
Type II processes (e.g., calculation of weighted sums) are needed for a correct response. 
Furthermore, information integration depended on the reflection of the consistency of the 
maximizing process where automaticity and cognitive reflection of the decision choices were 
integrated holistically and operated on a continuum. A similar suggestion is made by 
Horstmann et al. who conducted a study to examine the effect of intuitive processing and 






complex legal inference task where they had to decide who committed a crime in a hypothetical 
murder case. The study results pointed out that there is an interaction between the Type I and 
Type II processes that depend on similar information search and information integration. 
However, Type II processes add supplementary analytical features to the Type I processes. 
Taken together these studies’ results related longer inspection time with deliberation and Type 
II processes.  
This is in line with research on syllogistic reasoning studies that associated longer inspection 
time with increased reasoning processing (e.g., Ball, Lucas, Miles & Gale, 2003; Ball, Phillips, 
Wade & Quayle, 2006; Stupple & Ball, 2008).  For example, Ball et al. (2006), provided good 
evidence that eye-tracking measures of online attentional processing may capture reasoning 
processes. Ball et al. reported an experiment in which participants’ inspection time on 
syllogistic reasoning was tested by using an eye-tracking methodology. Reasoning processes 
were also tested by means of manipulation of conclusion validity and believability on reasoning 
tasks. Ball et al.  monitored the duration of people’s eye fixation on premises and conclusion 
of syllogistic problems and suggested ‘that increased inspection time of the problems 
components are a reflection of increased processing effort’ (p.84). Furthermore, it was 
suggested that the application of the eye-tracking measures might provide a deeper 
understanding of the reasoning processes, where fixation durations, attentional processing and 
high-level reasoning mechanisms can help facilitate plausible explanation for differences in 
reasoning processing. 
In three experiments that tested Evans’ (1996) heuristic-analytic account of reasoning on the 
Wason’s selection task (Wason, 1966), Ball et al. (2003), used an eye-tracking methodology to 
examine inspection time. In the Wason selection task participants are presented with a rule if 
p then q and four decks of cards to which the rule assigns. For example, the rule might be If a 
card has a vowel on one side, then it has an even number on the other side with the facing cards 
showing A (p), D (-p), 4 (q) and 7 (-q). Participants are then asked to turn over cards to 
determine whether the rule is true or false. The logical correct response should be A and 7 (p 
and -q) (Wason & Shapiro, 1971). Ball et al. (2003) provided a direct measure of online, 
attentional processing of the cards by using eye-tracking measures and tested inspection time. 
Two out of three experiments provided reliable evidence for inspection time; participants spent 
more time inspecting cards they selected than those they rejected. However, Evans and Ball 
(2010), re-examined the data from Ball et al.’s (2003) study and argued that attention may be 






analysis of Ball et al.’s (2003) data revealed that the inspection time differed significantly from 
participants’ subsequent card selection. Evans and Ball acknowledged that the measure of card 
inspection times may provide very important information of cognitive processing on the 
reasoning task, however, this cognitive processing does not include the key logical insight for 
a rule if p then q falsifying statement.  Nevertheless, Evans and Ball’s (2010) re-analysis of the 
data suggests that the eye-tracking methodology can be very useful in capturing different types 
of processing whereby the competitive nature of decision difficulty may have different effects 
on inspection time.  
The above presented evidence is consistent with the notion that the eye-tracking methodology 
can be useful in detecting attentional processing during decision-making. The primary 
advantage of the eye-tracking methodology is that provides a more direct measure of covert 
and overt attentional processing during decision-making. More specifically, inspection time 
has been shown to be a very useful measure for detection of Type I and Type II processes, with 
longer inspection time related to increased processing effort. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, the results from the first experiment indicated that Type II processes are involved early 
in IGT. In this chapter’s experiment a direct measure of the locus of explicit attention 
(inspection time) is used to examine cognitive processes during the IGT performance. This will 
allow for closer examination of attentional processing that may be implicated early in the game. 
Furthermore, the basic premises of SMH is that emotions guide decisions covertly and that 
participants are not able to explicitly verbalize their experience. The evidence discussed in 
Chapter 2 indicate that participants are able to generate conscious impressions of the goodness 
and the badness of the decks early in the game. According to dual-process framework, the input 
and output of the Type II processes are conscious, controlled and occur in deliberate mode 
(e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013). This is discussed next.    
Conscious Awareness   
Bechara et al.  (1994) made an argument that the performance on the IGT is ‘cognitively 
impenetrable’, meaning that somatic marker signals guide successful decision-making covertly 
in the absence of conscious knowledge of the game. As discussed in Chapter 1, this argument 
was challenged numerous times with contrasting evidence that conscious knowledge guides 
participants’ selections and they are aware of the deck contingences sometimes even without 
acquiring somatic markers (e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Cella et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2005; 






(2004) analysis indicated that somatic markers could be generated by conscious knowledge of 
deck payoffs and showed that awareness of the advantageous and disadvantageous deck picks 
develops early (after only 20 trials). Maia and McClelland’s results were replicated several 
times (e.g., Fernie & Tunney, 2006, 2013; Wagar & Dixon, 2006), and similar outcomes were 
obtained in studies that used subjective awareness questions (e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Cella 
et al., 2007; Evans et al., 2005). Bowman et al. used subjective experience ratings where 
participants were asked to provide deck ratings in terms of how good or bad they thought each 
deck was on a scale of zero to ten. Bowman et al. reported that participants developed 
awareness of the goodness and the badness of the decks after the first Block of trials. Similarly, 
by using the same subjective rating question, Evans et al. reported that both healthy people and 
people with schizophrenia developed awareness of which decks were ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ratings 
at above chance levels, after the first and second Blocks of trials. This compelling evidence 
challenged Bechara et al.’s argument and raised considerable doubt over the inference that 
somatic markers act covertly and cause conscious awareness of the goodness and badness of 
the decks. 
Conversely, Persaud et al. (2007) argued that the beginning of the task is based on unconscious 
informations. Persaud et al. asked the participants to wager on the payoffs of the trials.  The 
wager that could be placed was high (£20) or low (£10). The reward from disadvantageous 
decks was twice the amount wagered (with occasional penalties being larger) whereas the 
reward from the advantageous decks was equal to the amount wagered. The point of the task 
was that wagering could probe awareness. If/when participants had some awareness then he/she 
would bet higher in that choice because of a higher payoff.  Persaud et al. reported that the 
wagering bias started after 70 trials, and therefore concluded that unconscious (covert) 
influence of somatic markers guide decision-making early in the game.  This however, is more 
likely to be theoretical speculation because it examines the correctness of the decisional choices 
rather than conscious awareness (e.g., Seth, 2007). Furthermore, the problem with wagering 
method of assessing awareness could be loss aversion (e.g., Dienes & Seth, 2010; 
Konstantinidis & Shanks, 2013). Participants could be loss aversive and may choose to make 
low wagers even if they experience some level of conscious awareness.  
Persaud et al. (2007) have criticized Maia and McClelland’s test of awareness and argued that 
participants’ verbal report of their mental processes is sometimes unreliable. However, only 
one part of Maia and McClelland’s test consists of verbal report. The rest of the test is based 






ratings) and the estimation and calculation of the deck values, that requires conscious 
awareness of the deck contingencies (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2014). Furthermore, the 
structured questionnaire is presented in a clear numerical form which aids explicit tracking of 
the deck contingencies (e.g., Turnbull et al., 2014). Therefore, Maia and McClelland’s (2004) 
test of awareness could provide an examination of explicit awareness and provide multiple 
sources of information that could explain decision-making on IGT. Thus, despite some 
criticism, Maia and McClelland’s (2004) test was successfully used in studies that examined 
conscious awareness during IGT performance. (e.g., Fernie, & Tunney, 2006, 2013; Wagar & 
Dixon, 2006).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, there is substantial evidence for the effect of conscious awareness 
on IGT (e.g., Turnbull et al., 2014). Furthermore, conscious awareness is implicated in 
information integration (Strauss et al., 2015), learning (Dickinson & Balleline, 2009), and 
memory consolidation (Tononi, 2004) that again challenges Bechara et al.’s (1994, 1997) 
argument that somatic markers guide information integration during the IGT covertly and in 
the absence of conscious knowledge. In fact, some researchers argued that there is very little 
evidence in support of the unconscious (deliberation without attention) processes and that most 
of the attentional processing is associative with awareness (Newell & Shanks,2014). While 
questions remain about the suitability of different awareness assessments (Bechara et al., 1997; 
Maia & McClelland, 2004; Persaud et al., 2007) there is convincing evidence that awareness 
emerges in early trials on IGT. Thus, in addition to the attentional online measurements, an 
assessment of participants’ conscious awareness (Maia & McClelland, 2004) was used in the 
experiment because of the suggestion that conscious awareness may facilitate Type II 
processing (e.g., Shea, & Frith, 2016). Furthermore, according to Evans (2007, 2010), Type II 
processes incorporate the algorithmic and reflective processing whereby the reflective level of 
processing is involved in the generation of the alternative responses and is captured through 
thinking disposition and individual differences. This is discussed next in relation to IGT 
performance.    
Thinking dispositions and IGT  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Evans and Stanovich (2013) argued that the difference between the 
algorithmic and the reflective processes is depicted in the measurements of individual cognitive 
abilities and thinking disposition. The cognitive abilities measure the ability of algorithmic 






whereas thinking dispositions measure reflective processes and tendencies to collect 
information, calibrate decision choices, think about future consequences and to weigh minuses 
and pluses of a situation before deciding on a choice. Individual differences and thinking 
dispositions in IGT are not extensively researched (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006). Individual 
differences during IGT performance are not well-researched. There is some evidence that 
associated IGT performance and sensitivity of rewards and punishment and measures of 
personality, behavioural activation and inhibition, neuroticism and sensation seeking (e.g., 
Buelow & Suhr, 2013; Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Franken & Muris, 2005; Hooper, Luciana, 
Wahlstrom, Conklin & Yarger, 2008; Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012). However, research that 
examined the effect of thinking dispositions on IGT performance is relatively sparse. To the 
best of my knowledge, only one study examined thinking disposition differences on IGT 
(Harman, 2011). Harman used Cacioppo & Petty’s (1982) NFC test to examine people’s 
tendency to engage in and enjoy effortful thought during IGT performance. Harman (2011) 
reported that the high NFC group outperform the low NFC group, showing that performance 
of the healthy participants on the IGT is not optimal. Thus, different thinking dispositions and 
processing styles alongside often used measures of EFs could be used, to account for a non-
optimal performance in a healthy population (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Steingroever et al., 2013). 
This could also provide some further insight into the effect of explicit processes on IGT and if 
the explicit knowledge on IGT represents an artefact of individual’s different thinking 
dispositions (cf Toplak et al., 2010).  
Several thinking disposition measures were included in Experiment 2 to examine this notion: 
Epstein et al.’s (1996) REI was included because it measures different thinking dispositions 
(analytical and intuitive) that could be helpful in understanding IGT performance. For example, 
people who score high on REI are assumed to adopt the analytical thinking style and have the 
capability to understand intuitive style (e.g., Epstein & Pacini, 2001; Lu, 2015). Pertinent to 
the IGT performance, if there is a role for higher cognitive processing early in the game (e.g., 
Experiment 1; Simonovic et al., 2016), examination of the different thinking styles could show 
if the cognitive processing is related to cognitive ability or thinking disposition. This allows 
exploration of whether it is thinking dispositions or cognitive ability facilitate learning and 
guide successful IGT performance. 
Similarly, the use of measures such as AOT (Haran et al., 2013) and CFC (Strathman et al., 
1994) could provide closer examination of thinking disposition related to a number of 






calibrate the degree of strength of an opinion to the degree of evidence available and the 
tendency to think about future consequences before taking action. Macpherson and Stanovich, 
(2007) showed that participants who score high on AOT were more likely to overcome belief-
bias reasoning task. They argued that an increase in AOT reflects a desire for more information 
before making a prediction where the higher attention to information may improve estimation 
performance. Similarly, Haran et al. (2013) showed that information acquisition (as measured 
with AOT scale) predicts performance in an estimation task. In three studies, participants made 
estimates and predictions of uncertain quantities, with varying levels of control over the amount 
of information they could collect before estimating. AOT predicted a tendency to collect 
information which consequently predicted performance. This is relevant to IGT performance, 
because people need to pass through the exploration stage (sampling from different decks) 
where higher attention to collected information may improve performance in the subsequent 
exploitation stage. Equally, CFC (Strathman et al., 1994) could be related to IGT performance, 
because participants need to forgo high-immediate rewards and learn to favour long-term 
positive outcomes for advantageous decks. The CFC measures the extent to which individuals 
consider distant outcomes when choosing their present behaviour and it has been shown that 
individual differences in CFC predict a range of behaviour related to self-control (e.g., 
Joireman, Strathman, & Balliet, 2006), impulsivity and aggression (Joireman, Anderson, & 
Strathman, 2003). Thus, in addition to REI, both AOT and CFC scales are included in this 
chapters’ experiment to examine the effect of thinking dispositions on IGT performance.  
In addition, hemodynamic measures of physiological arousal are included in this chapters’ 
experiment (blood pressure and heart rate variability) because of the suggestion that this could 
have an effect on IGT performance (e.g., Colombetti, 2008; Steingroever et al., 2013). 
Research on emotion often employs different measures of autonomic arousal such as blood 
pressure, heart rate and SCR during decision-making (e.g., Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Christie 
& Friedman, 2004; Crone et al., 2004; Wagar & Dixon, 2006). Most of the studies related to 
IGT performance were focused on the anticipatory aspects of the physiological measurements. 
However, it would be helpful to specify different dimensions of arousal and tracking their roles 
according to the disadvantageous and advantageous aspects of decision-making (Colombetti, 
2008). In particular, it is important to understand if general arousal differs between the IGT 
Blocks and how it affects overall performance. Furthermore, one of the reasons for participants’ 
non-optimal performance on IGT may be sensitivity to punishments and rewards that may lead 






Thus, in addition to hemodynamic measures of arousal, an Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI) was 
used (Reiss, et al., 1986) to examine a tendency to endorse a negative implication for anxiety 
on other negative implications. Meaning that people who believe that anxiety has few or no 
negative effects may be able to cope with a relatively high level of exposure to anxiety-
provoking stimuli. In contrast, people who believe that anxiety has serious effects, tend to have 
anxiety reactions that grow in anticipation of severe consequences (e.g., Steinman & 
Teachman, 2010).   
4.2. The Experiment 
To the best of my knowledge, the Experiment 1, and only one published study has utilised eye-
tracking that measured pupil dilation methodology during the IGT performance in a healthy 
population (Lavin et al., 2014). Hence the predictions made here are based on the dual-process 
account of decision-making and research that focuses on reasoning and decision-making. 
CRT1 was used as a direct measure of deliberative thinking to replicate previous findings 
demonstrating that the CRT1 was highly predictive of IGT performance (e.g., experiment 1; 
Simonovic et al., 2016). In addition, thinking disposition measures (AOT, REI, CFC and ASI) 
were used because the self-reported measures may provide useful insights into how participants 
experience their own cognitive processes and attitudes. Eye-tracking measures (inspection 
time) and conscious awareness measure were also included to examine explicit attentional 
processes. Finally, participants hemodynamic activities were measured to test whether 
physiological arousal affects IGT performance.  The following predictions were tested: 
1. The standard analysis of IGT performance across Blocks was extended as in 
Experiment 1 to check if IGT performance will continue to improve after Block 5. 
2. It was also predicted that the correlations observed in Experiment 1 between CRT1 
score and disadvantageous card selections across Blocks would be replicated such that 
strong correlations would be found in early Blocks because of the importance of 
analytic processing early in the game.  
3. It was also predicted that the measures of thinking disposition should correlate with 
disadvantageous decks selection. 
4. The focus of eye tracking measurements was on inspection time for the advantageous 






processing plays a role in IGT, then this should be evident in increased inspection time 
(e.g., Ball et al., 2003; Horstmann et al., 2009). 
5.  Inspection time should differ according to the nature of the decks and it should predict 
overall IGT performance. 
6.  If attentional processing plays a role in early trials it is also expected that conscious 
awareness of the decks emerges early in the game (e.g., after Block 2).  
7. According to dual process theories, Type II processes include both, attention and 
conscious awareness. Hence it is expected that the conscious awareness of the game 
and inspection time should be related. 
8. It there is arousal during the game it was predicted that the physiological measurements 
(blood pressure and heart rate variability measures) differ between the Blocks. 
4.3. Method  
Participants 
Fifty healthy students from the University of Derby, aged 19-56 years, received participation 
points for participating in the experiment. Research was conducted in accordance with 
stipulations of the local ethics committee. Participants had normal or corrected to normal 
vision. 
Materials  
Iowa Gambling Task 
Participants completed Bechara et al.’s (1994) computerised version of IGT. The procedure 
and scoring were identical to that described in Experiment 1. 
CRT1  
The procedure and scoring were identical to that described in Experiment 1. The Cronbach 
alpha in this experiment was α= .65.  
Rational Experiential Inventory (REI; Epstein et al., 1996) 
The ten-item REI measured rational and experiential thinking styles and processing modes with 
two factors: Need for Cognition (rational measure) and Faith in Intuition (experiential 






true. Higher REI scores indicated higher analytic thinking style. An example of a question is 
‘Thinking hard and for a long time about something gives me little satisfaction’.  Several 
studies have confirmed that the REI is a reliable measure of the individual difference in 
information processing, and that the two independent thinking styles measures account for a 
substantial amount of variance that is not addressed by other personality theories (i.e. Norris, 
& Epstein, 2011). The Cronbach alpha in this experiment was α= .54. 
 Actively Open-Minded Thinking Scale (AOT; Haran et al., 2013) 
The seven-item AOT is based on Stanovich and West’s (2007) scale and is designed to capture 
thinkers’ desire to be more informed before making an estimate or prediction. The focus of the 
scale is the tendency to maximise or satisfice when making a decision. The seven-item scale 
was rated on a 7-point scale, from completely disagree to completely agree. Higher AOT scores 
indicated a higher tendency for information acquisition before making a decision. An example 
of a question is ‘One should disregard evidence that conflicts with one’s established beliefs’. 
The Cronbach alpha in this experiment was α= .40. 
Consideration of Future Consequences (CFC; Strathman et al., 1994) 
The twelve-item CFC measured the extent to which people consider distant versus immediate 
consequences of potential behaviour. This may be very important for the participants engaging 
in the IGT, since to maximize their profit participants need to consider choice consequences 
(punishment/reward). The twelve-item scale was rated on a 5-point scale, from extremely 
uncharacteristic to extremely characteristic. Higher CFC scores indicated higher consideration 
of future consequences when making a decision. An example of a question is ’I consider how 
things might be in the future and try to influence those things with my day to day behaviour’. 
The Cronbach alpha in this experiment was α= .84. 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI; Reiss et al., 1986) 
The sixteen-item ASI was used to examine participants’ concern about or fear of anxiety related 
symptoms. ASI measures a tendency to show exaggerated and prolonged reactions to anxiety-
provoking stimuli. The sixteen-item scale was rated on a 4-point scale, from very little to very 
much. Higher ASI scores indicated a higher tendency to endorse a negative implication for 
anxiety on other negative implications. An example of a question is ‘When I cannot keep my 
mind on a task, I worry that I might be going crazy’. The Cronbach alpha in this experiment 






Conscious Awareness Test  
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) Test of Awareness, measures emergence of the conceptual 
knowledge of the decks’ contingencies. This sensitivity test encompasses 5 questions in total 
with question 3 having 4 additional sub questions. Three measures of knowledge are obtained 
for each deck: a deck rating from −10 to 10 how good or how bad decks are (Deck Rating), an 
estimate of the average net amount won or lost on the deck (Estimated Net) and a calculated 
net amount based on participants’ estimates of how much they would win, how often they lost, 
and how much that average loss was (Calculated Net). An example of a question related to 
estimated net calculation is ‘What would you expect your average net result to be?’ An example 
of a question related to calculated net calculation is ‘For those trials in which you would get a 
loss, what would you expect the average loss to be?’ The participants are also asked which 
deck they would choose if they only had one choice (One Deck). Participants’ levels of 
knowledge were arranged according to the deck's ratings and one deck category (Level 1 
knowledge) and calculated and estimated net values (Level 2 knowledge).   
Eye Tracking Measurements   
Eye movements were recorded with the Eye-gaze binocular system Tobii-X2-30 (Inquisit 4 
milliseconds plugins), with a remote binocular sampling rate of 30 Hz and an accuracy of about 
0.45°. The X2 Eye Tracker is a stand-alone eye tracker, and it was attached to a laptop (Dell, 
Precision M6700, 2.70Ghz). Participants were seated approximately 70 cm from the laptop 
monitor. The Tobii measured 184mm (7.2’’) in length and enabled tracking at close distances 
(up to 36° gaze angle). Fixations were identified using a fixation radius of 20 pixels and 
minimum fixation duration of 100ms or above. Before starting the experiment, a 9-point 
calibration routine was executed. Each data point was identified with a timestamp and “X,Y” 
coordinates, and these coordinates were processed further into fixations and overlaid on a video 
recording of the IGT. Choices, decision times, and basic eye-tracking parameters such as 
inspection time and coordinates were recorded. To avoid methodological artefacts, an eye 
tracking metrics were delineated through fixation filters. Non-overlapping areas of interest 
(AOIs) around each cell in the matrix were defined, each containing different decks during the 
performance.  Hence, four AOIs were obtained with the size of 690 x 458 pixels for decks. For 
each participant and each decision, the inspection time within each AOI was calculated.  






Beat-to-beat blood pressure was measured continuously via a finger monitor (Finometer; TPD 
Biomedical Instruments, The Netherlands). Finometer measured Mean Blood Pressure (MBP), 
Hear Rate (HR) and Systolic Blood Pressure (SBP) responses to check participants arousal 
during the IGT performance. A baseline MBP, HR and SBP measurements were taken before 
the initiation of tasks followed by seven MBP, HR and SBP measurements taken during the 
IGT performance after each Block of 20 picks. MBPR, HRR and SBPR reactivity responses 
were calculated by subtracting the average of the performance MBP, HR and SBP 
measurements from the average of resting MBP, HR and SBP measurements. 
Procedure 
Following consent, participants sat for a 5-min resting period, and then baseline hemodynamic 
measurements were taken. Next, the process of calibration for eye-tracking methodology was 
undertaken and the IGT performed. Participants were interrupted after each Block (20 trials) 
and the questions related to the conceptual knowledge of the game were recorded.   After the 
completion of the IGT task post-task hemodynamic measurements were taken. The CRT1, 
AOT, REI, CFC and ASI were administrated and at the end participants were debriefed. Only 
the Conscious-Awareness test was scored on paper. The remaining tests were administered 
electronically. 
Analytic strategy and scoring   
Before the initiation of the analyses, data were inspected for normality by checking for outliers, 
Skewness and Kurtosis, normality tests and Z-scores to ensure that the assumptions of 
parametric statistics were met before analyses were performed. If parametric assumptions were 
not met the data were log transformed, corrections used, and non-parametric tests used when 
appropriate.  
IGT   
Standard scoring was derived by deducting total disadvantageous card picks (A + B) from total 
advantageous picks (C + D). A positive score suggests a more advantageous decision-making 
strategy, whereas a negative score suggests a disadvantageous decision-making strategy. A 
repeated measures ANOVA was conducted to check the IGT performance per Block. Next, 
bivariate correlations between the disadvantageous decks, CRT1, AOT, REI, CFC and ASI 







Inspection time was measured in seconds. As parametric assumptions were not met a log 
transformation was performed to stabilize variances. Inspection time was examined across 
Blocks by using 2 (deck) x 7 (Block) repeated measures ANOVAs with disadvantageous 
(A+B) and advantageous decks (C+D) as the dependent variables. A repeated measures t -
tests were used to test the deck differences between the matching Blocks.  Next, multiple 
regression (method Enter) tested the relative predictive strength of disadvantageous (A+B) 
and advantageous decks (C+D) inspection time for performance on IGT.   
Conceptual Knowledge 
Conscious awareness across Blocks was also examined as follows. Five measures of 
knowledge were obtained for each deck at each question period: a deck rating from −10 to 
10 (Deck Rating), an estimate of the average net amount won or lost on the deck (Estimated 
Net) and a calculated net amount based on participant estimates of how much they would 
win, how often they lost, and how much that average loss was (Calculated Net). The 
participants were also asked which deck they would choose if they only had one choice (One 
Deck). In the end, participants were asked to rate how confident they are in their decision 
(Confidence Rating). Participants’ level of conscious knowledge was then arranged 
according to three levels as suggested by Maia and McClelland (2004). Level 0: the 
participant does not have any conscious knowledge specifying a preference for one of the 
two best decks. Level 1: the participant has conscious knowledge specifying a preference 
for one of the two best decks but does not have conscious knowledge about the outcomes of 
the decks that could provide a basis for that preference. Level 2: the participant has 
conscious knowledge specifying a preference for one of the two best decks and has 
conscious knowledge about the outcomes of the decks that could provide a basis for that 
preference (Maia & McClelland, 2004, p.16076). Overall deck ratings (CD-AB) were 
examined to inspect Level 1 knowledge across Blocks. Next, a 2 (deck) x 2 (value) repeated 
measures ANOVA examined Estimated and Calculated net values between the 
disadvantageous (A+B) and advantageous (C+D) decks (Level 2 knowledge). Levels of 
conceptual knowledge (Level, 0, 1 and 2) were examined per Block by calculating the 
percentage of the number of the participants that reached different levels. Finally, a 2 (deck) 
x 3 (knowledge) repeated measures ANOVA examined inspection time of disadvantageous 
(A+B) and advantageous decks (C+D) across three levels of conceptual knowledge.  






As parametric assumptions were not met a log transformation was performed to stabilize 
variances. Three separate repeated measures ANOVAs were used to determine levels of 
participants’ arousal (MBPR, HRR and SBPR) per Block.  
4.4. Results  
Performance across Blocks was tested using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted repeated measures 
ANOVA. There was a main effect of Block condition, F(4.26,208.68)=24.33, p<.001, np
2=.33. 
Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 4.4.1. Bonferroni adjusted post hoc tests 
demonstrated that performance improved significantly through the Blocks of trials (excluding 
Block 6). Notably the nonstandard additional Blocks 6 and 7 continued to show changes in 
performance relative to earlier Blocks such that performance dipped in Block 6, but Block 7 
was significantly better than all but Block 6. 
Table 4.4.1 
Mean (SD) of IGT Performance as a function of Trial Block. 
 
Correlations between CRT1 scores, AOT scores, ASI scores, REI scores, CFC scores and 
selection of disadvantageous decks were conducted with the adjusted threshold alpha (p<.005) 
to avoid potential issues related to false positives results (see Table 4.4.2). These demonstrated 
the significant negative relationships between CRT1 scores and disadvantageous card 
selections in all but the first Block of trials. The correlations between the AOT, CFC, REI, ASI 
scores and selection of disadvantageous decks were not significant. This indicates that 
cognitive ability significantly correlates with disadvantageous deck section whereas measures 
of thinking disposition do not.   
Table 4.4.2 
Correlations between Disadvantageous card selections, CRT1 score and thinking disposition measures as a 
function of Trial Block. 
Trial Block IGT performance  
Block 1 -3.12 (7.15) 
Block 2 1.64 (6.53) 
Block 3 4.12 (7.04) 
Block 4 6.28 (7.38) 
Block 5 7.80 (8.29) 
Block 6 5.80 (9.12) 
















Block 1 r= -.201 r= .057 r= .012 r= -.018 r= -.035 
Block 2 r= -.458* r= .026 r= .059 r= -.019 r= .098 
Block 3 r= -.448* r= .268 r= .198 r= .164 r= -.071 
Block 4 r= -.511* r= .109 r= .078 r= .135 r= .019 
Block 5 r= -.546* r= .077 r= .209 r= .085 r= -.006 
Block 6 r= -.556* r= .119 r= -.020 r= .097 r= -.097 
Block 7 r= -.665* r= .124 r= .040 r= .152 r= -.037 
Total  r= -.667* r= .151 r= .106 r= .121 r= -.031 
 
Eye tracking Analyses 
Inspection time was analysed by conducting a 2 (Decks) x 7 (Blocks) Greenhouse-Geisser 
adjusted repeated measures ANOVA with log-transformed data. There was a main effect of 
Decks F(1.00,24.00)=7.22, p=.013, np
2=.23. Participants spent more time inspecting 
advantageous decks (M=0.75, SD=0.20) than disadvantageous decks (M=0.67, SD=0.20). 
Means and standard deviations are shown in table 4.4.3. 
Table 4.4.3  
Mean (SD) of Inspection Time in seconds as a function of Trial Block. 
 
There was a main effect of Block F(2.96,70.99)=7.07, p< .001, np
2= .22 with inspection time 
decreasing after the second block. The Bonferroni adjustment was too stringent to make 21 
comparisons to examine this main effect. The alpha level was therefore adjusted to p< .005 to 
balance concerns related to type I and type II errors. The adjusted post hoc pairwise 
comparisons (Table 4.4.4) demonstrated that inspection time in Blocks 1 and 2 was 
significantly higher than Blocks 6 and 7 (all p< .005). Inspection time in Block 3 was 
significantly higher than Block 6.   
                                                          
8 Note all * are significant at p = .001, and all ** are significant at p < .001 
 
Trial Block Inspection Time (C+D) Inspection Time (A+B) Total Inspection Time  
Block 1 0.71 (0.16) 0.84 (0.18) 0.78 (0.17) 
Block 2 0.78 (0.15) 0.79 (0.14) 0.79 (0.15) 
Block 3 0.80 (0.16) 0.69 (0.18) 0.75 (0.17) 
Block 4 0.80 (0.14) 0.61 (0.23) 0.71 (0.18) 
Block 5 0.76 (0.24) 0.64 (0.26) 0.70 (0.20) 
Block 6 0.69 (0.30) 0.59 (0.20) 0.64 (0.21) 
Block 7 0.69 (0.29) 0.54 (0.22) 0.61 (0.20) 








Mean differences (SD) in Inspection Time. Pairwise comparison across Blocks 
 
There was an interaction between the Decks and the Blocks F(2.84,68.18)=4.81, p=.005, 
np
2=.16. Bonferroni adjusted independent t-tests tested the interaction between the matching 
Blocks (Table 4.4.5). There was a significant interaction between Blocks 1, 4, 5 and 7 of 
disadvantageous and advantageous decks with Block 4, 5 and 7 showing greater increase in 
inspection time for advantageous Blocks (Figure 4.4.1). Means and standard deviations are 
shown in Table 4.4.5.  
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Figure 4.4.1. Mean inspection time for disadvantageous (AB) and advantageous (CD) decks per Block. Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean. 
Table 4.4.5 
Paired t tests inspection time comparison between disadvantageous and advantageous decks per matching Blocks.  
Fixation Blocks T Df sig10 
Block 1 3.50 47 p = .001* 
Block 2 -0.74 46 p =.460 
Block 3 -2.60 42 p = .013 
Block 4 -4.86 44 p < .001* 
Block 5 -4.12 34 p < .001* 
Block 6 -2.33 35 p = .025 
Block 7 -2.88 33 p = .007* 
 
Next, a multiple regression (Enter method) tested the relative predictive strength of inspection 
time for disadvantageous (A + B) (Mean=0.68, SD=0.12) and advantageous (C + D) 
(Mean=0.76, SD=0.15) deck picks for performance on the IGT. Data indicated that both 
predictors combined reliably accounted for 65% of the variability in IGT scores. The 
standardized beta for advantageous cards showed a positive correlation with inspection time 
while the disadvantageous cards showed a negative correlation. This indicated that increased 
inspection time of advantageous decks was associated with better overall performance in 
contrast while increased inspection time of disadvantageous decks was associated with poorer 
performance (Table 4.4.6)  
Table 4.4.6 
Multiple Regression Analysis of Inspection Time for disadvantageous (AB) and advantageous (CD) decks as 
predictors (standardized and unstandardized betas) of IGT performance. 
Durbin Watson= 1.98, VIF= 1.284; 1.284  
 
 
                                                          
10 Note: Bonferroni adjusted significance p = .007* 
11 B is unstandardized beta value and β is standardized coefficient 
Predictors Results 
Model ‘Enter.' R²=.681, R²adj=.652 
F(2, 24)= 23.50, p <.001 
Inspection time (A + B) B11=-114.32; β=-.531, p=.001 






Conceptual Knowledge Analyses  
Level 1 knowledge across Blocks was tested by conducting a Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted 
repeated measures ANOVA. There was a main effect of Block condition, 
F(3.55,173.83)=23.68, p<.001, np
2=.33. Bonferroni adjusted post hoc tests demonstrated the 
emergence of Level 1 knowledge after the first Block (Figure 4.4.2.). Level 1 knowledge in 
Block 1 was significantly lower than all Blocks (all p<.001). 
 
 
Figure 4.4.2. Mean deck ratings (CD-AB) as a function of Trial Block. Error bars are the standard error of the 
mean. 
Participants’ quantitative knowledge of the task was assessed using the Estimated Net and 
Calculated Net measures. The Estimated Net was an estimate of the average amount won or 
lost on the deck while the Calculated Net was calculated from participants’ estimates of how 
much they would win, how often they lost, and how much that average loss was when selecting 
from each deck. 
Quantitative knowledge of disadvantageous and advantageous decks was analysed by 
conducting a 2 (Deck) x 2 (Net values) Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted repeated measures 
ANOVA.  Mean and SD is shown in table 4.4.7.  
Table 4.4.7 





























Trial Block AB CD Total 
Estimated net 267.87 (321.05) 287.40 (224.13) 277.64 (275.64) 
Calculated net -358.91 (200.81) -116.64 (83.06) -237.77 (195.44) 
Total  -45.52 (412.52) 85.38 (263.64)  
There was a main effect of Deck F(1.00,49.00)=226.04, p<.001, np
2=.82, with overall higher 
Net values observed for the advantageous decks than the disadvantageous decks. There was a 
main effect of overall Net values F(1.00,49.00)=13.12, p=.001, np
2=21, with higher Net values 
observed for the estimated Net than the calculated Net values. There was an interaction between 
the Decks and the Net values F(2.84,68.18)=4.81, p=.005, np2=.16. There was no difference 
between advantageous and disadvantageous decks in estimated value, whereas calculated Net 
value was lower for disadvantageous decks than advantageous decks (Figure 4.4.3.). 
 
Figure 4.4.3. Mean estimate and calculated net values for disadvantageous (AB) and advantageous (CD) decks. 
Error bars are the standard error of the mean. 
Figure 4.4.4. shows levels of conscious knowledge. The participant’s conscious knowledge 
about the goodness of the decks and the outcome of the decks (Level 2) started to emerge from 
Block 2 onwards. The percentage of the participants that did not have any conscious knowledge 
declined from Block 1 until Block 5. The percentage of the participants’ that reached Level 1 
conscious knowledge, about the goodness of the decks was constant across the Blocks except 
Block 2 respectively. Finally, the percentage of participants that reached the full conceptual 
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Figure 4.4.4. The percentage of the participant's conscious levels of knowledge across Blocks.  
Inspection time and Conceptual Knowledge 
Next, differences between the inspection times of the disadvantageous/advantageous decks 
across different levels of conceptual knowledge was tested.  
Mean decks inspection time during the different levels of conscious knowledge was analysed 
by conducting a 2 (Decks) x 3 (Level of Knowledge) repeated measures ANOVA with log-
transformed data. Means and standard deviations are shown in Table 4.4.8. 
Table 4.4.8 
Means (SD) of levels of knowledge for disadvantageous (AB) and advantageous (CD) decks  




Level 2  
Knowledge 
Total  
AB 1.25 (1.10) 1.63 (1.06) 1.78 (1.53) 1.56 (0.23) 
CD 1.01 (0.88) 2.35 (1.68) 4.44 (2.55) 2.60 (1.72) 
Total  1.13 (0.17) 1.99 (0.51) 3.12 (1.87)  
 
There was a main effect of Deck F(1.00,16.00)=12.66, p=.003, np
2=.44 with greater inspection 
time observed for advantageous decks than disadvantageous  decks.  
There was a main effect of Knowledge F(2.00,32.00)=7.99, p=.002, np
2=.33. The inspection 
time increased at different levels of knowledge. Bonferroni adjusted post hoc tests 
demonstrated greater inspection time during Level 2 knowledge compared to the inspection 
time during the Level 1 knowledge (p<.001). There were no other significant differences.   
There was an interaction between deck inspection time and inspection time during different 
Levels of knowledge F(2.00,32.00)=23.42, p<.001, np








































demonstrated that inspection time during the Levels 1 and 2 of conscious knowledge was 
greater for the advantageous decks compared to the disadvantageous decks. There was also a 
greater deck inspection time between the Levels 1 and 2 of conscious knowledge for 
advantageous decks compared to the disadvantageous decks (Figure 4.4.5).   
Figure 4.4.5. Mean inspection time interaction with levels of knowledge for disadvantageous (AB) and 
advantageous (CD) decks. Error bars are the standard error of the mean  
Blood Pressure Analyses 
MBPR HRR and SBPR were tested across Blocks to examine participants’ arousal during the 
game. MBPR per Block was tested by using a repeated measures ANOVA. The MBPR 
differences between the Blocks were not significant (F(6.00,36.00)=.90, p=.50). Similarly, 
HRR per Block was tested by using a repeated measures ANOVA. The HRR differences per 
Block were not significant. SBPR was also tested by using a Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted 
repeated measures ANOVA. Although the results indicated a significant effect of Blocks, 
(F(3.78,185.26)=3.48, p=.010),  Bonferroni adjusted post hoc demonstrated that the differences 






























Figure 4.4.6.  Mean SBPR across Blocks. Error bars are the standard error of the mean 
4.5. Discussion  
The results from Experiment 2 demonstrated several significant results that are first 
summarised and then discussed in turns. Consistent with the first prediction, the Block 
performance analysis demonstrated that IGT performance did not reach ceiling at Block 5 and 
significantly improved in Block 7 after a non-significant dip in Block 6. The second prediction 
was partially supported. Correlations between CRT1 scores and IGT broadly replicated the 
findings from the control group in Simonovic et al., (2016) and the performance in healthy 
participants in Experiment 1 (Simonovic et al., 2017) with moderate correlations and evidence 
that reflective processing is implicated early in the task (after the first trial). This is in line with 
Brevers et al.’s. (2013) dual process account and represents unambiguous evidence of the Type 
II processing.  In contrast to the third prediction related to thinking dispositions, correlations 
between measures of thinking disposition and IGT were not significant. This suggested that 
self-reported measures of how participants experienced their own cognitive processes did not 
correspond with their actual cognitive ability. The forth and the fifth predictions are also 
supported: Attentional focus differed between the decks whereby different inspection time 
indicated that both disadvantageous and advantageous decks are processed according to the 
‘goodness’ and the ‘badness’ of the decks. Longer inspection time of the disadvantageous 
decks was observed in the first two Blocks and declined significantly after Block three while 
inspection time of the advantageous decks showed a slow increase from Block 1 until Block 4. 
A significant interaction between the decks was observed after Block 4 indicating longer 
inspection time of the advantageous decks. This is important because it showed that increased 

























but significantly declined after Block three, thus indicating less cognitive processing which is 
not sufficient for the deck's contingencies disambiguation. Inspection time for both decks were 
reliable significant predictors of IGT performance. Specifically, increased inspection time of 
advantageous decks predicted better overall performance, whereas inspection time of 
disadvantageous decks predicted poorer overall performance. This is also important because it 
is a clear indicator that increased inspection time of disadvantageous decks will increase the 
likelihood of the bad deck selection.   
In terms of Maia and McClleland’s (2004) measures of conscious awareness, consistent with 
the prediction 6, participants’ knowledge of the game was evident in the second Block. 
Participants could specify a preference for the good decks after the first Block, that is, they 
reached Level 1 of conceptual knowledge. The emergence of Level 2 conceptual knowledge 
occurred after the second Block for some participants, who were able to express conscious 
knowledge about the net outcomes of the decks and choose one of the advantageous decks as 
their final pick until the end of the game. A good proportion of the participants initially reported 
no knowledge of the game albeit this gradually increased and reached celling at the end of the 
game. However, it must be noted that some participants (30%) reported no knowledge after the 
final Block. Overall net value was higher for the advantageous decks than disadvantageous 
decks. Higher net values were observed for the estimated net than the calculated net values.   
The interaction shows that while there was no difference in estimated net values between the 
decks, there were however, differences in calculated net value such that net value was lower 
for disadvantageous decks than advantageous decks. This indicated that participants struggle 
to calculate the average amount won or lost on the bad decks and this may be one of the reasons 
why participants often engage in risk-taking behaviour (e.g., Dunn et al., Fernie & Tunney, 
2013). There was also a greater contrast between estimated and calculated values for bad decks 
than there are for good decks. 
Prediction 7 is also supported. The results indicated that there is a close interplay between the 
attentional processing and conscious awareness. Overall, Level 2 of conceptual knowledge was 
associated with greater inspection time than Levels 0 and 1 respectively. Furthermore, greater 
inspection time was related to the advantageous decks on Levels 1 and 2 of conceptual 
knowledge comparing to the disadvantageous decks. This indicated that even though 
participants were aware that the disadvantageous decks are ‘bad’ they neglected to attentionally 






Finally, prediction 8 was not supported; the results showed no effect of arousal on IGT as 
manifested by physiological measurements. The MBPR and the HRR differences between the 
Blocks were not significant. Overall SBPR results were significant, but the differences between 
the Block were not significant. This suggested that physiological arousal does not have an 
effect on IGT performance.   
Results implications  
The results are in line with previous research about the active role of attentional processing in 
constructing decision choices (e.g., Horstmann et al., 2009; Glaholt, & Reingold, 2011; 
Glockner, & Herbold, 2011; Krajbich et al., 2010; Krajbich et al., 2012). Specifically, the 
results support previous research that increased inspection time is related to increased cognitive 
processing (e.g., Ball et al., 2006; Evans & Ball, 2010; Horstmann et al., 2009; Glockner, 2007; 
Glockner, & Betsch, 2008; Glockner, & Herbold, 2008; Glockner, & Herbold, 2011). Most 
participants began the task by exploring disadvantageous decks, because they yielded 
substantially significant gains, and this was related to increased inspection time. After 
approximately the second Block feedback from encountered losses for ‘bad’ decks required a 
shift in strategy and a switch in decision choices. That is, participants learned to avoid the bad 
decks and shifted towards the more advantageous decks. This was evident in the increased 
inspection time of the advantageous decks. Meaning, participants cognitive processing of the 
advantageous decks increased the likelihood of the good cards selection. This is contrary to the 
SMH prediction that increased processing of the disadvantageous decks occurs later in the 
game and as a result of somatic markers biasing signals (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994, 1997, 2000). 
The results are more in line with suggestion that Type II processes are involved in gathering 
information about the task that leads to learning about the multiple outcomes of decision 
choices and subsequently development of the decision-making strategy (e.g., Horstmann et al., 
2009; Glaholt, & Reingold, 2011; Glockner, & Herbold, 2011).  
Indeed, the results are in line with research evidence that a specific strategy related to the task 
is needed for information integration and learning, and reflection on the previous choices is 
needed for an optimal choice formation (Horstmann et al., 2009; Glockner, 2007; Glockner, & 
Herbold, 2011). However, attentional processing is necessary to initiate information collection 
on IGT, but it is likely that supplementary analytical processes are needed for information 
integration or inhibition of the previously learned ‘bad’ and ‘good’ information. This could 






game.  This supports Brevers et al.’s (2013) argument that emphasises the importance of the 
‘cool’, reflective processes in information integration. However, contrary to Brevers et al.’s 
suggestion that the reflective processes account for IGT performance in the later Blocks, the 
results indicated that reflective processes arise early in the game. The evidence from the 
correlations between CRT1 and performance across Blocks indicated a consistent role for 
analytic ability in determining IGT performance after the first Block. This further indicates that 
explicit monitoring of deck contingences appears early, and it is consistent with the proposition 
that the learning on the task is explicit (e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Simonovic et al., 2016). 
Furthermore, observed correlations between the CRT1 and IGT performance in this experiment 
and Experiment 1 suggest that analytic ability is needed early in IGT for optimal performance 
(e.g., the ability to estimate and calculate gains and losses). Taken together the evidence 
showed the involvement of Type II processes early in the game indicating that cognitive 
processing guides IGT learning and performance. This is further supported by measures of 
conceptual knowledge.  
Sufficient knowledge to guide advantageous long-term choices emerged for the majority of the 
participants after the first Block. Average deck ratings indicated that participants’ conceptual 
knowledge about the decks emerged after the second Block of trials. This is consistent with 
previous research that challenged SMH’s suggestion that conscious awareness of the game 
appears late in the game (Bowman et al., 2005, Evans et al., 2005; Fernie & Tunney, 2006, 
2013; Maia & McClelland, 2004, 2005). Hence, the results are contrary to the suggestion that 
somatic markers reinforce learning early in the IGT (ambiguous stage) while the later stages of 
the task are informed by conscious knowledge and higher cognitive processes (e.g., Brand et 
al., 2007). Participant’s conceptual knowledge about the goodness of the decks and the 
outcome of the decks (Level 2) started to emerge from Block two onwards. This indicated that 
the conceptual knowledge related to the deck’s net value was available and participants were 
able to express conscious knowledge about the net outcomes of the decks. However, there is a 
possibility that participants’ Level 2 knowledge did not reach ceiling as shown by the 
inconsistencies in the estimated and calculated values computations. Participants were not able 
to accurately calculate the amount of money won, the amount of money lost and the amount of 
average loss during the game. This raises the possibility that participants’ calculations are 
mostly incorrect and for that reason, they are not able to retain conceptual knowledge about the 






Indeed, only seventeen participants developed a full conceptual knowledge (Level 2) that 
emerged after the second Block and gradually increased until the last Block. The analysis of 
attentional processing and levels of knowledge on the sample of the participants that reached 
full conceptual knowledge showed overall increased inspection time of the advantageous decks 
from no knowledge (Level 0) to full conceptual knowledge (Level 2). Similar increases in 
inspection time were observed for disadvantageous decks. However, greater inspection time 
for advantageous decks was observed on the conceptual knowledge 0 and 2. This suggests a 
lack of cognitive processing of the disadvantageous decks and a possibility that even if the 
participants reach full conceptual knowledge level, participants’ knowledge was not fully 
complete. This could also indicate that attentional processing and conceptual knowledge is not 
sufficient to guide behaviour on the disadvantageous decks because a specific cognitive ability 
is required that will enable net outcome calculation. However, this notion is not directly tested 
in the experiment and remains to be examined. Nevertheless, this suggestion is in line with 
research that indicated that full conceptual knowledge involves awareness of the 
reward/punishment schedule where a specific cognitive ability is needed (e.g., WM capacity, 
analytic thinking, inhibitory capacity) to augment optimal performance and decks’ 
disambiguation (e.g., Bowman et al., 2005; Fellows, & Farah, 2003; Hornak et al., 2004; 
Turnbull et al., 2003).    
A lack of correlation between the thinking dispositions and IGT performance indicated that the 
chosen measures are not related to IGT performance. Toplak et al. (2010) review suggested 
that since the performance on IGT is relatively independent from a cognitive ability that 
thinking disposition or cognitive style measures could provide a good measurement of 
cognitive reflective processes during the IGT performance. Toplak et al. further argued that 
impaired performance on IGT may be attributable to problems in Type I processes and 
cognitive reflective processes related to the thinking dispositions.  The results from this 
experiment did not provide support for this argument. Instead, the results indicated that 
cognitive ability (as measured with CRT1) independently correlated with IGT performance 
thus supporting an argument that optimal IGT performance depends on individuals’ cognitive 
abilities (Buelow & Suhr, 2009).  
Thus, the results from this experiment support the argument that there is an important role for 
Type II processes in deck contingences disambiguation. In   this chapter, the locus of explicit 
attention, cognitive reflection and conscious awareness were examined as potentially important 






results indicated that: (i) an increase in cognitive processing occurs early in the game and it 
differs according to the nature of the desks; (ii) similarly cognitive ability is important early in 
the game and it is related to disadvantageous deck’s disambiguation; (iii) conceptual 
knowledge is evident early in the game and it interacts with attentional processing. Thus, it 
could be argued that attentional processing advances conscious awareness and informs 
cognitive processes that facilitate learning of the task. Measures of thinking disposition were 
not related to learning of the disadvantageous decks’ contingencies; and physiological arousal 
had no effect on IGT performance. Bechara et al. (2005) argued that   physiological arousal 
integral to the task may be beneficial compared to the physiological arousal that is not integral 
to the task (e.g., stress). Hence, stress can have a serious impact on the quality of decision-
making. Simonovic et al. (2016) showed that stress impedes analytic thinking and disrupts 
learning of the task. The next chapter extends on this finding and examines the locus of explicit 


















Chapter 5  
Overview 
This chapter addresses objective (iv) of the Thesis and details the third experiment that 
examines the effect of stress on attentional processing, conscious awareness and analytic 
thinking during the IGT. The chapter also details a systematic review which was conducted by 
using the PSYCHinfo and PSYCHarticles database following a strict methodological process 
in order to select relevant articles related to the use of IGT under stressful conditions. As 
discussed in Chapter 4 attentional processing, conscious awareness and analytic ability may 
play a more significant role early in the IGT than was previously previous suggested. This 
challenges the basic premises of SMH that unconscious biasing signals guide successful 
decision-making on IGT.  Previous research that investigated the impact of stress on IGT has 
shown that stress can interfere with the learning process and increase disadvantageous card 
selection (e.g., Preston et al., 2007; Simonovic et al., 2016; van den Bos, Harteveld, & Stoops, 
2009). According to the SMH, emotions act as mediators between the environmental input and 
decision-making choices whereby stress amplified emotion interferes with learning and 
optimal decision-making (Reimann & Bechara 2010). Specifically, stress amplified emotion 
generates dysfunctional strategy during decision-making that is influenced by altered feedback 
of the reward and punishment processing (e.g., Starcke, Wolf, Markowitsch, & Brand, 2008). 
However, stress also results in limited attentional processing, reductions in executive 
functioning and as a result may limit cognitive resources that prompt dysfunctional strategy 
and inhibits learning during decision-making (e.g., Kassam, Koslov & Mendes, 2009; 
Simonovic et al., 2016). This challenges the SMH assumption that stress interferes with the 
development of somatic markers that are necessary for optimal IGT performance and instead 
suggests that stress affects analytic ability and shifts cognitive processes away from 
deliberative processing towards more automatic processing. Thus, it is important to investigate 
the effect of stress on cognitive processes that are involved in learning and IGT performance 
to explore this alternative explanation.  The experiment in this chapter aims to extend 
Simonovic et al.'s (2016) findings related to the effect of stress on analytic processing on IGT 
performance. Thus, in addition to a stress manipulation replication, the extended version of 
CRT (CRT1, Toplak et al., 2014) was used; as was eye-tracking methodology as a measure of 
attentional processing; and conscious awareness test to measure cognitive penetrability of IGT. 






processing and conscious awareness (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2004) during IGT performance. 
Blood pressure and heart rate responses to stress were examined for manipulation check.  
5.1. Introduction  
Stress is a significant factor that influences our daily lives. Stress arises in uncontrollable 
situations and epitomises a mental tension resulting from the presence of a stressor that results 
in a compensatory psychological and physiological response (Lovallo, 2016). Stress activates 
the sympathetic nervous system (SNS) and hypothalamus-pituitary-adrenal (HPA) axis (e.g., 
Kudielka, & Kirschbaum, 2007). The adrenal hormone cortisol indicates the activity of the 
HPA axis, while blood pressure and heart rate can be taken as a proxy for sympathetic activity. 
Research on stress emphasizes the prevalence of multiple interacting mediators that can have 
a severe effect on wear and tear of the brain and the body if adaptation to the demands of a 
situation does not occur (McEwen, 2007). Thus, inability to adapt to the demands is a large 
part of allostatic load/overload, where allostasis signifies the process of achieving stability 
through alteration of physiological output (e.g., McEwen, 2008). Furthermore, stress may lead 
to changes in brain regions such as PFC, amygdala and hippocampus that consequently hinder 
cognitive, emotional and memory processing (e.g., McEwen &. Morrison, 2013; Roman et al., 
2005; Wender et al., 2000). Thus, stress may induce a far-reaching, potentially maladaptive 
consequences, which affect not only brain structure but also health.        
According to Bechara (2004), in an ambiguous decision-making situation (high uncertainty 
with unknown probabilities), people are more likely to rely on intuitive ‘gut' feelings. The 
intuitive ‘gut feelings’ may be used as information source guiding decisions through inferred 
values (Bechara, 2004; Pham, 2004). This view corresponds with the SMH (see Chapter 2 for 
a review), whereby it is assumed that the experience of decision-making induces emotional 
responses that match with particular somatic states (Damasio, 1996). According to the SMH, 
the connection between the processing of the somatic markers and decision-making can be 
interrupted by stress (e.g., Reimann & Bechara, 2010). For example, a stressor may have an 
impact on emotional resources, whereby the inhibition of the emotional learning disrupts 
consistent tasks performance (e.g., Bechara et al., 2000). IGT studies have shown that stress 
can interfere with the learning process in healthy controls, increase risk-taking behaviour and 
lead to disadvantageous card selections (Miu, Heilman, & Houser, 2008; Preston et al., 2007; 
Robinson, Bond, & Roiser, 2015; Simonovic et al., 2016; Starcke, Agorku, & Brand, 2017; 






reduces learning from somatic markers feedback thus providing support for the SMH (e.g., 
Starcke et al., 2017), other evidence pointed out that this disruption of the development of the 
somatic markers may have been because of the reduction in higher order cognitive processes 
(e.g., Preston et al., 2007; Simonovic et al., 2016). This evidence is not conclusive and warrants 
further investigation especially in the healthy population. Thus, the purpose of the current 
review was to evaluate the empirical studies that used Bechara et al.’s (1994) IGT and 
psychological stressors as variables that may influence decision-making. The review is focused 
on the use of IGT in stressful conditions in a healthy population. 
5.2. Review methods  
Studies were identified by literature research using the electronic databases such as: PsycINFO, 
PsycARTICLES, EBSCO Electronic Journals Service, Ovid, PubMed, Elsevier Science Direct 
and Google Scholar. Since this review was only concerned with the performance on IGT under 
stressful conditions, the focus was narrow. Electronic database searches yielded 6,761 (IGT), 
623,850 (Stress), (88,439) Cognition and Emotion. These results were combined generating 
179 study titles that were then filtered with key words such as ‘stress', ‘stressors', ‘anticipatory 
stress', ‘anticipated stress', ‘affect', ‘emotions', ‘uncertainty', ‘decision-making' and ‘cognition'; 
the search process summarized in Figure 5.2.1. This narrowed down the results to 19 studies. 
Since the inclusion criteria were strict and only involved studies that manipulated stress in 
healthy people and used IGT as a performance measurement, the screening and reading of 
relevant titles and abstracts narrowed down the results to seven studies included for the 
purposes of this review. Therefore 12 studies were excluded for the following reasons: 
participants with addictive behaviour (N=3), participants with severe cognitive and emotional 
impairment due to brain lesions (N=5), depressed and anxious participants and participants 






























Figure 5.2.1. CONSORT diagram - Overview of the search process, identification of studies and data extraction  
 
Table 5.2.1 
Review findings  
Study ID and 
references  
Sample size and design Measures and Stress 
exposure 
Main Findings  
Cella et al. (2007) N=75; Male (N= 23); 
Female (N=52). 
Undergraduate students; 
Three groups of 
participants (N=25). 
Group allocation not 
specified. 
Stress in the form of time 
constraint of 2 seconds 
and 4 seconds for two 
groups. Bechara et al. 
(2000) computerised 
version of the IGT 
Time constraints of 2 
(group I) and 4 seconds 
(group II) had an impact 
on learning and 
significantly disrupted 
performance on IGT. 
Group 1 had the worst 
performance comparing 
to control and group 2. 
Preston et al., (2007)  N=40; 20 Male and 20 
Female students Two 
groups of participants 
(N=20). Participants 
Anticipated speech as a 
stressor.  
The State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory, the Positive 
and Negative Affect 
The experimental group 
had greater increases in 
heart rate from the speech 
anticipation stress than 
the control group. The 
718,757 excluded on title not relevant 
for current review 
Studies included in systematic 
review (n=7)  
Initial hits: 6,761 (IGT), 623,850 
(Stress), (88,439) Cognition and 
Emotion; electronic database searches  
161 excluded: 
Book related to emotions (n=2)  
Studies on animals (n=22)  
Participants with head injuries studies (n=34) 
Studies with pathological gamblers (n=15) 
Clinical population studies (n=87) 
 
 
179 titles included for review of 
abstracts  
19 included studies for full review 
12 excluded: 
Participants with addictive behaviour (N=3) 
Brain lesions participants (N=5)  







randomly allocated to 
groups.   
Schedule. Bechara et al. 
(2000) computerised 
version of the IGT. Heart 
rate measurements.  
participants in the 
experimental group were 
slower to learn the task. 
Santos-Ruiz et al. (2012) N=40; Female students, 
professors, or 
administrative personnel.  
Two groups of 
participants (N=24) 
(N=16). Participants 
randomly allocated to 
groups.   
 
Trier Social Stress Test 
adapted for a Virtual 
Reality Environment — 
TSST (VR). The 
Symptom Checklist SCL-
90-R, the Positive and 
Negative Affect Schedule 
and computerised Iowa 
Gambling Task 
(Bechara et al., 1994). 
Cortisol level 
measurements.   
Stress manipulation 
worked. 
Cortisol levels were 
significantly higher in the 
group with poor 
performance on the IGT.  
Simonovic et al. (2016) N=60; 29 Male and 31 
Female students.  Two 
groups of participants 
(N=30). Participants 
randomly allocated to 
groups. 
Bechara et al. (1994) non-
computerised version of 
the IGT. A modified 
version of Preston et al.’s 
(2007) anticipatory 
speech task. Self- 
assessed stress 
perception. Blood 
pressure measurements  
The stress manipulation 
reduced participants' 
reflective ability. The 
stress manipulation 
indirectly affected IGT 
scores by reducing 
cognitive reflection but 
did not have a direct 
effect. 
Starcke, et al. (2017) N=54; Undergraduate 
students. Gender not 
specified. Group 
numbers and allocation 
not specified.  
Unsolvable anagrams as 
stressors. Bechara et al. 
(2000) computerised 
version of the IGT. Self-
measurements of current 
Affect and measurements 
of personality used.  
The exposure to an 
unsolvable anagram task 
led to a decrease in 
decision-making 
performance in the IGT. 
van den Bos, et al. (2009) N=71; 33 Male and 38 
Female students. Two 
groups for gender 
comparison.  
The TSST; cortisol level 
measured after stress 
induction. The 
computerised Iowa 
Gambling Task (Bechara 
et al., 1994). Cortisol 
level measurements.  
High cortisol level 
related to poorer 
performance in male’s 
participants. Slightly 
elevated cortisol level 
lead to good performance 
in female’s participants 
Wemm, & Wulfert, 
(2017) 
N= 56; 24 Male and 32 
Female students; Group 
numbers and allocation 
not specified  
The TSST; SCR and heart 
rate measured; Bechara et 
al. (2000) computerised 
version of the IGT 





(HR and SCR) as well as 
negative affect. The 
stressed group made less 
advantageous decisions. 
 
5.3. Review results 
All but one study reviewed here recruited students as participants. Santos-Ruiz et al. (2012) 
recruited University personnel. Most of the studies used both males and female’s participants 
except one study that used only female participants (Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012). The differences 






to 75 participants (Cella et al., 2007). The studies also used distinct types of stressors such as 
anticipatory speech (Preston et al., 2007; Simonovic et al., 2016); the TSST (Kirschbaum, et 
al., 1993) (Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012; van den Bos et al., 2009; Wemm, & Wulfert, 2017); time 
constraint (Cella et al., 2007); and unsolvable anagrams (Starcke et al., 2017). Some of the 
studies related an increase in heart rate variability to poor learning and less advantageous 
choices on IGT (Preston et al., 2007; Wemm, & Wulfert, 2017). Similarly, some studies 
associated higher cortisol level with poor performance (Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012) albeit only in 
males (van den Boss et al., 2009). The effect of time is identified as important by one study 
(Cella et al., 2007). Cella et al. showed that time constraints could significantly interrupt IGT 
performance, but it does not affect subjective experience ratings of the decks. The review 
results also indicate that cognitive abilities play a role in the IGT during the early trials 
(Simonovic et al., 2016) and later trials (Starcke et al., 2017).  
Several studies presented evidence that stress can affect learning and subsequent performance 
on IGT (Preston et al., 2007; Simonovic et al., 2016; Starcke et al., 2017; Wemm, & Wulfert, 
2017). However, there was a disagreement between the studies about the nature of the learning 
effect and performance during Block trials. Starcke et al., (2017) argued that the early trials of 
the IGT depend on emotional feedback processing, as evidenced by the performance of the 
control group in their study. It is evident that the participants in the experimental group (who 
were stressed by being presented with unsolvable anagrams) showed delayed preferences for 
advantageous decks. However, a claim that early trials relate to emotional feedback processing 
is questionable. Firstly, interactions between the groups, the Block trials and the decks were 
not significant which indicate that the learning curve between the groups is not different. 
Secondly, the experimental group may have had experienced reduced cognitive abilities in 
early trials, and that may be the reason for poor performance in earlier Blocks. Indeed, 
Simonovic et al., (2016) showed that reflective thinking may be important earlier in the game 
than previously suggested. The overall correlations reported in Simonovic et al.’s (2016) study 
suggest that reduced reflective thinking in the experimental group leads to more 
disadvantageous deck’s selection by Block four, while the control group had reached ceiling 
for most of the participants. Furthermore, the effect of stress on overall IGT performance 
developed through the diminished capacity for reflective thinking thus indicating an indirect 
effect of analytic thinking on IGT performance through stress. Although, the findings from the 
study were not robust, this challenge the primacy of emotion feedback learning in early trials 






Simonovic et al.’s (2016) study was a replication with the extension of Preston et al.’s (2007) 
study that induced stress by informing participants that they would deliver a speech while being 
videotaped and evaluated. Preston et al. (2007) demonstrated that stressed participants showed 
a slower learning curve on the IGT than the control group. Their results were interpreted as 
evidence that incidental anticipatory stress interfered with the development of somatic markers 
and that this may have been because of a disruption of WM (Hinson et al., 2002). Furthermore, 
Preston et al. (2007) suggested that the anticipatory stress shifts cognitive processes away from 
deliberative processing towards more automatic processing, thus impairing the ability to 
differentiate between the advantageous and disadvantageous choices. However, this 
assumption was not tested directly. Nevertheless, both Preston et al. and Simonovic et al. 
showed that stress impairs IGT performance by reducing deliberative thinking ability during 
learning to ascertain the cost and benefits of decision-making. Furthermore, the results from 
these studies resonate with previous research suggesting that stress reduces cognitive capacity 
and consequently diminishes learning of negative choices (Lighthall, Mather, & Gorlick, 2009; 
Petzold, Plessow, Goschke, & Kirschbaum, 2011). Nevertheless, it is difficult to rule out the 
possibility that stress can impair emotional feedback learning and the development of somatic 
markers necessary for good IGT performance. The reduced cognitive processing may be related 
to IGT performance, but it does not allow us to make casual claims. It could be that stress 
impairs the development of somatic markers and feedback learning to the extent that cognitive 
processing could not integrate prior consequences (from feedback) into the goal-pursuing 
decision-making process.  
The hemodynamic measurements (cortisol, heart rate and blood pressure variability) taken in 
the reviewed studies indicate that stress induced physiological arousal may disrupt emotion-
based learning, impede analytic thinking and interfere with learning and performance on the 
IGT. The results also show that reflective thinking and arousal may help participants learn from 
the outcome of their choices even when stressed (e.g., Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012; Simonovic et 
al., 2016). However, it is unclear if the cognitive abilities are responsible for the relatively poor 
or reliable performance in early or later trials on the IGT. It may be that stress disrupts learning 
by interfering with the creation of somatic markers. Conversely, it may also be that stress 
disrupts learning by affecting analytic cognition and conscious awareness thus reducing the 
cognitive capacity for Type II cognitive processing. To understand the factors that determine 
the early influence of deliberative thinking on IGT performance, one possibility is to 






4). Such an investigation may explain the learning process and how attentional processing and 
control under stress affect IGT performance. 
Attention under stress 
According to dual-process approaches stressful conditions interfere with Type II processes and 
prompts processing of a choice to fall back to automatic processes with increased risk-taking 
behaviour (e.g., Coates & Herbert, 2008; Cueva et al., 2015; Porcelli, & Delgado, 2009). 
According to this approach, stress is mediated by the cognitive processes that have an effect on 
decision-making (e.g., Balleine & O'Doherty, 2010). These processes depend on the PFC 
functioning. By contrast the SMH posits that stress is mediated by emotion-feedback 
parasympathetic activity that depends on VMpfc functioning (e.g., Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012). 
According to this view, people learn emotion-feedback response relation regardless of 
outcomes. For example, high stress reactivity on IGT could be mediated by the increase in 
cortisol level that enhances risk-taking behaviour (e.g., van den Bos et al., 2009; Santos-Ruiz 
et al., 2012). However, stress also interferes with cognitive processes and increases risk-taking 
behaviour (Porcelli & Delgado, 2009). Porcelli and Delgado used a financial decision-making 
task combined with cold pressor test induced stress to examine the effect of acute stress on 
financial decision-making. Participants had to select between two potentially negative 
outcomes (loss domain) or two potentially positive outcomes (gain domain) of equal expected 
values but varied probability, either under normal or stressful conditions. They found that the 
stress condition altered decision-making by increasing risk taking. Participants in the stress 
condition made more risky choices in the loss domain but conservative choices in the gain 
domain, thus indicating that stress is mediated through decreased cognitive processing that 
leads to activation of automatic responses. This is in line with von Helversen and Rieskamp’s 
(2013) results, who conducted a study that examined the effect of stress on risk-taking on a 
financial decision-making task. Participants were exposed to a cold pressor task and underwent 
a task where they needed to make 40 choices between two gambles while inspection time (eye-
tracking) was measured. The gambles differed in probability of win/lose 60 times (High 
outcome gambles) and win/lose 30 times (Low outcome gamble). Their results showed greater 
inspection time to losses in the high outcome gamble, which indicated that stress increases risk 
taking in the loss domain but decreases risk taking in the gain domain. Thus, although is 
possible that stress is mediated though the emotional responses, it is also likely that stress 
mediation occurs through the reduced cognitive processing that activates automatic, Type I 






Conversely, Pabst, Brand, and Wolf (2013) showed that this explanation warrants further 
investigation.  Pabst et al., examined the performance of two different experimental groups that 
underwent the TSST and performed a modified version of the GDT. In the original GDT the 
goal is to maximize a starting capital of virtual money by choosing among different alternatives 
that consist of different combinations of dice. In the modified version the monetary amounts 
of gains and losses were adjusted to ensure equal increases in expected values with increasing 
winning and losing probabilities in gain and loss domain. Pabst et al. found that stress did not 
increase risk taking behaviour in the gain domain. However, contrary to Porcelli and Delgado’s 
(2009) study, stressed participant in the loss domain made less risky decisions compared to 
controls. Taken together these results indicate that under stress, automatic processes could 
promote risk-avoidance and good decision-making strategy; and diminished cognitive control 
that results from a shift in higher cognitive to lower processing may increase risk-taking 
behaviour. However, the exact nature and the conditions under which stress influences risk-
taking needs better understanding.  For example, under stress, intuitive gut feelings may hijack 
or bypass the examination of Type II processes and have a direct effect on decision outcome 
by increasing risk-taking behaviour (Arnsten, 2009). This is consistent with the idea that stress 
impairs certain parts of the prefrontal cortex (related to cognitive abilities and attention control) 
and engages attentional control through the amygdala, thus leading to potentially unexamined, 
erroneous responses that would not necessarily promote risk-taking behaviour (e.g., Keinan, 
1987). Thus, attentional control may be the key mechanism that needs to be examined under 
stress, because it is involved in the maintenance of choices direction that is affected by the task-
irrelevant stimuli (Eysenck et al., 2007).  
The role of attention has been acknowledged in dual-processes theories of decision-making 
(Dijksterhuis, Bos, Nordgren, & van Baaren, 2006). It has been found that stress heightens 
attentional control to mostly negative choices and increases the likelihood of the adverse 
preferences, even though the risk is none existent (e.g., Sapolsky, 2000). Similarly, poorer 
learning from punishments is also associated with stress (Cavanagh, Frank, & Allen, 2011). 
Cavanagh et al. induced the social stress manipulation on participants that engaged in the 
probabilistic learning tasks. Cavanagh et al. measured heart rate variability and cortico-striatal 
monitoring systems reaction. Their results indicated that stress increases attentional sensitivity 
for rewards and punishments, where the poor learning rate was associated with participants 
sensitivity to rewards and punishments. This is line with research that showed increased 






disengagement from negative choices (e.g., Ononaiye, Turpin, & Reidy, 2007; Sposari & 
Rapee, 2007; Sapolsky, 2000). This could be pertinent to IGT performance under stress and 
may explain participants’ tendency to persistently select cards from the disadvantageous decks 
because they are unable to disengage from negative choices and learn from the negative 
feedback (cf. Starcke et al., 2017). This coincides with evidence that stress reduces learning 
from negative feedback (e.g., Petzold et al., 2011). Petzold et al. examined learning on the 
probabilistic selection task after the TSST induction. Participants in the control condition used 
more negative feedback for learning compared to stress conditions where participants in the 
stress group discounted the negative feedback in favour of positive feedback. However, the 
positive feedback during the TSST in this study was negligible, and participants mainly relied 
on the negative feedback. This raises a possibility that observed effects in this study may be 
due the nature of the test used. Nevertheless, taken together the evidence indicate that 
attentional processing may be sensitive to rewards and punishments, whereby an increase in 
sensitivity to punishments may affect cognitive capacity for learning and optimal decision-
making.  
Recently some studies have employed an eye-tracking methodology to measure performance 
under stress (Caseras, Garner, Bradley, Mogg, 2007; Chen & Lee, 2015; Pieters & Warlop, 
1999; Sanchez, Vazquez, Marker, LeMoult, & Joorman, 2013; van Herpen & Trijp, 2011). It 
has been suggested that time pressure increases demand on cognitive functions leading to 
higher inspection time but also reduces the amount of fixated information (e.g., Pieters & 
Warlop, 1999). The general theme that emerges from these studies is that stress reduces 
decision accuracy by increasing demand on attention and cognitive processes. Although it is 
possible that stress leads to a greater cognitive demand, it is also likely that stress enhances the 
effect of emotional stimuli that disrupts cognitive processing of negative material and increases 
the difficulty in attentional disengagement (e.g., Compton, 2000; Grillon et al., 2016; Sanchez 
et al., 2013). For example, Compton (2000), showed that a reduced ability to disengage 
attention was associated with increased emotional reactivity to a distressing film clip. 
Similarly, the impairment in cognitive control was related to greater inspection time of negative 
stimuli and associated with attentional disengagement in depressed individuals (e.g., Caseras 
et al., 2007; Sanchez et al., 2013). However, in certain condition stress can enhance learning 
because it shifts attention to potentially relevant stimuli (Herten, Otto, & Wolf, 2017). Herten 
et al. used the TSST and tested participants’ free recall on tasks involving the objects presented 






accompanied by longer inspection times and larger fixation amounts on these objects. This 
suggests that stress alters early attentional processing, such that memory of the perceived 
relevant object is enhanced. However, although there is evidence that increased attention give 
rise to cognitive processing, it is not clear to what extent this focused-attention recruits other 
EFs related to cognitive control that may be driven by attention.   
Cognitive control has been shown to regulate emotional responses (e.g., Nolen-Hoeksema, 
2012), but, the efficacy of cognitive control to regulate emotional responses diminishes under 
stress (Raio, Orederu, Palazzolo, Shurick, & Phelps, 2013). This could be because stress affects 
cognitive control of goal-directed choices by reducing connectivity between ventromedial PFC 
and dorsolateral PFC regions linked to cognitive control (Maier, Makwana, &, Hare, 2015). 
Goal-directed behaviour is identified as an important cognitive function and there is evidence 
a disruption of the Type II processes impedes goal-directed behaviour during decision-making.  
(Margittai et al., 2016; Schwabe & Wolf, 2009; Schwabe & Wolf, 2013; Schwabe, Tegenthoff, 
Höffken, & Wolf, 2010; Seehagen, Schneider, Rudolph, Ernst, & Zmuy, 2015). The prevailing 
themes in these studies are that a decrease in cognitive control is associated with negative 
choice selection (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009), behaviour adjustment (Seehagen, et al., 2015) and 
changes from goal-directed to automatic control of action (Margittai et al., 2016). Margittai et 
al. tested healthy participants that received placebo, cortisol and a drug that increases 
noradrenergic stimulation, before performing the original CRT (Frederick 2005). In addition, 
blood pressure measurements were taken. Their results showed that an increase in cortisol 
causes a shift from reflective (deliberate) processing towards more automatic (intuitive) 
processing. The results showed that cortisol mediates the engagement of different cognitive 
processes and complements research on the IGT that showed poor performance on the IGT is 
related to stress mediated, reduced capacity for reflective Type II processes (Simonovic et al., 
2016). Margittai et al.’s results are also in line with research that showed higher-order top-
down processes to be cortisol dependent (Schwabe & Wolf, 2009; Schwabe & Wolf, 2013; 
Schwabe et al., 2010). Thus, decision-making under stress can be affected by impaired 
cognitive control and/or increased automatic response tendency. Moreover, impaired, stress 
mediated cognitive processes may be responsible for the activation of automatic Type I 
processing that impedes a goal-directed behaviour (e.g., Seehagen et al., 2015).  






As discussed in Chapter 4, another aspect of the Type II processing that may be pertinent to 
IGT performance is conscious awareness.  Newell and Shanks (2014) argued that selective 
attention occurs inside of conscious awareness and there is a complex relation between the 
attention, executive processes and conscious awareness. However, the question whether 
conscious awareness is related to Type II processes as a distinctive category and if it improves 
decision-making is still under debate (e.g., Dijksterhuis et al. 2006; Evans, 2010; Newell & 
Shanks, 2014). Chen and Lee (2015) examined eye-movements and conscious awareness and 
measured memory of past events. Greater inspection time was observed for the stimuli that 
were previously experienced. Conscious awareness was also correlated with higher inspection 
times indicating that both measures provide good explicit measures of the past experience.  
This could be related to IGT learning where it was suggested that conscious awareness of the 
deck contingencies develops in the exploration stage through the experiences of gain and losses 
(Maia & McClelland, 2004. The results from the experiment in Chapter 4 support this notion 
and show that conscious knowledge may improve decision-making on IGT performance and it 
may arise early in the game. To the best of my knowledge, the impact of stress on conscious 
awareness during IGT performance has not been investigated yet. There is some evidence that 
stress affects conscious awareness by impeding attentional monitoring of the correctness of the 
decision choices (Reyes, Silva, Jaramillo, Rehbein, & Sackur, 2015) and impedes the 
processing of information during a performance on the motor task (Hardy, Mullen, Jones, 
1996). Furthermore, stress may affect preconscious selective attention that decreases avoidance 
reaction towards negative stimuli (e.g., Roelofs, Bakvis, Hermans, van Pelt, & van Honk, 
2007). This evidence implies that stress impairs conscious awareness and attentional 
monitoring during decision-making and may impede information processing and decrease 
avoidance of the negative choices because they are not sufficiently processed. This suggestion 
could be related to IGT performance because of the evidence that conscious awareness plays a 
role early in the game (e.g., Experiment 2; Maia & McClelland, 2004; Fernie & Tunney, 2006; 
2013).  
According to some evidence in the systematic review, stress interferes with the development 
of the somatic markers that consequently lead to poor performance or increases selection from 
the disadvantageous decks (e.g., Reimann & Bechara, 2010, Starcke et al., 2017; Wemm, & 
Wulfert, 2017). It was also indicated that stress would lead to increased reward seeking and 
risk taking due to alterations in dopamine firing rates and reduced executive control due to 






reviewed here indicates that: stress diminishes cognitive processes and may increase risk-
taking behaviour; impedes goal-directed behaviour by increasing automatic processing that is 
associated with negative choices selection and disrupts the development of conscious 
awareness and selective attention. There is also evidence that stress mediated   cognitive 
processes have an effect on decision-making. To the best of my knowledge these suggestions 
have not been tested in relation to IGT performance. Simonovic et al. (2016) argued that stress 
disrupts cognitive processes and impairs cognitive ability to differentiate between the 
disadvantageous and advantageous deck selections on IGT. Simonovic et al.’s mediation 
analysis indicated that ‘IGT performance occurs through reducing the capacity for reflective 
Type II thinking rather than disrupting performance via an alternative route’ (p. 653). These 
findings are extended in the following experiment.  Attentional processing (inspection time) 
was examined by using an eye-tracking methodology; CRT1 (Toplak et al., 2014) was used as 
a measure of analytic ability; Conscious Awareness test (Maia & McClelland, 2004) was also 
used to examine conceptual knowledge during the game.  
5.4. The Experiment  
The main aims of the experiment were to first replicate Simonovic et al.’s (2016) findings by 
(i) examining the role of stress in delaying the optimization of deck selection; (ii) examining 
the effect of stress on analytic thinking and disadvantageous deck selections. Next, Simonovic 
et al.’s original findings were extended with the objectives and aim to: (iii) examine the 
differences in inspection time between the disadvantageous and between the advantageous 
deck selections in both conditions; (iv) examine whether stress responses inhibit the emergence 
of knowledge sufficient to guide choice behaviour on IGT; (v) examine whether stress 
responses, inspection time, reflective thinking or knowledge either individually or combined 
predict card selection scores. It was hypothesised that:  
1. The stress manipulation will inhibit performance on the IGT and delay the elimination 
of disadvantageous deck selections. 
2.  Stress would reduce participants’ reflective ability as measured by the CRT1; this 
represents the first direct test of stress on an extended version of CRT1 scores in the 
literature. 
3. CRT1 scores would significantly correlate with disadvantageous deck’s selection early 
in the game consistent with Simonovic et al.’s (2016) argument that higher-level 






4. There would be differences in inspection times between the disadvantageous decks and 
advantageous decks between the stress and the control group.  
5. Stress will inhibit learning of the patterns of gains and losses (deck rating) and learning 
of the estimated and calculated net values, thus impeding the emergence of conscious 
knowledge.  
6. Finally, the relationship between inspection time, conscious knowledge, CRT1 scores, 
stress and IGT performance was tested by using mediation analyses to extend 
Simonovic et al.’s previous findings and it was predicted that inspection time, conscious 




Twenty-three male and 53 female, from the University of Derby, aged 19-56 years, were 
recruited and randomly allocated to stress and control groups. Participants had normal or 
corrected to normal vision. All participants gave informed consent, in accordance with 
stipulations of the local ethics committee. People under the age of 18 years old and people who 
reported depression, anxiety, any cardiovascular disease or high blood pressure were excluded 
from participation.  
Materials 
Stress manipulation 
The study used the same anticipatory speech task as Simonovic et al. (2016, based on a 
modified version of Preston et al.'s 2007 anticipatory speech task). A video camera was 
installed that simulated recording during the experiment and participants in the experimental 
group were told that they would be video-recorded during their performance and they would 
have to summarise their experience at the end of the experiment in front of the camera. Control 
participants were not given a description of a speech before the task, and the camera was not 
present in the room. 
Physiological measurement 
SBP and HR responses to stress were measured to check whether the manipulation was 






System, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) was used to measure SBP and HR in both groups. 
Baseline SBP and HR measurements were taken continuously for five minutes and averaged 
to create a baseline measurement before the initiation of tasks. After that, SBP/HR 
measurements were taken during the IGT performance. SBP/HR responses were calculated by 
subtracting the average of the performance SBP/HR measurements from the average of 
baseline SBP/HR measurements. 
Conscious Awareness Test  
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) Test of Awareness was used as in the previous experiment with 
the identical procedure. 
Eye Tracking Measurements 
Eye movements were recorded with the Eye-gaze binocular system and the identical procedure 
was used as in the previous experiment.  
IGT 
Bechara et al.’s (1994) computerised version of IGT was used as in previous experiments with 
the identical procedure.  
CRT1  
CRT1 was used as in previous experiments with the identical procedure. The Cronbach alpha 
for this experiment was α= .77. 
Procedure 
Following consent, participants sat for a 5-min resting period, and then baseline SBP/HR 
measurements were taken. Next, they were randomly allocated to groups. The instructions 
regarding the presentation to the camera were only given to the experimental group, and they 
were shown the camera which was then switched on. The camera was not present in the room 
for the participants in the control group. The CRT1 was administrated followed by the IGT and 
SBP/HR measurements. Eye tracking measures were taken during the IGT performance. Also, 
conscious awareness per Block was assessed during the task. After the completion of the IGT 
task, participants in the experimental group were told that they would not have to give the 







Analytic strategy and scoring 
Before the initiation of the analyses, data were inspected for normality by checking for outliers, 
Skewness and Kurtosis, normality tests and Z-scores to ensure that the assumptions of 
parametric statistics were met before analyses were performed. If parametric assumptions were 
not met the data were log transformed, corrections used, and non-parametric tests used when 
appropriate. Initial analyses focused on checking that the stress manipulation was effective: 
ANOVA was used to determine if SBP and HR responses differed by condition. Next, a 2 
(condition) × 7 (Block) mixed ANOVAs were used to determine the effect of the manipulation 
on IGT scores across the seven Blocks. Standard scoring was derived by deducting total 
disadvantageous card picks (A + B) from total advantageous picks (C + D). As parametric 
assumptions were not met, a Mann–Whitney test was used to examine if there were differences 
in CRT1 scores between the two conditions. Bivariate correlations were examined to determine 
relationships between CRT1 scores and disadvantageous deck picks (A + B) during each Block, 
for each group separately. Fixation duration was also examined across Blocks. A 2 (condition) 
x 7 (Block) mixed ANOVAs were used to determine the differences in inspection time for 
disadvantageous and advantageous decks across Blocks. separately. Next, a 2 (condition) x 7 
(Block) mixed ANOVA was used to determine the effect of manipulation on Level 1 conscious 
knowledge on overall deck ratings (C+D – A+B) across Blocks. In addition, 2 (condition) x 2 
(decks) mixed ANOVAs were used to determine the effect of the manipulation on estimated 
and calculated values across the disadvantageous and advantageous decks.  Finally, a 
bootstrapped mediation model tested the conceptual model outlined in Figure 5.6.8. All 
hypotheses were tested simultaneously using the ‘Process' macro for SPSS (Hayes, 2012), with 
10 000 bootstrapping re-samples and bias-corrected 95% confidence intervals (CIs) for each 
indirect effect. In bootstrapping analyses, bias-corrected CIs that do not contain 0 signify a 
significant mediational effect (Preacher & Hayes, 2004, 2008). Direct effects estimate how 
much two cases differing on the independent variable (stress manipulation) also differ on the 
dependent variable (total IGT score: (C +D) - (A + B)), independent of the effect of the 
mediator variables (SBP responses, inspection time, CRT1 scores and conscious knowledge) 
on the dependent variable. Total effects are the sum of the indirect and direct effects of the 
independent variable (stress manipulation) on the dependent variable (IGT scores) (Hayes, 








ANOVA revealed a condition (stress vs. control) effect for SBP responses, F(1,74)=13.63, 
p<.001, np
2=.16; responses were larger in the stress condition than in the control condition 
(Table 5.6.2). Further, ANOVA revealed a condition (stress vs. control) effect for HR 
responses   F(1,74)=4.07, p<.05, np
2=.05; responses were larger in the stress condition than in 
the control condition (Table 5.6.2). 
Table 5.6.2  
Mean (SD) SBP and HR at baseline and during IGT performance 
                         SBP                          HR 
 Baseline  During Baseline During  
Stress 122.05 (15.19) 139.16 (13.76) 80.46 (14.44) 85.08 (14.28) 
Control 120.22 (8.70) 122.60 (7.19) 77.33 (7.95) 77.50 (8.24) 
IGT performance 
To determine the effect of stress manipulation on the standard IGT scoring, (C+D) – (A+B) 
across the seven Blocks of the IGT, a 2 (Condition) x 7 (Blocks) Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted 
repeated measures ANOVA with log-transformed data was used (see Table 5.6.3). There was 
a main effect of stress manipulation F(1,74)=58.80, p < .001, np
2 =.44 such that IGT scores 
were significantly lower in the stress condition (M=17.07, SD=43.69) than in the control 
condition (M=38.39, SD=46.18).   
Table 5.6.3  
Mean (SD) standard IGT scores per Block for control and stress group 
Blocks Stress Control Total 
1 -4.05 (4.48) -3.16 (8.29) -3.60 (6.63) 
2 -2.32 (6.39) 4.53 (8.02) 1.10 (7.98) 
3 -.53 (7.56) 9.40 (6.94) 4.43 (8.77) 
4 -.89 (6.23) 10.32 (7.22) 4.71 (8.76) 
5 2.00 (7.45) 11.74 (7.70) 6.87 (8.99) 
6 1.21 (7.81) 12.10 (7.88) 6.65 (9.53) 
7 1.89 (9.21) 13.16 (7.70) 7.53 (10.16) 






There was a main effect of Block F(4.25,314.32)=33.29, p<.001, np
2=.31 with IGT scores 
increasing after the first Block (See table 5.6.3). The Bonferroni adjustment was too stringent 
for 21 comparisons therefore alpha level was adjusted to p<.005 to balance concerns related to 
type I and type II errors. The adjusted post hoc pairwise comparisons (Table 5.6.4) 
demonstrated significantly lower IGT scores in Block 1 than all other Blocks (all p<.005). 
Furthermore, IGT scores in Block 2 were significantly lower than Blocks 4, 5, 6 and 7 (all 
p<.005). There were no other significant differences between Blocks. 
Table 5.6.4 
Mean differences (SD) in IGT Scores. Pairwise comparison across Blocks 
 
There was an interaction between the IGT scores and the stress condition across blocks 
F(4.25,314.32)=7.44, p<.001, np
2=.09, on IGT score. Independent t-tests revealed that 
participants in the stress conditions had lower IGT scores in all but Block 1 (all significant at 
p<.001) compared with participants in the control condition (see Figure 5.6.2) (Alpha adjusted 
threshold p<.005). 
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Figure 5.6.2.  Block and stress interaction between the groups with IGT scores as the dependent variable. Error 
bars are the standard error of the mean 
CRT1 performance 
A Mann–Whitney test showed differences in CRT1 scores between the two groups: participants 
in the stress condition had lower CRT1 scores (Median=1, IQR=5) than participants in the 
control condition (Median=4.5, IQR=7) U=128, p<.001, demonstrating that reflective thinking 
was inhibited by stress (with a large effect size, r=.72). 
Correlations between CRT1 and IGT 
Correlations between disadvantageous card selection scores (A+B) per Block revealed medium 
to large correlations across both conditions. Further correlations between disadvantageous card 
selection scores for each Block and CRT1 scores were calculated for control and stress 
conditions separately. Significant negative correlations between disadvantageous card 
selection scores and CRT1 scores were observed in Blocks three, five, six and seven in the 
control condition (Alpha adjusted threshold p<.005). Meaning, higher CRT1 scores were 




























 Correlations between CRT1 scores and disadvantageous card selection scores (A+B)  
 
Inspection time  
Two separate repeated measures ANOVA were conducted to test the effect of inspection time 
of disadvantageous decks in stress and control conditions (first analysis) and the effect of 
inspection time of advantageous decks in stress and control conditions (second analysis). 
Inspection time of disadvantageous decks across conditions (First analysis) 
A Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted repeated measures ANOVA with log transformed data was 
used to determine the effect of stress manipulation on the inspection time for disadvantageous 
choices (A+B) across seven Blocks of the IGT (see Table 5.6.6). There was a main effect of 
stress manipulation F(1,74)=89.25, p<.001, np
2=.54, such that longer inspection time was 
observed in the stress condition (M=.35, SD=.10) compared to the control  condition (M=.15, 
SD=.07). 
Table 5.6.6 
 Mean (SD) inspection time for disadvantageous decks per Block for control and stress group 
Blocks Stress Control Total 
                                                          
12*Significant at p<.05. 
**Significant at p<.01 
  
Blocks12 Stress Control 
1 r=-.321, p=.049 r=.007, p=.966 
2 r=-.005, p=.977 r=-.186, p=.264 
3 r=-.175, p=.294 r=-.442, p=.005* 
4 r=-.124, p=.458 r=-.201, p=.227 
5 r=-.234, p=.158 r=-.476, p=.003* 
6 r=-.354, p=.029 r=-.519, p=.001** 
7 r=-.327, p=.045 r=-.484, p=.002* 






1 0.21 (0.08) 0.23 (0.15) 0.22 (0.12) 
2 0.45 (0.14) 0.15 (0.14) 0.30 (0.20) 
3 0.49 (0.18) 0.13 (0.08) 0.31 (0.23) 
4 0.53 (0.20) 0.17 (0.17) 0.35 (0.26) 
5 0.38 (0.23) 0.12 (0.10) 0.25 (0.22) 
6 0.20 (0.16) 0.13 (0.12) 0.17 (0.15) 
7 0.19 (0.15) 0.14 (0.14) 0.17 (0.15) 
Total  0.35 (0.10) 0.15 (0.07)  
There was a main effect of Block, F(4.14,306.16)=21.81, p<.001, np
2=.23 with the inspection 
time increasing from Block 1 until Block 4 (See table 5.6.6). Post hoc tests were used to unpack 
this main effect. The Bonferroni adjustment was too stringent to make 21 comparisons between 
all combinations of Blocks, therefore the alpha level was adjusted to p<.005 to balance 
concerns related to type I and type II errors. The adjusted post hoc pairwise comparisons (Table 
5.6.7) demonstrated that inspection time in Block 1 was significantly lower than inspection 
time in Blocks 2 and 3 (all p<.005). Inspection time in Blocks 2 and 3 was significantly higher 
than inspection time in Blocks 6 and 7.  Furthermore, the inspection time in Block 4 was 
significantly higher than inspection time in Blocks 5, 6 and 7 (all p<.005).  
Table 5.6.7 
Mean differences (SE) in Inspection Times (in seconds). Pairwise comparison across Blocks.  
 
Finally, there was an interaction between the stress manipulation and Blocks F(4.14,306.16)= 
26.16, p<.001, np
2=.26. Bonferroni adjusted independent t-tests tested the interaction between 
the matching Blocks in both conditions. These revealed longer inspection time for 
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disadvantageous decks in the stress conditions in Blocks 2, 3, 4 and 5 compared with 
participants in the control condition (Figure 5.6.3) (Alpha adjusted threshold p<.005). 
Figure 5.6.3. Block and stress interaction between the groups with inspection time of disadvantageous decks as 
the dependent variable. Error bars are the standard error of the mean 
Inspection time of advantageous decks across conditions (Second analysis) 
A Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted repeated measures ANOVA with log transformed data was 
used to determine the effect of stress manipulation on the inspection time for advantageous 
choices (C+D) across the seven Blocks of the IGT (see Table 5.6.8). There was a main effect 
of stress manipulation F(1,74)= 7.52, p=.008, np
2=.09, such that longer inspection time was 
observed in the control group (M=.29, SD=.10) compared to the stress  group (M=.22, SD=.08).   
Table 5.6.8 
Mean (SD) inspection time for advantageous decks per Block for control and stress group 
Blocks Stress Control Total 
1 0.22 (0.10) 0.22 (0.14) 0.22 (0.12) 
2 0.19 (0.10) 0.30 (0.14) 0.25 (0.13) 
3 0.23 (0.15) 0.41 (0.23) 0.32 (0.21) 
4 0.23 (0.16) 0.46 (0.30) 0.35 (0.27) 
5 0.19 (0.12) 0.22 (0.18) 0.21 (0.15) 
6 0.23 (0.15) 0.18 (0.16) 0.21 (0.16) 





























Total  0.22 (0.08) 0.29 (0.10)  
 
There was a main effect of Block, F(3.78,280.19)= 12.12, p<.001, np
2=.14 with the inspection 
time increasing from Block 1 until Block 4 (See table 5.6.8). Post hoc tests were used to unpack 
this main effect. The Bonferroni adjustment was again very stringent so the alpha level was 
adjusted to p< .005 to balance concerns related to type I and type II errors. The adjusted post 
hoc pairwise comparisons (Table 5.6.9) demonstrated that inspection time in Block 1 was 
significantly slower than Blocks 3 and 4 (all p<.005). Furthermore, inspection time in Block 3 
was significantly longer than Blocks 5 and 6 (all p<.005). Additionally, inspection time in 
Block 4 was significantly longer than Blocks 5, 6 and 7 (all p<.005). 
Table 5.6.9 
Mean differences (SD) in Inspection Times (in seconds). Pairwise comparison across Blocks.  
 
There was an interaction between the stress manipulation and Blocks F(3.78,280.19)= 10.88, 
p<.001, np
2=.13. Bonferroni adjusted independent t-tests tested the interaction between the 
matching Blocks in both conditions. These revealed longer inspection time for participants in 
the control condition in Blocks 2, 3 and 4 compared with participants in the stress condition 
(see Figure 5.6.4) (Bonferroni adjusted threshold p<.005). 
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Figure 5.6.4. Block and stress interaction between the groups with inspection time of advantageous decks as the 
dependent variable. Error bars are the standard error of the mean 
Conscious awareness  
A Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted ANOVA was used to determine the effect of stress 
manipulation on the Level 1 knowledge (overall deck ratings, (C + D) – (A + B)) across the 
seven Blocks of the IGT (see Table 5.6.10). There was a main effect of stress manipulation 
F(1,73)=12.90, p=.001, np
2=.15, such that the Level 1 knowledge was lower in the stress group 
(M=-1.19, SD=6.90) compared to the control group (M=-7.61, SD=8.32). 
Table 5.6.10 
Mean (SD) for overall deck ratings (C+D – A+B) per Block for control and stress group 
Blocks Stress Control Total 
1 -5.84 (7.48) 1.37 (7.01) -2.28 (8.07) 
2 1.18 (9.36) 4.83 (9.62) 2.99 (9.13) 
3 1.60 (8.64) 8.37 (8.81) 4.94 (9.31) 
4 3.47 (9.28) 8.51 (11.15) 5.96 (10.49) 
5 3.13 (8.08) 9.51 (11.38) 6.28 (10.30) 
6 2.39 (8.27) 10.48 (10.65) 6.39 (10.30) 
7 2.45 (8.00) 10.16 (10.46) 6.25 (10.01) 
Total  1.19 (6.90) 7.61 (8.32)  
There was a significant main effect of Block, F(2.75,200.67)= 26.43, p<.001, np
2=.27, with the 


























were used to unpack this main effect. The alpha level was again adjusted to p< .005 to balance 
concerns related to type I and type II errors. The adjusted post hoc pairwise comparisons (Table 
5.6.11) demonstrated that Level 1 Knowledge in Block 1 was significantly lower than all other 
Blocks (all p<.005). There were no other significant differences between Blocks. 
Table 5.6.11 
Mean differences (SD) in Level 1 Knowledge. Pairwise comparison across Blocks.  
 
The Block x stress manipulation interaction F(2.75,200.67)= 1.62, p=.127, np
2=.02 was not 
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Figure 5.6.5. Overall deck ratings (C+D – A+B) between the groups. Error bars are the standard error of the 
mean  
Two separate mixed ANOVAs (one for calculated deck values and the second for estimated 
deck values) were used to determine the effect of stress manipulation on the deck ratings for 
advantageous and disadvantageous decks.  
The first mixed ANOVA tested the effect of stress manipulation on the estimated deck values. 
There was a main effect of stress manipulation F(1,74)=4.32, p=.041, np
2=.05, such that 
participants in the stress condition estimated deck values were higher compared to the control 
group (see Table 5.6.12).  
There was no significant main effect of decks, F(1,74)=0.35, p=.55, np
2=.005.  
There was however, a significant deck x stress manipulation interaction F(1,74)=8.89, p=.004, 
np
2=.11. Independent t-tests revealed higher estimated values of the disadvantageous decks for 
participants in the stress conditions compared with participants in the control condition (see 





























Mean (SD) for estimated net values per deck 
 
 
Figure 5.6.6. Estimated values for advantageous and disadvantageous decks between the groups. Error bars are 
the standard error of the mean  
The second mixed ANOVA tested the effect of stress manipulation on the calculated deck 
values. There was a no significant main effect of stress manipulation F(1,74)=.11, p=.74, 
np
2=.001. There was a significant main effect of deck, F(1,74)=56.16, p<.001, np
2=.43, such 
that lower calculated values were observed for  disadvantageous decks compared to 
advantageous decks (see Table 5.6.13); and there was a no significant deck x stress 
manipulation interaction F(2.09,154.82)=.46, p=.64, np





























Deck                   Estimated values                    Total  
 Stress Control  
AB 379.23 (312.35) 155.56 (341.22) 267.39 (343.86) 
CD 276.88 (239.80) 308.37 (172.90) 292.62 (208.25) 







Mean (SD) for calculated net values per deck 
 
Figure 5.6.7. Calculated net values for advantageous and disadvantageous decks between the groups. Error bars 
are the standard error of the mean  
The participant’s conscious knowledge started to emerge from Block 2 onwards in both 
conditions. 39% percent of the participants reached Level 1 conscious knowledge in the stress 
condition after the first Block, compared to 50% of the participants in the control condition.  
(Figure 5.6.8). However only 2% of the participants in the stress group reached Level 2 
conscious knowledge after the first Block compared to 16% of the participants in the control 
condition. By the end of the game only 8% of the participants reached level 2 knowledge in the 
























Deck                    Calculated values          Total  
 Stress Control  
AB -356.62 (329.82) -365.87 (211.74) -361.25 (275.32) 
CD -165.46 (159.37) -129.70 (65.84) -147.58 (122.45) 







Figure 5.6.8. Participant’s conscious levels of knowledge across Blocks in stress and control conditions.  
Mediation analyses 
Data was first screened for the outliers and there were no issues. The data screening also 
indicated that the assumption of normality was not violated. For the mediation analyses, stress 
manipulation was an independent variable and overall IGT score was a dependent variable. 
CRT1 scores, inspection time, conscious knowledge and SBP reactivity were mediators.  
Initially, it was checked if the stress manipulation predicts chosen mediators. Stress 
manipulation significantly predicted all the mediators (Table 5.6.14).  
The results were significant for all the mediators. Further mediation analyses indicated that the 
direct effect of stress manipulation on IGT was not significant when controlling for mediators, 
b =15.30 (SE=12.15), t=1.26, p=.212. However, there was a significant indirect effect of stress 
manipulation on IGT scores through CRT1, b=30.32 (SE=7.40), Z=4.09, ,p<0.001 and 
conscious knowledge, b=13.64 (SE=4.67), Z=2.92,  p=0.003. Conversely, the indirect effect of 














































































reactivity, b=-1.86 (SE=3.50), Z=-0.53, p=0.488 was not significant. The full model of stress 
manipulation as a predictor of IGT scores, indirectly thorough mediators in a non-sequential 
pattern, is outlined in Figure 5.6.9. 
Table 5.6.14 




Overall module Stress manipulation effect 
CRT1  F(1,74)=80.35,p<.001, R2=.52 
 
b=3.13 (SE=.35), t(74)=8.96, p<.001 
SBP reactivity  F(1,74)=21.54,p<.001, R2=.22 
 
b=-11.89 (SE=2.56), t(74)=-4.64, p<.001 
Inspection time F(1,74)=90.93,p<.001, R2=.55; b=-.26 (SE=.03), t(74)=-9.54, p<.001 
Conscious 
knowledge  
F(1,74)=12.98, p<.001, R2=.15 b=-6.35 (SE=1.76), t(74)=-3.60, p<.001 
                                                                                   - 
                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                   
      b= 3.13, p<.001                                                                                          b=- 0.16, p=.586                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                      
                        b= -.26, p<.001                                                    b=- 13.05, p=.624                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                        
                                                                                                                                             
                                                            c’=15.68, p=0.117                                        
                                                            c=60.84, p<.001                                                                               
                                                                                                              
                         b= -6.35, p<.001                                                 b= -2.15, p<.001                                                                                                                                                                                                                                              
    b= -11.89, p<.001                                                                                      b= 9.68, p<.001                                                                                                                                                      
                                                        
 
                                                                                  
                                                        
                              Direct effect, R2 = 0.68, b= 15.68, t(70.00) = 1.58, p = 0.117 c’ 
                              Total effect, R2 = 0.44, b= 60.84, t(74.00) = 7,70, p< 0.001 c 
                             Indirect effect CRT1, b=30.32 (SE=6.52), 95% CI [19.17, 45.90] 
 
                     Indirect effect Inspection time, b=3.45 (SE=7.78), 95% CI [-10.21, 20.76]                     
                 Indirect effect Conscious knowledge, b=13.64 (SE=4.83), 95% CI [5.70, 24.93] 

















Figure 5.6.9. Model of stress manipulation as a predictor of IGT scores, mediated by SBP reactivity, inspection 
time, CRT1 and conscious knowledge. The confidence interval for the indirect effect is a BCa bootstrapped CI 
based on 10 000 samples 
5.7. Discussion 
The hypotheses related to replication of Simonovic et al.’s (2016) findings (Hypotheses 1, 2 
and 3) are partially supported. The first hypothesis that the stress manipulation would inhibit 
IGT performance and would delay the optimisation of deck selections is supported. The stress 
manipulation also reduced participants' reflective ability as measured by the CRT1. It was 
hypothesised that CRT1 scores would correlate in the earlier Blocks for both conditions. The 
hypothesis is partially supported; correlations between CRT1 scores and disadvantageous deck 
picks were shown in Blocks three, five, six and seven only in the control condition.  
It was further hypothesised (Hypothesis 4) that there will be differences in inspection time 
across conditions between the disadvantageous decks and advantageous decks. That hypothesis 
is supported. Longer inspection time for disadvantageous decks was observed in the stress 
condition in Blocks two, three, four and five. Conversely, longer inspection time for 
advantageous decks was observed in the control condition in Blocks two, three and four. It was 
also hypothesised that the stress will inhibit the learning of the patterns of gains and losses 
(deck rating) and learning of the estimated and calculated net values (Hypothesis 5). This 
hypothesis is partially supported; overall, participants in the control conditions gained enough 
knowledge to understand the patterns of gains and losses compared to the stress condition. 
However, the interaction between the blocks and the decks was not significant. It was expected 
that participants in the stress conditions would estimate and calculate net values greater than 
those in the control condition. The findings only partially support this hypothesis; estimated 
net value was higher in the stress condition compared to the estimated net value in the control 
condition. There were no differences in calculated net value results between the conditions. 
The emergence of Level 2 conscious awareness was evident in both conditions after the first 
Block. However, a higher percentage of the participants in the control group developed 
conscious knowledge compared to the participants in the stress conditions. This supports the 
hypothesis that stress interferes with the development of conscious knowledge. Finally, a 
mediation regression analysis was conducted to examine direct and indirect effects of the stress 
manipulation, SBP, inspection time, CRT1 and conscious knowledge upon IGT scores 






scores by reducing cognitive reflection and conscious knowledge but did not have a direct 
effect. These findings are discussed in turn.   
Manipulation check and IGT performance 
The results showed that the manipulation was successful as indicated by higher SBP/HR 
reactivity scores in the stress condition. The results showed that stressed participants selected 
more cards from disadvantageous decks, after the first Block, indicating that their learning was 
impaired. These findings support Simonovic et al.'s (2016) findings on a non-extended version 
of the IGT. These data are also in line with previous studies that have shown that stress impairs 
learning and leads to a slower elimination of disadvantageous deck selection (Preston et al., 
2007; Starcke et al., 2017; Wemm & Wulfert, 2017). For example, Starcke et al. found that a 
stress-inducing task, unsolvable anagrams, lead to a decrease of advantageous choices on IGT. 
Results from the Experiment 3 in this chapter yielded similar results.  Participants in the stress 
condition improved the IGT performance after the fourth trial compared to the participants in 
the control condition that improved the performance after the first trial. This is also similar to 
the results of Wemm and Wulfert's (2017) study that found increased heart rate responses to a 
stress-induced task was associated with an increased selection of disadvantageous decks.  
CRT1 results  
Participants in the stress condition had significantly lower CRT1 scores, indicating that stress 
reduced reflective ability. This supports Simonovic et al.’s (2016) results and indicates that 
analytic thinking processes are negatively affected by stress, where physiological responses to 
a stressor shift decision-making from deliberate and reflective processes towards automatic and 
habitual processes. This is also in line with Margittai et al.’s (2016) study that demonstrated 
higher cortisol level effect on impaired performance on the original CRT. Margittai et al. 
interpreted their results as direct evidence that the stress hormone cortisol biases decision-
making towards automatic processing. This corresponds with research evidencing that stress 
disrupts the higher order control, (mediated by PFC) and allows bottom-up (automatic) control 
(amygdala mediated) to dominate (e.g., Arnsten, 2009; Schwabe & Wolf, 2011; Schwabe & 
Wolf, 2013). This further supports the dual process account of IGT where it is assumed that 
‘cool' reflective processes are important in overriding ‘hot' processes that favour short-term 
gain (Brevers et al., 2013). According to Brevers et al. ‘cool’ systems are associated with 






where ‘hot’ systems do not allow risk assessments of the choices, ‘cool’ systems are involved 
in the determination of the risk and benefits of the choices.  The overall correlation between 
the CRT1 scores and disadvantageous deck selections scores observed in the control condition 
indicate that reflective processes are implicated in disambiguation of the disadvantageous deck 
contingencies. Correlational data further indicate that the reflective processing is significant 
not only in earlier trials (e.g., Simonovic et al., 2016; experiment 1 and 2) but in the later trials 
when participants presumably learned the rules of the task (e.g., Starcke et al., 2017). 
Presumably, learning shift varies from participant to participant, and it is difficult to predict a 
clear cut-point. The CRT1 scores in the control condition appeared to correlate with 
disadvantageous deck scores during the whole game. This indicates that the importance of 
reflective thinking emerged after the second Block and persisted until the end of the game 
showing less reflective participants in the control group were more likely to make a 
disadvantageous choice. 
Inspection time 
The overall inspection time of disadvantageous decks between the stress and the control 
condition was significant. Greater inspection time was observed for participants in the stress 
condition, particularly from Blocks two to five. This indicates that there are differences in 
attentional control between the two conditions and possible lack of control of the 
disadvantageous deck choices. This lack of control, presumably, impaired participants’ ability 
to disengage from the negative choices associated with disadvantageous decks in the stress 
condition. This is in line with previous research on the effect of stress on decision-making 
where an increased likelihood of the negative preferences and poor learning from punishment 
is associated with increased attention towards negative choices (Cavanagh et al. 2011; 
Ononaiye et al., 2007; Sapolsky, 2000; Sposari & Rapee, 2007). Thus, the findings indicate 
that stress condition inhibited participants' ability for attentional disengagement from the 
negative choices. However, it is not clear if the stress condition reduced participants' learning 
from negative feedback by ‘hijacking' cognitive control, or just increased the risk-taking 
behaviour through reducing individual abilities to disengage from the bad choices. 
Nevertheless, the second analysis related to the overall inspection time of advantageous choices 
between the conditions revealed that participants in the stress condition fail to maintain 
attentional control over advantageous decks. Greater inspection time for advantageous decks 






indicator of participants’ awareness of the advantageousness of decks and it should not occur 
so early in the task according to some authors (Bechara et al., 1997, 2000; Starcke et al., 2007; 
2017).  Thus, it is possible that stress impaired both learnings from the positive and negative 
feedback of disadvantageous/advantageous decks, reduced participants' ability for attentional 
disengagements of disadvantageous choices and increased awareness of the advantageousness 
of the good decks in control group.  
Conscious awareness  
Sufficient knowledge to guide advantageous long-term choices emerged for most of the 
participants in the control condition after the first Block. Overall deck rating scores in the stress 
condition suggested that stress interfered with participants’ learning as they failed to develop 
sufficient knowledge to guide their performance compared to the control group. There were no 
differences in the calculated net values between the two conditions suggesting that participants’ 
knowledge of the advantageous/disadvantageous deck contingencies is mostly inaccurate in 
both groups. However, participants in the control condition were able to retain knowledge of 
the disadvantageous estimated deck contingencies, compared to participants in the stress 
condition. This indicates that stress affected participants’ knowledge of the estimated net value, 
whereby participants in the stress condition overestimated the average amount won or lost on 
disadvantageous decks. Stress also impeded participants’ development of full conceptual 
knowledge in the stress condition. These data are consistent with previous studies that have 
shown that the IGT can be performed through access to explicit, conscious knowledge (e.g., 
Maia, & McClelland, 2004, 2005; Fernie & Tunney, 2006; Fernie, & Tunney, 2013). Thus, 
while the possibility that somatic markers contribute to IGT performance cannot be ruled out, 
the results reliably show that stress impaired the conscious processes which are integral to IGT 
performance. However, it should be noted that the nature of the IGT design and the design of 
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) test is likely to promote some cognitive processing rather than 
intuitive processing because participants only need to pay attention to the punishment delivered 
on disadvantageous/advantageous decks to learn the IGT. Nonetheless, these data support 
previous research that have shown that the contention that the non-conscious intuitive signals 
bias decisional choices in the early stage of IGT can no longer be confidently endorsed (e.g., 







Conceptual knowledge and inspection time of the advantageous decks emerged after the second 
Block. This indicated that participants in the control group had gained sufficient knowledge 
about the deck contingences and were more focused on the good decks. This also suggests that 
explicit knowledge runs in parallel with participants’ deck selection. Similar results are 
reported in a study that used wagering to examine conceptual awareness (Konstantinidis & 
Shanks, 2013). Participants were able to develop preferences towards the advantageous decks 
and accurately justify their preferences. Thus, it could be argued that a considerable amount of 
awareness activates cognitive processing about the payoff structure of the IGT that leads to an 
optimal decision-making strategy. This argument is in line with Newell and Shank’s (2014) 
suggestion that conscious awareness diverts attention to positive decisional choices and recruits 
cognitive processes related to goal-directed behaviour. According to this view, conscious 
awareness initiates executive attention that further initiates executive functioning (e.g., WM) 
that reflects on the specific components on the task at hand. The results from this experiment 
certainly indicate that conscious awareness, attentional processing and analytic ability arise 
early in the game, however the causality of their influence in relation to leaning IGT is yet to 
be established. Nevertheless, the results indicated that participants who reflect more on their 
responses have a higher awareness of the deck contingences and are focused more on the good 
decks early in the game which is an indicator of explicit Type II processing.  
Mediation analysis  
The mediation analysis revealed that learning and performance on IGT are multifaceted. The 
effect of stress on overall IGT performance occurs through reduced reflective and conscious 
capacity rather than different routes. This is in line with Preston et al.'s (2007) and Simonovic 
et al.'s (2016) argument that stress disrupts Type II cognitive processes. Furthermore, 
conceptual knowledge emerged as an additional mediator to the previously suggested reflective 
ability (e.g., Simonovic et al., 2016). The mediators reduced the direct effect of stress 
manipulation on IGT scores. However, the analysis revealed a not very strong connection 
between the mediators and overall IGT scores. This raises the possibility that the mediators are 
not strongly related to each other. Nonetheless, the data indicate that the IGT performance is 
not primarily dependent on emotion feedback processing and are instead compatible with the 
recently suggested dual process framework of decision-making (Brevers et al., 2013). 
However, contrary to Brevers et al.’s suggestion that the ‘hot’ processes guide successful 






making on the IGT. If there is a role for emotion-feedback processing and the Type II 
processing early in the game, then it could be argued that a complex interaction between the 
different components give rise to the somatic markers. This is in line with evidence from 
reasoning literature that the conflict between the Type I and Type II processes can be 
psychophysiologicaly arousing (e.g., Evans, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2005; De Neys & 
Glumicic, 2008; De Neys et al., 2010). Thus, it could be argued that it is not the emotion-based 
processing that creates the arousal, but the cognitive processing during the early stages of the 
task where participants’ cognitive effort is employed for learning decks contingences. If there 
is a lack of or insufficient cognitive processing early in the game this may create a somatic 
signal.  
In conclusion, the results of this experiment replicate and extend previous studies that have 
demonstrated a link between stress and IGT performance. Moreover, the experiment 
demonstrated the importance of reflective cognition, attention and conscious knowledge not 
only in later trials but also in the earlier trials usually associated with learning the task. The 
results indicate that induced stress impedes analytical thinking, attentional disengagement, and 
development of the conscious knowledge that consequently interferes with performance on the 
IGT. The results of this experiment are not definitive but provide broad support for the dual-
process framework of decision-making. The importance of attentional control and conscious 
awareness was demonstrated, (as in the previous experiment) and this accords with the 
hypothesis emerging from the thesis that there is a complex interplay between the cognitive 
processes during IGT performance. Certainly, the pattern of attentional control and cognitive 
reflection that guides learning observed in the previous experiment was replicated here in 














This chapter details a summary and general discussion of the experimental results in relation 
to the SMH and dual-process framework. First, a summary of the empirical results is provided, 
and the results of each experiment are discussed in turn. Second, the methodology that is used 
in this Thesis is discussed and certain caveats highlighted regarding the results. Third, 
theoretical implications of the results and some direction for future research are discussed. 
Finally, a conclusion is provided in respect to the findings of this Thesis.  
6.1. Summary of empirical results  
SMH postulates that emotions play an important part in decision-making (e.g., Damasio, 1994). 
Behaviour on IGT (Bechara et al., 1994, 2000) has been interpreted as support for the SMH. 
Three critical assumptions have been made in support of the SMH. These are: (i) somatic 
markers guide decision-choices away from the bad decks as participants are able to anticipate 
the good and the bad options, (ii) there is a limited role for cognitive procesesing during IGT 
performance, especially during the initial stages of the task, and (iii) somatic markers bias 
decision-making covertly, in the absence of the awareness of deck contingencies. The 
systematic review with meta-analyses and the experiments described in this Thesis examined 
these assumptions and found little evidence in support of the SMH. There were several 
objectives that this thesis aimed to achieve, and these were: a) to systematically examine aSCRs 
evidence in support of SMH (Chapter 2), b) to test if pupil dilation can be used as an alternative 
measure of somatic markers and to test cognitive processes during IGT performance (Chapter 
3), c) to examine explicit learning, individual differences in thinking disposition and cognitive 
processing during IGT performance (Chapter 4), and to examine the effect of stress on IGT 
performance and cognitive processing (Chapter 5). The experimental results demonstrated that 
the explicit processing might be very relevant during decision-making on IGT. Furthermore, 
the experiments provided support for the recently proposed dual-process framework of 
decision-making on IGT (e.g., Brevers et al., 2013).   
6.1.1. Chapter 2 Results  
Chapter 2 explored if there is evidence in support of the aSCRs effect on IGT performance. 






examined the effect of overall aSCRs on IGT performance and the second analysis examined 
the differences in aSCRs between the disadvantageous and the advantageous decks. The first 
analysis provided some support for SMH with reliable results that overall aSCRs correlate with 
successful IGT performance. However, the second meta-analysis showed that the results were 
not homogeneous and indicated an absence of evidence that there is a clear distinction in aSCRs 
between the disadvantageous and advantageous decks. This novel finding raised the possibility 
that aSCRs measures cannot distinguish decisional outcomes according to the goodness and 
the badness of choices. This would be problematic for SMH because it challenges the 
underlying assumptions that somatic markers differentiate between the good and the bad 
choices that consequently drive future deck selections behaviour (e.g., Bechara & Damasio, 
2005). The systematic review also indicated that aSCR might represent a response to reward 
and punishment feedback rather than a marker of how good or bad a selected option is (e.g., 
Suzuki et al., 2003).  This suggests that anticipatory somatic markers may not be directly 
involved in decision-making and that the traditionally employed SCR measurements are unable 
to distinguish between different somatic markers signals.  Furthermore, both analyses revealed 
small effect sizes, indicating that other factors may be important during IGT performance. For 
example, if there is an anticipatory signal that precedes disadvantageous deck selection then it 
could be argued that signal leads to a non-optimal behavioural performance (e.g., Dunn et al., 
2006).  Thus, these results provide some support for SMH but also raise the possibility that 
faster physiological measures are needed to further test the SMH. 
6.1.2. Chapter 3 Results  
In the third chapter, an eye-tracking methodology was used to measure pupil dilation as an 
alternative physiological marker; and a direct measure of cognitive reflection was used to 
examine performance on IGT. The standard interpretation of somatic markers is that future 
optimal choice is determined by previously encountered negative feedback during a monetary 
loss that biases processes of cognitive evaluation in the later trials of the game (e.g., Bechara 
et al., 1997, 2000). The findings from the Experiment 1 showed little support for this 
suggestion. These novel findings demonstrated that cognitive processing impacts on IGT 
performance early in the game which raises the possibility that somatic markers may be 
correlates of cognitive load rather than emotional feedback. Thus, evidence was found 
undermining the second assumption that there is a limited influence of cognitive processing 
early in the game. This is further demonstrated in Experiment 2 and 3; learning did not occur 






important for learning and subsequent IGT performance. This also raises the possibility that 
the observed increase in the anticipatory pupillary responses develops from cognitive 
processing. Furthermore, Bechara et al.’s (1997, 1999, 2000) suggestion that the healthy 
participants should perform optimally on the IGT, whereby the peak of the optimal 
performance should be observed after the fourth trials was not supported. The results 
demonstrated that the performance on the IGT continues to improve after the fifth trial and this 
was further supported by the results from the Experiments 2 and 3 (control group). Taken 
together, these results provide support for recent assertions that the explicit processing occurs 
early in the game and guide successful IGT performance (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2004; 
Fernie & Tunney, 2013; Simonovic et al., 2016). Thus, it is concluded that IGT behaviour is 
best explained within the dual-process framework. 
6.1.3. Chapter 4 results  
The third assumption of IGT behaviour in the SMH framework is that somatic markers bias 
decks’ selection covertly in the absences of conscious awareness and explicit processes. This 
was explored in chapters 3, 4 and 5. The results from Experiment 2 demonstrated several 
significant results that highlighted the role of Type II processes such that increased cognitive 
processing, explicit knowledge and cognitive reflection all have an impact on IGT 
performance. The results replicated findings from the Experiment 1 regarding the effect of 
cognitive reflection in the initial stages of the IGT. Increased cognitive processing, as measured 
by the inspection time, was also demonstrated for both disadvantageous and advantageous 
decks and these differed according to the nature of the decks. The importance of cognitive 
awareness was also demonstrated early in the game (from Block 2 onwards); conscious 
awareness had an effect on learning and performance on the task. However, it was noted that 
not all the participants developed Level 2 conceptual knowledge. One explanation for this 
behaviour is that participants’ Level 2 knowledge is not complete, and few possess accurate 
knowledge of the deck contingencies (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2005   
In addition, it was found that there is an interplay between the conscious awareness and 
increased conscious processing such that conscious awareness alone is not enough for 
disambiguation of the deck contingencies. Greater cognitive processing of the advantageous 
decks was related to conscious awareness compared to the disadvantageous decks. This 
indicated that conscious awareness of disadvantageous decks alone is not sufficient for optimal 






punishment schedule to strengthen their decisional choices. Taken together these novel results 
add further empirical evidence to the increasing number of studies (Bowman et al., 2005, Evans 
et al., 2005; Fernie & Tunney, 2006, 2013; Maia & McClelland, 2004, 2005; Simonovic et al., 
2016) that have reported the effect of explicit processing during learning and IGT performance. 
Furthermore, the results demonstrated an active role for attentional processing (as indicated by 
the inspection time) during the IGT, which is contrary to the suggestion that attention is 
determined by physiological arousal and by passively acquired information (e.g., Bechara & 
Damasio, 2005; Brand et al., 2007).  
6.1.4. Chapter 5 results  
Chapter 5 continued the exploration of cognitive processes on IGT albeit under stress. 
According to the SMH stress interferes with the development of somatic markers that are 
necessary for optimal IGT performance (e.g., Reimann & Bechara 2010; Starcke et al., 2017). 
Specifically, stress amplifies emotion that is not relevant to the task that alters the reward and 
feedback processing and generates a dysfunctional strategy during decision-making. The 
results of Experiment 3 do not support this contention. The results demonstrated that stress 
affects explicit processing such that it reduces the analytic ability, cognitive processing and 
conscious awareness of the bad choices. Specifically, stress reduces reflective and conscious 
processes that are important for disambiguation of the decks’ contingencies; this raises the 
possibility that insufficient cognitive processing early in the game may create a somatic signal 
that interferes with IGT performance No evidence was found to support the assumption that 
stress interferes with emotional feedback processing that impairs learning and IGT 
performance (cf. Starcke et al., 2017; Wemm, & Wulfert, 2017). Instead, these novel findings 
replicated and extended previous results that stress reduced cognitive processing lead to 
disadvantageous deck selection (e.g., Simonovic et al., 2016). This was demonstrated through 
the participants’ inability to disengage from the bad choices and through the lack of cognitive 
processing of the disadvantageous decks’ selection.  
The main results from this Thesis can be summarised thus; explicit processing and explicit 
knowledge determine successful IGT performance. Type II processes play a significant role in 
learning and IGT performance. Participant performance is not optimal and continues to 
improve; and even a small amount of stress can interfere with performance because it hinders 







6.2. Methodology  
6.2.1. Systematic review  
Systematic review and meta-analyses provide very useful data synthesis (e.g., Bartolucci & 
Hillegass, 2010). However, it must be noted that despite many benefits, systematic reviews 
require access to a wide range of databases and peer-reviewed journals, which can be 
problematic and very expensive. This can sometimes undermine the objectivity of the search 
and retrieval process that could introduce a bias to the review processes. The systematic review 
in this Thesis aspired to be as objective as possible. Three independent reviewers had to reach 
an agreement about the studies’ inclusion criteria and the overall quality of the studies. This 
process presumably minimized the risk of inconsistent screening and increased the objectivity 
of the quality of the screening process. Another potential issue with meta-analyses is data 
availability as well as methodological diversity. To account for this issue, some of the authors 
were contacted directly and asked to provide additional information through personal 
correspondence. Although, most of the additional information was obtained, some of the 
authors (e.g., Denburg et al., 2006) were not able to provide meaningful data to be included in 
the meta-analyses. Nevertheless, the systematic review and meta-analyses provided a very 
good synthesis of the data and decision-making research should consider implementing these 
methods in the future.  
6.2.2. Eye-tracking methodology  
Changes in pupillary responses have been increasingly used as measures of cognitive and 
emotional effort (e.g., Fiedler & Glockner, 2012; Hewig et al., 2011; Preuschoff et al., 2011). 
The interpretation of pupillary responses varies according to the nature of the tasks used to 
assess decision-making (e.g., Costa & Rudebeck, 2016; Jepma & Nieuwenhuis, 2011; van 
Stegeren, 2008). The level of a task complexity may increase cognitive processing mode or 
elicit emotional responses to a triggered stimulus that is reflected by an increase in pupillary 
responses (e.g., de Gee et al., 2014; Preuschoff et al., 2011; Satterthwaite et al., 2007; Shiv et 
al., 2005). The results from the Experiment 1 demonstrated that anticipatory pupillary 
responses could be sensitive to the differences in the advantageousness of the deck 
contingences. It was argued that this might represent a somatic marker, although a possibility 
that this was due to cognitive processing could not be excluded. It has to be noted that the raw 
pupillary data contained some missing values and it was difficult to extract more meaningful 






measures of pupillary responses were not processed with software that is usually recommended 
for quadric interpolation of the raw data (e.g., Satterthwaite et al., 2007). Therefore, the analysis 
of pupillary response measures in Experiment 1 was relatively narrow and further applications 
of the pupillary response methodologies are necessary to more fully explore the utility of this 
measure in investigating the IGT and the SMH.  
Increased inspection time effect was associated with increased cognitive processing during the 
task performance that differed according to the nature of the decks in the Experiments 2 and 3. 
This is in line with evidence that associated longer inspection time with increased reasoning 
processing (e.g., Ball et al., 2003, 2006; Glockner, 2007; Glockner, & Betsch, 2008; Horstmann 
et al., 2009). However, it is not clear if an increase in inspection time reflected actual cognitive 
processing during IGT. Some evidence indicates that fixation duration acts as an external 
memory space that reduces demands on WM, and therefore can be taken as an indicator of 
cognitive processing (e.g., Droll & Hayhoe, 2007). Different evidence however indicates that 
decision-making on the complex tasks that involve working-memory processes could also be 
revealed though an increase in inspection time (e.g., Aivar, Hayhoe, Chizk, & Mruczek, 2005). 
Hence, decision complexity could increase the demand on WM processes, leading to longer 
inspection time that has an effect on learning (e.g., Bialkova & van Trijp, 2011; Fiedler & 
Glöckner, 2012). This contention is in line with the results from the Experiments 2 and 3 of 
this Thesis. It was evident that participants’ processing of the disadvantageous decks occurs 
early in the game and this probably increased demand for cognitive processing. This could also 
explain the early correlations between the cognitive reflection and disadvantageous deck 
selection. Thus, it could be argued that increased inspection reflects reasoning processes, but 
also captures the learning effect that is driven by the properties of the task demands.   
6.2.3. CRT1 
CRT1 (Toplak et al., 2014) was a very strong predictor of IGT performance in all the 
experiments. This is a strong indication that increased cognitive reflection is needed for 
disambiguation of the disadvantageous decks’ contingencies. This suggests that either: a) 
participants do not engage in deep thinking enough and are unwilling to invest cognitive effort 
during the IGT performance (e.g., Toplak et al., 2011, 2014); or b) that participants lack 
analytic ability and numerical skills (e.g., Stupple et al., 2013, 2017) to calculate frequencies 
of rewards and punishments of the disadvantageous decks. It could be argued that early 






supplementary analytical processes are needed for information integration and calculation of 
the learned outcomes. It has to be noted that the CRT1 is not the only extended version of the 
original CRT that could have been used in this Thesis (e.g., Primi, Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, 
& Hamilton, 2016; Thomson, & Oppenheimer, 2016). The CRT1 measure was chosen because 
it is a potent measure of cognitive reflection that is associated with decision biases and 
responses time (e.g., Alos-Ferrrer et al., 2016), cognitive skills (Corgnet et al., 2016) and 
analytic reasoning styles (e.g., Hertzog et al., 2017; Rinaldi et al., 2017; Ring et al., 2016) that 
may be important for IGT performance (e.g., Simonovic et al., 2016). The replication of these 
Thesis findings with a wider range of CRT tasks could provide further insight into cognitive 
processes related to IGT performance. 
6.2.4. Conscious awareness 
Maia and McClelland’s (2004) conscious awareness test was a reliable predictor of IGT 
performance. Level 1 and Level 2 conceptual knowledge emerged early in the game and 
influenced IGT performance above the chance. Thus, conceptual knowledge after the second 
Block was sufficient to guide successful decision-making in the Experiments 2 and 3. This is 
in line with previous research that used this measure and demonstrated similar results (e.g., 
Maia & McClelland, 2004, 2005, Fernie & Tunney, 2013). Note, however, that the participants 
were not asked to verbalize their reports because of the possibility that the verbal reports may 
not be sufficiently reliable and sensitive instruments for measuring awareness (e.g., Persaud et 
al., 2007; Newell & Shanks, 2014). Thus, only the quantified measures were used because of 
the suggestion that this meet reliability criterion, sensitivity criteria and a stringent insight 
criterion related to conscious awareness (e.g., Newell & Shanks, 2014). However, it has to be 
noted that even the use of stringent criteria may be elusive because it is difficult to obtain 
measures of conscious awareness that are simultaneously exclusive and exhaustive (e.g., 
Velmans, 2009). Nevertheless, in addition to the results obtained from the CRT1 measure and 
inspection time, conscious awareness during IGT performance clearly indicates a role for 
explicit knowledge and Type II processes early in IGT. Furthermore, the results also indicate 
that there is a complex interplay within the Type II processes. Conscious awareness was 
associated with increased processing effort (inspection time) and it could be argued that 








6.2.5. Thinking disposition measures 
There is some evidence that individual differences related to sensitivity to rewards and 
punishment and measures of personality, behavioural activation and inhibition, neuroticism 
and sensation seeking could have an effect on IGT performance (e.g., Buelow & Suhr, 2013; 
Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Franken & Muris, 2005; Hooper, Luciana, Wahlstrom, Conklin & 
Yarger, 2008; Mardaga & Hansenne, 2012). The thinking disposition measures used in this 
Thesis demonstrated non-significant results. This suggests that self-reported measures of how 
participants experienced their own cognitive processes did not correspond with their actual 
cognitive ability. The REI, AOT and CFC are often employed as measures of the reflective 
processes that are important for collection and generation of the alternative answers during 
decision-making (e.g.,  Evans & Stanovich, 2013; Toplak et al., 2010). One of the reasons why 
these measures were not related to IGT performance could be the structure of the IGT. Learning 
the IGT occurs through the experience of direct gains and losses, where the occurrence of losses 
is sporadic and needs to be remembered and calculated. Hence greater processing of the 
punishment schedule is needed than the integration of consistent rewards for optimal IGT 
performance (Harman, 2011). Another reason why these self-reported measures of thinking 
disposition yielded non-significant results could be motivational biases in explicit self-reports 
and social-desirability bias (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006, Newell & Shanks, 2014). Newell and 
Shanks (2014) propose that reliable explicit self-reports need to be relevant to the task in order 
to provide a valid measure of and individual self-reported insight. Self-reported measures of 
sensitivity to rewards, punishments and types of personality have been found to correlate with 
IGT performance (e.g., Carter & Pasqualini, 2004; Franken & Muris, 2005; Guillaume et 
al.,2012) and could be further investigated as they may be the sources of      individual 
differences variability in IGT performance.  
6.2.6. Blood pressure  
The measurement of the arterial pressure waveform on the finger with the Finometer (Finapres 
Medical System, Amsterdam, The Netherlands) was effective. The Finometer has become an 
accepted technology widely used in different areas of research such as autonomic control of 
cardiovascular function, hypertension, pharmacology, psychophysiology and decision-making 
(Evers et al., 2013; Huisman et al., 2002; Schutte et al., 2003; Schwabe, Bohringer, Chatterjee, 
& Schachinger, 2008). Finometer measurement fulfils the accuracy requirement for blood 






van Rooyen, & Schutte, 2004). Heart rate and blood pressure were successfully measured in 
previous studies that tested IGT performance (e.g., Crone et al., 2004; Preston et al., 2007) and 
the measure obtained from Experiments 2 and 3 further contribute to the understanding of the 
physiological arousal during IGT performance.  It has to be noted that due to equipment failure 
(a certain part of the equipment that enables a direct connection to the IGT software was 
missing), it was not possible to obtain more specific measurement (e.g., anticipatory heart rate 
or blood pressure measurements) related to the IGT performance. Nevertheless, this 
methodology could be used as an alternative tool that measures somatic markers (e.g., Crone 
et al., 2004).   
6.3. Theories 
Damasio’s (1994) suggestion that somatic markers increase sensitivity to different possible 
outcomes during the IGT that may be captured through physiological measures is not fully 
supported. It is possible that an individual employs a conscious strategy based upon the idea 
that outcomes that have occurred recently become less probable in the future. SMH proposes 
that decision-making first involves mapping the currently experienced situation to knowledge 
about emotional responses in previously experienced similar situations. This previous 
knowledge is assumed to be unconscious. The second set of processes involves explicit recall 
of relevant facts pertaining to the consequences of previous choices, and the activation of 
relevant reasoning strategies. In this case, the relevant knowledge and processes are assumed 
to be largely available to conscious awareness. This suggestion maps on the dual-process 
framework of decision-making where the role of Type I processes can be then conceptualized 
as a two-step process: a) unconscious knowledge and previous experience are first marked with 
the somatic markers; b) this signal is then used to further influence explicit knowledge. 
However, the problem for the SMH results from the claim that early stages of the task depend 
mainly on unconscious anticipatory signals that guide learning and performance on the task. 
The claim that anticipatory somatic markers guide deck selection on the IGT prior to the 
development of conscious knowledge and without the explicit processing early in the game is 
central to the SMH. This version of the SMH has been used in the majority of the published 
studies that have examined IGT performance. Several authors challenged these assumptions by 
showing that knowledge of the deck's contingencies and cognitive processing occurs early in 
the game (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2004, 2005; Fernie, & Tunney, 2006, 2013; Simonovic et 






demonstrated that conscious knowledge and explicit processing of the deck contingencies is 
the critical component of the learning and performance. Without explicitly processing 
information that disadvantageous decks are bad and that the alternatives are qualitatively 
different, participants did not learn to select advantageously. Results from the Experiment 1 
left open the possibility that differential somatic markers could be of a cognitive nature. This 
indicates that somatic markers reflect cognitive load or cognitive demand, that is instigated by 
conscious knowledge and explicit processing early in the game. If somatic markers do not 
precede conscious knowledge and explicit processing, then it is also possible that they occur 
as a result of knowledge and early cognitive processing but not as a covert bias that feeds into 
knowledge development. The importance of the early cognitive processing and the emergence 
of conscious knowledge demonstrated in Experiments 2 and 3 support such a contention which 
is further supported by the evidence about the importance of the executive component of WM 
in IGT selection (e.g., Hinson et al, 2003; Jameson et al, 2004). 
Another concern for the interpretation of IGT behaviour in relation to the SMH is that a 
substantial proportion of the healthy participants do not perform optimally on the task and 
select disadvantageously (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Steingroever et al., 2013). Bechara and 
Damasio (2002) and Bechara et al. (2001, 2002) reported that between 30 and 40% of the 
healthy population does not behave advantageously. This is also reported in further studies 
(e.g., Bowman &Turnbull, 2003; Evans et al, 2004; Crone et al, 2005). The results from the 
experiments in this Thesis demonstrated that optimal performance did not reach ceiling after 
Block 4 and improved with additional trials. These results are problematic for SMH as it has 
been argued that non-optimal performance of the healthy population raises a question about 
the ecological validity of the IGT (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006). If healthy participants do not learn 
to select from the advantageous decks but presumably have no emotional impairment in 
decision-making, then the efficacy of the IGT as a test of such functioning is uncertain. For 
example, the variability in healthy participants’ performance complicates the interpretation of 
IGT data. The differences in performance between the clinical and the healthy population may 
be due to intact decision-making ability in the clinical population or it may be due to poor 
performance in healthy control (e.g., Steingroever et al., 2013). Furthermore, if a considerable 
number of healthy population perform disadvantageously on IGT, and presumably do not 
demonstrate any decision-making deficit in real life, it is not clear to what extent IGT measures 






needed in order to be accepted as a valid tool that measures decision-making deficit in a clinical 
population.  
Taken together the results from these experiments and the systematic review indicate that it is 
difficult to avoid concluding that either: a) IGT is not an adequate experimental paradigm for 
the demonstration of somatic markers; b) currently employed SCR measurements do not 
adequately capture somatic markers; or c) somatic markers are a part of the processing system 
that underlies Type I intuitive processing. These conclusions do not, of course, denote that 
there is no such thing as a somatic marker. For example, Osumi and Ohira (2010), used the 
Ultimatum Game and demonstrated the presence of somatic markers by using pulse-rate 
deceleration and functional magnetic resonance imaging scan (fMRI). They found that the 
brain activation differences in right insular activation were related to pulse-rate deceleration 
reactivity that was attributable to decision-making whether to reject or accept an offer. Thus, 
the study showed a clear connection between the brain processes, physiological responses and 
decision-making with an important role for somatic markers in mapping decisional choices.  
Clearly, the SMH deserves further investigation but it is also clear the IGT behaviour is difficult 
to explain within the SMH framework (e.g., Brevers et al., 2013; Dunn et al., 2006; Turnbull 
et al., 2014).  
As discussed in Chapter 1, Brevers et al.’s (2013) dual process framework could provide a 
better explanation of IGT behaviour than the SMH. According to this view, emotion is related 
to ‘hot’ processing that guides successful decision-making. The ‘hot’ system is laden with 
affective tags or ‘gut feelings’, these are dependent on previous experience and can be regulated 
by the ‘cool’ processes. However, this framework is yet to receive empirical support and it 
needs conceptual clarification. For example, the ‘cool’ systems resemble the classification of 
Type II processes that map on the ‘traditional’ dual- process framework in decision-making 
(e.g., Evans & Stanovich, 2013). Similarly, the ‘hot’ systems map onto the Type I processes, 
but they are conceptually different.  According to Brevers et al.’s account, the ‘hot’ systems 
operate through ‘slow and controlled processes and allow to hold on to a mental representation 
for contemplation and self- reflection during decision-making’ (p. 2). Hence, some properties 
of the Type II processes (e.g., slow and controlled processing) are integrated within the ‘hot’ 
systems. Conversely, according to Evans and Stanovich (2013), Type I processes are 
automatic, fast and include affective components. Hence, Type I process reflect intuitive and 
affect-laden processes that operate without deliberative and conscious thinking (e.g., Glockner 






arousal might influence reaction to a decision choice based on the previously successful 
behavioural options during the task in hand or based on previous knowledge experienced from 
a similar task (Glockner & Witteman, 2010). Hence, the affective reaction is established by the 
personal importance of the decision in hand and by the conflict that emerges from different 
parts of information that informs the decisional choice (e.g., Pfister & Bohm, 2008). According 
to this view covert, affective arousal is often accompanied by the emerging interpretation of 
choices that enters cognitive awareness and further necessitates cognitive processing. 
Conversely, Brevers et al. do not assume covert bias for the affective arousal, and instead 
propose that ‘hot’ systems regulate emotional response, whereby emotion not integral to the 
decision-making may ‘hijack’ the ‘hot’ systems that consequently require intervention from 
the ‘cool’ systems although this is not explicit. Thus, this conceptualisation suggests a conflict 
between the ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ systems that are presumably mediated by affective emotional 
arousal.  
A different account of IGT behaviour could be that: a) somatic markers represent an affective 
arousal to a decision choice; b) an imprecise somatic marker signal triggers Type I processing; 
c) both Type I and Type II processes operate on a continuum during decision-making; and d) 
Type II processes need to occasionally intervene during decision-making to disambiguate 
decision-choices. According to dual-process models, Type I processes are closely related to the 
processing of affective information (e.g., Kahneman & Frederick, 2002). Thus, affective 
information could play an important role in that is used as a signal to avoid or approach a 
stimulus (e.g., Clore, Gasper, & Garvin, 2001). However, the affective signal plays no role in 
learning and it just leads to the activation of the cognitive processes that then act upon the 
decision choice (e.g., Pfister & Bohm, 2008). Thus, Type I processes integrate affective signals 
with previous experience (this might include affective and cognitive parts of the previous 
experience) to transfer the experience into awareness (e.g., Glockner & Witteman, 2010). This 
contention is in line with research evidence demonstrating that dual-process conflict during 
logical and reasoning tasks create arousal (Stupple & Ball, 2008; De Neys & Glumicic, 2008) 
whereby, emotional/intuitive ‘gut’ feeling, signals conflict and triggers Type II processes. 
According to this view emotion often accompanies emerging awareness where the cognitive 
interpretation and processing of the arousing stimuli is then needed to provide an optimal 
choice. Hence, from this perspective Type I and Type II processes are relatively independent, 






perspective could certainly account for the experimental results in this Thesis and could explain 
the early explicit processing during IGT performance. 
Notably, the IGT is a complex task and the aforementioned arguments raise the question of 
how explicit learning guides successful IGT performance. For example, attentional processing 
could be proportionally distributed to all relevant outcomes according to the importance of 
rewards and punishments, thus determining what information enters analytic processes (e.g., 
Glockner & Witteman, 2010). Results from the Experiment 2 support this argument. Increased 
inspection time of the disadvantageous decks was observed early- in Blocks 1 and 2, and 
presumably informed further analytic processing that increased optimal learning of the bad 
deck contingencies - which could then shift selection towards the more advantageous decks. 
This is also in line with the results from Experiment 3. However, the Experiment 3 
demonstrated that attention (increased inspection time) could be also focused on the specific 
but non-optimal criteria, which are then used as a starting point for the subsequent choices 
(e.g., Wilson. 2002).  Stress impaired participants’ ability to disengage from the negative 
choices associated with disadvantageous decks. Furthermore, decoupling conscious awareness 
of the positive and negative ratings showed that conceptual knowledge of the nature of the 
disadvantageous decks is strongly related to overall optimal decision-making on IGT. Such 
differentiation between deck ratings suggests that accumulative losses encountered from the 
disadvantageous decks are a major driving force in IGT decision-making (e.g., Turnbull et al., 
2014). Thus, the key to optimal IGT performance could be to explicitly learn and process 
disadvantageous decks contingencies. This is in line with Dunn et al.’s (2006) review results 
and the experimental results in this Thesis support this contention.  
6.4. Future directions 
The IGT is still used as a test of decision-making despite some difficulties in explaining 
cognitive processes that occur early in the game. This Thesis has made an important 
contribution to an understanding of explicit processes important for learning and subsequent 
performance during IGT decision-making. As well as highlighting the importance of using the 
faster methodology for capturing emotion-cognitive processes, increasing IGT trials could 
improve performance. Contributions have also been made in relation to the specific cognitive 
processes involved during IGT learning and performance. Furthermore, the results indicate that 
stress not only impacts emotional feedback processing but also explicit processing that is 






provide a better and more parsimonious account of IGT decision-making than the SMH, which 
raises the possibility that somatic markers could be explained through the mechanisms of the 
affective components of the Type I processes.    
The work on the Thesis has nevertheless generated questions as well as answers about IGT 
behaviour and its relationship with the SMH and dual-process theories. An important follow-
up analysis would be to measure pupillary responses between the trials according to the 
anticipatory and feedback nature of the choice outcomes. This could provide further insight 
into emotion-cognitive processes during learning and if positive or negative outcomes of the 
decks guide successful learning and performance during the game. In terms of the future action, 
data from the Experiment 1 could be ‘cleaned’ with the required software to provide such an 
analysis. If somatic markers map onto Type I processes, some faster IGT-like measures could 
be used (e.g., BLINK, Peatfield, Turnbull, Parkinson, & Intriligator, 2011) to examine the 
effect of Type I processes on IGT performance.  The BLINK model incorporates parameters 
of recency, attention and response consistency and could provide a useful insight into the fast 
and associative system that presumably contributes to learning and decision-making (e.g., 
Gigerenzer, 2004).  
Several studies on emotion, reasoning and cognitive processing have indicated that the 
distinction between the ‘hot’ and the ‘cold systems is an oversimplification of possible complex 
interaction between the affective and cognitive pathways during decision-making (e.g., Gray, 
Braver, & Raichle, 2002; Greene, Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004; Hinson et al., 
2006). Previous studies on IGT have shown that WM load disrupts the formation of somatic 
markers (e.g., Hinson et al., 2002; Jameson et al., 2004).  A useful follow up study would 
measure different inspection times and whether cognitive load disrupts cognitive processes 
before and/or after fixation on the decision options. This would allow examination of whether 
poor decision-making results from interference with cognitive processes that are needed for 
learning and subsequent IGT performance. In addition, these measurements could be used to 
examine responses to the frequencies of rewards and punishments between the decks. This will 
allow for a closer examination of the disadvantageous decks as the successful performance on 
IGT mostly relies on disadvantageous decks disambiguation (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006; Turnbull 
et al., 2014).    
Blood pressure and heart rate measures could be also used as an alternative somatic marker 






broad and it would be useful to measure physiological arousal to the specific outcome selection. 
It would be also useful to examine physiological arousal to decks’ selection separately. This 
will allow close inspection of the choices and if more risky decisions follow prior losses or 
prior gains from a specific deck (e.g., Silva & Gross, 2004). This could be then matched with 
conscious awareness measures and different cognitive reflection measures. Furthermore, 
different CRT measures could be inspected more closely for the correct and incorrect answers, 
because of the suggestion that not all the participants provide normatively intuitive responses 
(e.g., Stupple et al., 2017). Inspection time of the CRT1 responses is warranted as it will allow 
examination of the type of processing that could be related to IGT performance.  
The effects of stress on explicit processing and explicit knowledge needs further replication 
especially in relation to CRT1. CRT1 was only administrated under stress and before the IGT 
(experiment 3). This was important because it revealed the participant’s capacity for Type 2 
processing under stress, however it also raised methodological questions. There is, however a 
possibility that: a) this limited the predictability of CRT1; and b) this increased Type II 
processing in the control condition that may account for good IGT performance. In future 
experiments CRT1 could be administered before and after the stress manipulation to examine 
baseline vs stress CRT1 change. One way to understand successful learning and performance 
on the IGT is to examine whether participants are able to learn over time to inhibit the lose-
shift pattern of responding to the disadvantageous decks following punishment. IGT studies 
have shown that stress can hinder learning and decision-making through disrupting emotional 
or deliberative processes (e.g., Preston et al., 2007; Simonovic et al., 2016; Starcke et al., 2017). 
Certain techniques (e.g., Mindfulness and Self-Compassion techniques) of stress reduction 
could be used to alleviate stress and to increase attention during the task performance. For 
example, mindfulness meditation and compassionate imagery have been associated with 
reductions in the size and duration of stress responses (e.g., Rockliff, Gilbert, McEwan, 
Lightman & Glover, 2008; Zeidan, Johnson, Diamond, David, & Goolkasian, 2010). The eye-
tracking could include both the measurement of pupil dilation as an index of somatic markers 
and for participant gaze to be recorded to track the focus of their attention. This could provide 
insight into how decisions and learning take place in stressful circumstances and thus allow for 
more optimal decision-making under pressure; and this could lead exploring how these 
techniques could be used in everyday stressful situations (e.g., surgery).  
Finally, it would be useful to explore alternative theoretical accounts of both SMH and dual-






maintain its organization as an adaptive living system, it needs to minimize its information-
theoretic free-energy in its interactions with the environment (Friston & Stephan, 2007). This 
minimization can be achieved by predicting or anticipating sensory input (use of sensory 
acquired information) or by changing the environment (use of cognitively acquired 
information) to match what is anticipated (Clark, 2016). Thus, this type of predictive coding 
can be used to minimize prediction errors. Related to IGT performance, it is possible that higher 
order cognitive processes generate predictions during the task, that are matched with sensory 
information and result in prediction-errors about the goodness or badness of the deck. It is 
possible that individuals performing the IGT, need to adjust to, or get in tune with, their internal 
state to perform more optimally on IGT. Thus, interoception, defined as the sense of the 
physiological condition of the body (Craig, 2003), may play a role in IGT.  
There has been increasing theoretical interest in the possibility that attentional control and 
internal bodily awareness (interoception) are connected to activity in the brain areas (e.g., 
insula, and cingulate cortex) that may help the optimization of the decision-making (e.g., 
Barttfeld et al., 2013; Craig, 2003; Kirk, Downar, & Montague, 2011).  For example, 
participants’ heart rate perception accuracy correlates highly with optimal performance in 
decision-making tasks (Kirk et al., 2011). Pertinent to IGT performance, it may be that 
individuals paying attention to their internal bodily state make fewer errors than the individuals 
paying less attention to their internal state because they are attending to the present moment 
and use their bodily perception to infer the current causes of sensation. Thus, interoception may 
provide an explanation as to why some healthy participants fail to improve their performance 
on the IGT selecting more cards from disadvantageous than from advantageous decks. A future 
study could compare participants with accurate vs. inaccurate cardiac perception and sustained 
attention with respect to their IGT performance. Awareness of the Breath and a Body Scan 
could be used to assess hear-beat perception (e.g., Ehlers & Breuer, 1992; Schandry, 1982) and 
eye-tracking methodology to examine sustained attention. This may show whether varying 
access to somatic feedback among different individuals is responsible for differences in 
performance on the IGT and whether a relation between sustained attention and accurate 
cardiac perception increases IGT performance. 
 
 






The role for anticipatory markers appears not to be in accordance with expectation stemming 
from SMH. Damasio (1994) argued that somatic markers help decision-making by diverting 
decisional choices from the bad or risky choices. However, the evidence points out that the 
largest somatic markers appear just before an individual makes the wrong decision (e.g., 
Bechara et al., 1996, 1997). Thus, the most obvious conclusion would be that the somatic 
markers indicate metacognitive uncertainty related to the choice. The SMH is an intriguing 
idea that needs clearer specification and more supportive evidence. The Dual-process 
framework could help to reintroduce the idea that emotion-laden processes are part of the 
intuitive Type I processes. Hence, the dual-process framework may integrate affective aspects 
of Type I processes with cognitive reasoning whereby intuitive processing captures decision-
processes that reflects imprecise somatic marker signal that triggers Type II processing.   
This Thesis has examined specific SMH assumptions and concluded that they could not be 
supported by a detailed examination of behaviour during the IGT performance. The importance 
of explicit processing during early stages of the game violates SMH assumptions and could be 
best explained within the dual-process framework.  When somatic activities are measured by 
using pupil dilation, there is some evidence for the anticipatory function of the somatic 
markers; however, these somatic markers can be correlates of cognitive load or cognitive 
demand, rather than emotion feedback.  This raises the possibility that either somatic markers 
do not play a significant role in learning IGT or that the IGT does not offer a complete test of 
SMH (e.g., Dunn et al., 2006).  Hence, a caution is warranted when the IGT is used as a 
diagnostic tool from which to conclude deficient VMpfc functioning or myopic decision-
making. To conclude, learning in a complex environment, such as the IGT, is determined based 
on explicitly processed information that helps learning and optimal performance. Full 
comprehension of the explicit processes is necessary to understand how learning on the IGT 
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A.1. Experiment 1, Ethics form 
This form is for University members of staff and PhD students making applications to the Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee (PREC). Complete this form and submit it by email to the Chair and Deputy 
Chair of PREC. Information about submission and approval processes, deadlines, and meeting dates is 
given at http://www.derby.ac.uk/science/psychology/psychology-ethics-committee/ 
Once approval has been given, you will be eligible to commence data collection. 
1. 
Name: 
Boban Simonovic 2. School/ Research Centre (if internal 
applicant) 








Email:   B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk                                      Tel No. 07426322112 





Postgraduate researcher  
If applicable: 
5a. Name of supervisor (Director of Studies) if you are PhD student: Dr.  Edward Stupple 
5b. Supervisor (Director of Studies) signature of consent: 
I have reviewed this application and approve its submission:    
6. Title or topic area of proposed study 
Eye-movements and decision making: Effects of  intuitive and reflective thinking on 
decision making under ambiguous and uncertain conditions 
7. What are the aims and objectives of your study? 
The aim of the proposed study is to investigate decision making performance in healthy 
individuals by using Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) and an eye-tracker monitor. 
Objectives: 
To examine thinking disposition among healthy participants related to decision 
making under uncertain conditions. 
To examine somatic markers and attention using an eye-tracker (i.e. pupil dilation, 






advantageous/disadvantageous decision-making patterns during the IGT 
performance. 
To examine which blocks of the IGT are related to learning/performance phase of the 
task, and how this relates to thinking dispositions of the healthy participants  
 
 
8. Brief review of relevant literature and rationale for study 
Learning, making decisions and information management in uncertain or ambiguous 
situations is a key function in everyday life. Every simple decision has a potentially 
perplexing array of options that needs to be evaluated for making a best optimal decision. 
Damasio (1996) developed the Somatic Marker Hypothesis (SMH) in order to explain 
optimal decision making. The theory postulates that the foundation of optimal decision-
making rests on the positive or negative emotional reactions to prior outcomes of choices, 
rather than rational, cognitive calculation of gains and losses. It is assumed that the emotional 
reactions guide decision making by creating positive or negative somatic markers. Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio and Anderson (1994) developed The Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) that is 
often used as an experimental tool for assessing SMH. It is argued that the IGT resembles 
real life decision making, and it is characterised by the uncertainty of punishment and reward 
outcomes. When performing the IGT, participants have to choose among four decks of cards 
with different frequencies of gains and losses in order to learn to select from the most 
advantageous card decks to obtain the greatest gains. Research evidence from the patients 
with lesions of limbic structures, neurological diseases or psychological disorders have 
emphasised the importance of emotional processes in deciding advantageously during the 
IGT performance. In contrast, analytic thinking was regarded as having much less 
importance. Early evidence suggested that developing somatic markers should help people 
making the right decision and avoid taking a risky choice (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994). 
However, contrasting evidence discovered that the largest somatic marker occurs just before 
making the erroneous decision (e.g., Bierman, Destrebecqz & Cleeremans, 2005).     
While research has identified the effectiveness of the IGT in clinical research, Steingroever, 
Wetzelsa, Horstmann, Neumann and Wagenmakers (2013) have called for greater scrutiny 
of the performance of healthy controls on the IGT. Steingroever et al. indicated that there is 
a substantial individual variability during the performance of healthy participants whereby, 
individual choices are driven by frequency of losses rather than the long-term outcome of the 
decks. This challenges the assumption that the performance of healthy participants is optimal.  
Previous research further indicated that implicit processing (e.g., processing the feedback of 
previous trials and associated emotional responses) may significantly contribute to 
advantageous decision making in the IGT (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994). However, a dual 
process account of IGT performance, presented by Brevers et al., (2013) emphasises a deficit 
in “cool” reflective processes among pathological gamblers in contrast to healthy controls. 
They also argue that the hyperactive emotional processing can ‘hijack’ the reflective 
mechanism that detects problematic future outcomes from disadvantageous decks and thus 
lead to disadvantageous card selections. This suggestion needs further examination among 






executive functions depend on the integrity of ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ neural systems. A ‘cool’ 
executive function includes analytical thinking and problem-solving disposition while ‘hot’ 
executive functions include regulation of emotional responses and inhibition of impulsive 
reaction. There is also a suggestion that the IGT comprises learning and performance phase, 
however determining the point to delineate learning and performance phases is somewhat 
controversial. For example, Schiebener, Zamarian, Delazer, and Brand (2011) suggest that 
the learning phase includes the first 40 trials; Bechara and Damasio (1997) suggest 50 trials; 
and Preston et al., (2007) argue for 60 trials This distinction needs further examination 
especially within a healthy population.  
 
The relationship between optimal decision making in the IGT and experiential, affective 
reactions has been demonstrated in studies using skin-conductance response (e.g., Bechara, 
Damasio, Damasio, & Lee, 1999; Bechara, Damasio, Tranel, & Damasio, 1997). In order to 
clarify the role of intuitive (experiential) and analytical reasoning systems during the IGT, an 
investigation of somatic reaction to potential options before actually making a choice is 
needed. One simple indicator of autonomic nervous system activation is pupil size variation.  
 
Research indicates that there is a relation between the pupil size and affective and cognitive 
processing of the information (Bierman, Cleeremans, van Ditzhuyzen, & van Gaal, 2004). 
By using pupil size as a somatic marker, it is possible to differentiate between somatic 
markers on potential options and provide a relatively clearer picture about the role of implicit 
learning during the decision-making task. Thus, using an eye-tracker will provide a clearer 
distinction between reflections on positively and negatively marked options during the IGT. 
Furthermore, previous research suggests that using an eye-tracker may be useful for 
understanding a complex interplay between experiential and executive functions processes, 
information searching and implicit learning (Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glockner, 2009; 
Bierman et al., 2004). Therefore, an eye-tracker can potentially be a very useful tool in 
providing evidence about the involvements of intuitive or analytical reasoning during the 
task.  
 
Additionally, behavioural strategies and executive functions in healthy participants need 
stronger methodological measures that can tease out the processes involved in decision-
making. The proposed study will test aspects of dual process account of IGT performance in 
healthy participants by using an eye-tracker. Furthermore, the study aims to examine critical 
thinking aptitude and disposition by using measures that can possibly explain types of 
processing in decision making, i.e. extended version of the Cognitive Reflection Test 
(Toplak, West & Stanovich, 2014). 
 
An eye-tracker will measure pupil size which will be used as a somatic marker. It is expected 
that pupil size decreases at the beginning of the task when making disadvantageous choices. 
The use of an eye-tracker will help to differentiate between somatic reactions on each viable 






of task processing and periods of rests. Based on the previous research an increase in pupil 
size should be demonstrated when looking at the disadvantageous decks (e.g., Bierman et al., 
2004). Furthermore, number of fixation and mean fixation duration will be investigated. 
Mean fixation duration refers to the average duration of single fixation in a decision. Research 
indicates that executive processes are associated with longer fixations, whereas more intuitive 
processing is accompanied by shorter fixations (Horstmann et al., 2009). Single fixations will 
be categorized according to Horstmann et al.’s suggestion in short (< 150 ms), medium (≥ 
150 and < 500 ms) and long (≥ 500 ms) fixation durations resulting in the variable time 
category.    
 
  
9. Outline of study design and methods 
 
The present study is a quantitative experimental research that will be conducted on-campus. 
Eye-movements will be recorded using the Eye-gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30), with 
remote binocular sampling rate of 30 Hz and an accuracy of about 0. 45°.The first 
administrated task (CRT) will measure participants’ tendency to engage in reflective thinking 
followed by the IGT task. Bechara et al.’s (1994) computerised version of IGT will be used 
for the purpose of this study. The equipment and the material will be stored in room (T038) 
where the experiment will take place. The IGT involves virtual money and participants will 
not risk their own money. Non-clinical, student population will be recruited via the university 
website and student forums. Participants under the age of 18 years old will not be allowed to 
participate in this study. Participants will be asked for general demographic information. 
Following briefing and informed consent the researcher will explain the rules of the task, 
what is involved and what kind of measurements will be taken during the performance.  
     
 
This study will test a somatic markers account based on pupil dilation variation. The numbers 
of disadvantageous/advantageous picks will be calculated and correlated to individual 
variations in pupil dilations. Furthermore, participants' cognitive disposition abilities and type 
of processing during the IGT performance will be assessed. The study will comprise 110 
participants who will each perform the task once. The IGT involves four decks of cards (e.g., 
A, B, C and D) and the game consists of 100 trials that is usually broken down to 5 blocks of 
20. In the IGT, following each selection, a specified amount of fictitious money is awarded. 
However, at certain times, losses of different fixed amounts occur. Two decks of cards, C 
and D, are advantageous, as they result in small immediate gains, but also very small losses 
and will therefore return greater money in the long run, than that which is given out. The 
other two decks (decks A and B) produce high immediate gains. However, because very high 
losses occur at certain times, more money will be lost than gained (disadvantageous decks). 
Participants are required to learn to avoid bad decks by following their hunches and guesses, 
and by using feedback from previous trials. The IGT involves virtual money and participants 






the second highest score (£70/30) on the game in order to facilitate recruitment and increase 
motivation for participation in this study. The role of incentives in motivating experiment 
participation has been widely documented and shows that money may be more effective than 
non-cash incentives (e.g., Church 1993; Groves, Presser, Dipko 2004; Singer, & Couper, 
2008). Cumulative scores for the gambling task will be calculated by adding the total net 
scores from all trials.   
 
The IGT task will be extended to 140 trials to examine the transition from learning to 
performance phase during the task.  It is predicted that there will be strong correlation 
between the performance in the latter trials of the IGT and measures of analytic thinking. 
 
The dependent variables in this study are the pupil dilation and the CRT scores. Firstly, it is 
hypothesised that participants will have larger pupil dilation when looking at disadvantageous 
decks (i.e. A and B). Secondly, it is hypothesised that participants have higher number of 
long fixation at advantageous decks (i.e. C and D). And lastly, participants who are more 
reflective will perform better on IGT than participants who are less reflective. Pupil dilation 
will be calculated as peak pupil dilation scores, that is, the maximum increase of pupil size 
from baseline (measured at blank screen and fixation cross before each decision) in the same 
time period. Pupil dilation will be measured as radius in mm. Single fixations will be 
categorized in short (< 150 ms), medium (≥ 150 and < 500 ms) and long (≥ 500 ms) fixation 
durations resulting in the variable time category.    
 
Pupil dilation will be regressed to average mean with standard deviation scores. Then 
ANOVA will be used to determine if pupil dilation variability increased between the baseline 
measurement and task measurement. Separate linear regression will be used to see is there a 
relationship between the eye tracking measurements and Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT). 
Separate ANOVA’s will be used to determine the effect of reflective thinking (CRT), pupil 
dilation and periods of fixation on IGT scores during the learning and performance phase. 
Finally, multiple regression will be conducted to determine to what extent CRT scores pupil 
dilation and periods of fixation will predict IGT scores in the learning and performance 
phases of the IGT 
  
 
10. Sample: Please provide a detailed description of the study sample, covering 
selection, number, age, and if appropriate, inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Participants will be recruited at the University by using e-mails and by contacting various 
student groups. A study-related announcements and recruitments materials (such as 
invitations to participate) will be handed in classrooms (with collaboration and approval of 
the lecturers) or outside classrooms. GPower software was used in order to determine the 
number of participants needed to detect medium effect sizes. Thus, for moderate effect sizes 






males and females). Participants under the age of 18 years old will not be allowed to 
participate in the study. An opportunity samples (student participants) will be recruited for 
this study. Participants with previous knowledge of the IGT or the CRT, and participants with 
a history of brain injury will be excluded from the study Participants will be asked about their 
general health, history of brain injuries and familiarity with the task prior to commencement 







11. Are payments or rewards/incentives going to be made to the participants?  If so, 
please give details below. 
 
Participation points will be given for face-to-face participation (2 points).  
 
 
Do you intend to give Participation Points for taking part in your study? Yes (Delete as 
appropriate) 
12. What resources will you require?  (e.g., questionnaires, equipment, for example video camera, 




Extended version of the Cognitive Reflection Test will be used (CRT, Toplak, West & 
Stanovich, 2014). This will offer a measure of reflective thinking that can evaluate individual 
differences in reflective processing among participants engaging with the IGT. This test is 
constructed to measure peoples’ aptitude to engage in reflective thinking whereby the more 
reflective you are the more likely you are to inhibit initial response to a problem (heuristically 
derived) and engage in finding an alternative solution to a problem.  
 
The scales are publicly available and there are no copyright issues. 
 
Bechara et al., (1994) computerised Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is frequently used as an 
experimental task in the decision-making research, and the University holds a copy of the 








The use of the Eye gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30) will be undertaken after 
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14. Ethical Considerations Please indicate how you intend to address each of the following in your 
study. Points a-i relate particularly to projects involving human participants.  Guidance to completing 





a.  Consent 
The participants will be fully informed about the goals and purpose of the study prior to 
giving consent, as well as known risks attached. The participants will be asked to fill out 
formal consent form, once they have agreed to take part in the experiment (see appendices). 
 
 






No deception will occur at any time. 
 
 
c. Debriefing  
At the end of the experiment the participants will be provided with full written debrief where 
they will be informed about the purpose of the study, and they will be provided with contact 
information for future correspondence and additional information’s (i.e. researcher email, 
student service centre). 
 
 
d. Withdrawal from the investigation 
Prior to the experiment, the participants will be fully informed that their participation is 
voluntary, and that they are allowed to withdraw from the experiment at any time and any 
answers they had given up to that point would be deleted. If they decide to withdraw their 
data after they had taken the experiment, they will be allowed to do so within the time limit 
of four weeks from the day that they completed the experiment (the email address of the 
researcher will be provided with the debrief document). 
 
e. Confidentiality 
To provide anonymity and confidentiality participants will be asked to create a unique code, 
which will be a combination of the last two letters of their favourite film and the last two 
digits of their mobile number. They will be asked not to reveal any personal details. 
Participants will be asked to leave their email addresses if they wish to opt in to the prize for 
the best task performance.  It will be explained that the email address is only for contacting 
the highest scorers on the gambling game and that it will be deleted immediately after the 
prize has been awarded.   
 
f. Protection of participants   
There is no deception involved and participants will be assured anonymity. No lasting harm 
will occur as a result of this experiment. Participants under the age of 18 years old and 
participants with a history of brain injury will not be allowed to participate in the study. 
Research will be conducted during office hours and the researcher will adhere to the BPS 










g. Observation research [complete if applicable]  
Not applicable 
 
h. Giving advice  
I will only be providing the relevant information in regard to the experiment and the 
phenomenon in question. If participants are concerned about anything else, they will be 
advised to contact the student services at University of Derby. Furthermore, the researcher 
will act in accordance with both the BPS ethical principles and adhere to the codes of conduct 
outlined by the University of Derby to ensure ethical conduct and knowledge development. 
 
i. Research undertaken in public places  [complete if applicable] 
Not applicable 
 
j. Data protection 
The experimental data will be password protected and stored on external drive. The data 
collected will be accessible only to the researcher and his supervisors. All paper data collected 




k. Animal Rights [complete if applicable] 
Not applicable 
 










15. Have/do you intend to request clearance from any other body/organisation ?   
Yes/No (please circle as appropriate) 
 




16. All projects have an element of risk which should be assessed before any project is 
undertaken. 
 
    Have the activities associated with this research project been risk assessed?  Yes 




17. Declaration: The information supplied is accurate to the best of my knowledge and 
belief. I understand my obligations and the rights of the participants. I agree to act at 
all times in accordance with University of Derby Ethical Policy for conducting research 




















A.2. Ethical Approval 
Approval Letter: Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
University of Derby 
 
Date: 15th October 2014 
 
Dr Frances A. Maratos  





Ethics Ref No:  25-14-BS 
 
Thank you for submitting this revised application to the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee.   
 
I have now reviewed the revised documents you sent following the feedback you received on 
your initial application, and I am satisfied that all of the issues raised have been dealt with. 
The application can now therefore be approved. 
 
 The following documents have now been re-reviewed: 
 
1. Revised Ethics application form 
2. Revised IGT Instructions 
3. Revised invitation to participate 
4. Revised debrief 
 
  
If any changes to the study described in the application or supporting documentation is 
necessary, you must notify the committee and may be required to make a resubmission of the 
application.  
 




F. A .Maratos 
 











A.3. Materials  









This is removed for copyright reasons Please see the original paper  
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Assessing miserly information 



















INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE  
 
My name is Boban Simonovic. I am a postgraduate researcher studying for a PhD award at the 
University of Derby. As part of my research I am interested in decision making under uncertain 
conditions.  
 
The aim of the present research is to explore people’s decision-making abilities under 
uncertainty. A computer gambling game is involved. If you decide to participate in this 
research, you will be asked to complete the gambling game and a series of problem solving 
tasks. During the study we will be using an eye tracker device as a monitoring tool to measure 
gaze direction and pupil dilation.  
This is removed for copyright reasons Please see the original paper 
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). Insensitivity to future 









The experiment should take no more than forty-five minutes. You will play the gambling game 
with virtual money. You are, however, encouraged to play the game to the best of your ability. 
You will receive two participation points for taking the part in this study.   
Participation is voluntary, and all information recorded will remain anonymous and 
confidential. Data recorded for this study will not be used for any other purpose than the study 
itself. Data will be stored in accordance with data protection laws and University of Derby data 
collection and storage policies.  Please note that you may withdraw your consent for 
participation at any time during the study. If you choose to withdraw your data after taking the 
part, please contact the researcher (see below) using your unique code. Withdrawal from the 
study will result in all participant information being destroyed and will not be included in any 
analysis. Participant withdrawal is available up to 4 weeks after participation.  
 
To ensure anonymity of the data you will be asked to create your unique reference number. 
Once you have completed the experiment, please keep a note of your reference number and 
quote it in any future correspondence. You will be asked to give your email address. This will 
be used for contact purposes only if you are a winner of a cash prize. Email addresses will be 
deleted immediately after the scores have been assessed.   
 
Please note no harm will occur as a result of this experiment. To avoid and reduce any 
unnecessary risks, for example, if you feel depressed or anxious, you should not to take part in 
this research. Please note that the Iowa Gambling Task and the Cognitive Reflection Test will 
be used in this study. If you are familiar with these tasks you are advised not to take part in this 
study.  
Exclusion criteria: People under the age of 18 years old. People with a history of brain 
injuries. 
Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time before during and after you made your decision 
to participate  






Supervisor name: Edward Stupple 
Supervisor contact e-mail: E.J.N.Stupple@derby.ac.uk 




Personal Reference Number: ____________________________                                                                                                                           
 (Last two letters of your favourite film and last two digits of your mobile number): 
 
This research is about people’s decision-making abilities under uncertainty. Please note that 
you are under no obligation to complete the experiment and you can withdraw at any time 
during the process. Participation is voluntary, and all information recorded will remain 
anonymous and confidential. Data recorded for this study will not be used for any other purpose 
than the study itself. Withdrawal from the study will result in all participant information being 
destroyed and not included in analysis. Participant withdrawal is available up to 4 weeks after 
the day of participation. You will need to use your unique personal reference number in order 
to send the request for data deletion.  
Contact e-mail B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk,  
 
What will participation involve? - It involves a computer gambling game and problem 
solving tasks while having your eye-movements tracked. It will take approximately about 45 
minutes to complete the experiment.  
 
As an informed participant of this research I understand that: 
1. My participation is voluntary, and I may cease to take part in this research at any time. 










I have read and understood the above and give consent to participate. 
Participant signature_________________________________ 
 




DEBRIEF               
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this experiment. The aim of this research was to 
investigate uncertainty and decision making.   
 
Evidence suggests that decisions can be made based on strategic or intuitive assessments of 
risk and both can be used interchangeably depending on the context of the situation.  In the 
case of the gambling game you have just completed the initial ambiguity of the task did not 
provide adequate cues for strategic decisions making, perhaps leading you to rely on your ‘gut 
feelings’. There is evidence that this gambling task is comprised of two phases (learning and 
performance) that differ in terms of the involvement of either intuitive or strategic reasoning. 
The evidence is not conclusive, and the purpose of this study was to shed more light on this 
topic. Furthermore, this study investigated the relationship between people’s thinking 







Your eye gaze and pupil dilation were monitored during the experiment because an increase of 
pupil dilation and numbers of fixations may have a relationship with decision making. This 
assumption is based on the Somatic Marker Hypothesis which postulate that affective somatic 
states may be associated with prior decisions outcomes that are used to guide future decisions. 
For example, if you made a choice followed by a negative outcome, an emotional reaction 
becomes associated with that choice. Once the emotional reaction is sufficiently well 
established, the reaction occurs before a choice is made. If your pupil was small, that suggests 
that you intuitively ‘knew’ which decks were bad even if you didn’t have any conscious 
awareness of it.  Please bear in mind that pupil dilatation does not have any effects on your 
health, and is completely normal. 
    
Hopefully your participation will make significant contribution in further clarification of these 
phenomena.  
  
Please bear in mind that the data collected will only be used for this research, and will be stored 
and safeguarded on a removable disc by the researcher for a minimum of 6 years. Please keep 
your reference number safe for further correspondence, and bear in mind that you can withdraw 
your data up to 4 weeks after participation. Please bear in mind that in order to secure your 
anonymity, your email will be deleted..  For any further question please feel free to contact me 
or the Supervisor of this research Dr Edward Stupple. 
 
Researcher contact e-mail: B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk 
Supervisor contact e-mail: E.J.N.Stupple@derby.ac.uk 
Please feel free to contact student service centre if this study has raised any issues or concerns  
Student service centre: University of Derby, Kedleston Road, Derby, DE22 1GB. 
T: +44 (0)1332 590500 








If you are interested in this topic, the article below may provide more information regarding 
people’s thinking disposition on decision making, following link about the eye tracking 
measurements and Somatic Markers Hypothesis..  
Steingroever, H., Wetzels, R., Horstmann, A., Neumann, J., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2013). 
Performance of healthy participants on the Iowa Gambling Task. Psychological assessment, 
25(1), 180-193. 
 
Horstmann, N., Ahlgrimm, A., and Glöckner, A. (2009). How distinct are intuition and 
deliberation? An eye-tracking analysis of instruction-induced decision modes. Judgment and 
Decision Making,  4, 335–354. 
 
Hinson, J.M., Jameson, T.L., & Whitney, P. (2002). Somatic markers, working memory, and 



























B.1. Experiment 1, Ethics form 
 
This form is for University members of staff and PhD students making applications to the Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee (PREC). Complete this form and submit it by email to the Chair and Deputy 
Chair of PREC. Information about submission and approval processes, deadlines, and meeting dates is 
given at http://www.derby.ac.uk/science/psychology/psychology-ethics-committee/ 
Once approval has been given, you will be eligible to commence data collection. 
1. 
Name: 









Email:   B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk                                      Tel No. 07426322112 





Postgraduate researcher  
If applicable: 
5a. Name of supervisor (Director of Studies) if you are PhD student: Dr.  Edward Stupple 
5b. Supervisor (Director of Studies) signature of consent: 
I have reviewed this application and approve its submission:    
6. Title or topic area of proposed study 
Effects of intuitive and reflective thinking on decision making under ambiguous and 
uncertain conditions 
7. What are the aims and objectives of your study? 
The aim of the proposed study is to investigate decision making performances in 







To examine thinking attitude and disposition in healthy participants related to 
decision making under uncertain conditions. 
To examine physiological responses (i.e. blood pressure, heart rate variability) in 
relation to advantageous/disadvantageous decision-making patterns during the IGT 
performance. 
To examine which blocks of the IGT are related to learning/performance phase of 
the task, and how this relates to thinking dispositions of the healthy participants  
 
 
8. Brief review of relevant literature and rationale for study 
Making decisions in uncertain or ambiguous situations is a key function in everyday life. 
The complexity of everyday life compels quick decision making, often under stressful 
conditions and many situations that require decisions to be made elicit stress responses 
themselves. The decision whether to take a risky choice that may have extensive financial 
consequences or to choose between several alternatives that offer different rewards or 
punishment are stress-eliciting situations. In these kind of situations it is of great importance 
for an individual to remain calm under pressure, with relatively sound judgment, to decide 
advantageously. Thus, stress and decision making are intricately connected and the 
influence that stress has on the quality of a decision is of special interest in decision making 
research. Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Anderson (1994) developed The Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) that is often used as an experimental task and a clinical assessment tool in 
decision making research. It is argued that the IGT resembles decision making in real life 
and it is characterised by the uncertainty of punishment and reward outcomes. In the IGT 
participants have to choose among four decks of cards with different frequencies of gains 
and losses in order to learn to select from the most advantageous card decks to obtain the 
greatest gains. Research evidence from the patients with lesions of limbic structures, 
neurological diseases or psychological disorders have emphasised the importance of 
emotional processes in deciding advantageously during IGT performance. In contrast, 
analytic thinking was regarded as having much less importance. While research has 
identified the effectiveness of the IGT in clinical research, Steingroever, Wetzelsa, 
Horstmann, Neumann and Wagenmakers (2013) have called for greater scrutiny of the 
performance of healthy controls on the IGT. Steingroever et al. indicated that the 
performance of healthy participants is characterised by substantial individual variability 
whereby individual choices are driven by frequency of losses rather than the long-term 
outcome of the decks. This challenges the assumptions that performance of the healthy 
participants is optimal. On the other hand, IGT studies have shown there is a relationship 
between the hormone cortisol and disadvantageous behavioural patterns (e.g., Santos-Ruiz 
et al., 2012), but these studies did not measure other physiological responses that may be 
relevant for decision making.  
Early research indicated that implicit processing (e.g., processing the feedback of previous 
trials and associated emotional responses) may significantly contribute to advantageous 
decision making in the IGT (e.g., Bechara et al., 1994). However, a dual process account of 






reflective processes among pathological gamblers in contrast to healthy controls. They also 
argue that hyperactive emotional processing can ‘hijack’ the reflective mechanism that 
detects problematic future outcomes from disadvantageous decks and thus lead to 
disadvantageous card selections. This suggestion needs further examination among healthy 
participants Furthermore, on the basis of dual-process model of self—regulation, executive 
functions depend on the integrity of ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ neural systems where a ‘cool’ executive 
function includes analytical thinking and problem solving disposition while ‘hot’ executive 
functions include regulation of emotional responses and inhibition of impulsive reaction. 
There is also a suggestion that the IGT comprises learning and performance phase, however 
it is difficult to pin point which blocks relate to learning/performance phase. This distinction 
needs further examination especially within a healthy population.  
It has also been shown that behavioural changes, leading to disadvantageous card selection 
may occur from an increase in cortisol whereby such an increase affects neural circuits in 
the prefrontal cortex which are important for analytical thinking (e.g., Santos-Ruiz et al., 
2012). This conclusion is based on studies that measured cortisol reactivity to stress but did 
not measure other physiological responses that may be relevant for decision making. For 
instance, the effect of blood pressure and heart rate variability on decision making whereby 
elevated blood pressure (BP) reactivity leads to decreased cognitive performance, remain 
unexamined but may offer a more dynamic measure of the physiological response during 
decision making. Additionally, behavioural strategies and executive functions in healthy 
participants are in need of strong methodological measures that can tease out the processes 
involved in decision-making. The proposed study will test aspects of dual process account 
of IGT performance in healthy participants, examine components of executive functions 
and examine critical thinking aptitude and disposition by using measures that can possibly 
explain types of processing in decision making, i.e. extended version of the Cognitive 
Reflection Test (Stupple, Hunt, & Steel, in prep),  Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI, 
Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier  1996)  active open-minded thinking (AOT, Haran, 
Ritov, & Mellers, 2013), the consideration of future consequences (CFC, Strathman, 
Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) and Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI, Reiss, Peterson, 
Gursky, & McNally, 1986). In addition, this study aims to assess participants’ level of 
knowledge throughout the game, by using a sensitive test of awareness in the form of a 
structured questionnaire (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2004). An eye tracker will measure 
pupil size dilation in order to differentiate between the positive and negative somatic 
markers. It is expected that pupil size and increase in the beginning of the task when making 
disadvantageous choices.   In addition, blood pressure reactivity and heart rate variability 
measures will be taken, and Anxiety Sensitivity Index will be measured in order to examine 
physiological responses during decision-making processes and participants’ anxiety 
sensitivity level. This study will follow National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 
(NICE, 2011) guidelines in order to have an operational definition for high blood pressure 
as an exclusion criterion for this study participation. According to NICE 120/80 mmHG is 
ideal RESTING blood pressure while 140/90 mmHG and higher may be a reason for 
concern. Thus, participants with a blood pressure higher than 140/90 mmHG will not be 
allowed to enter the study and advised to maybe visit their GP as a precaution. No guidance, 
however, exists for high blood pressure levels during mental stress studies but a systolic 
blood pressure of over 200mmHg is considered high during exercise (AHA, 2010) and so 






participant’s blood pressure will reach this level, but the study will be stopped if it reaches 
this level. Heart rate variability (HRV) is calculated based on variation of time in 
milliseconds between two heartbeats. HRV is a relatively new method for assessing, for 
example, stress. What makes HRV interesting is the fact that it can reflect changes in stress 
while other physiological parameters, like blood pressure, are still in normal or accepted 
ranges. For the purposes of this study standards of measurements and physiological 
interpretation are adopted from the Task Force of The European Society of Cardiology and 
The North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology (1996). In the situation where 
HRV is related to emotional arousal the Task Force suggests the use of Frequency domain 
methods. This method assigns bands of frequency and then counts the number of NN (beat-
to-beat) intervals that match each band. The bands are typically high frequency (HF) from 
0.15 to 0.4 Hz, low frequency (LF) from 0.04 to 0.15 Hz and the very low frequency (VLF) 




9. Outline of study design and methods 
 
The present study is a quantitative experimental research that will be conducted on-campus. 
The equipment and the material will be stored in room (T038) where the experiment will 
take place.   Bechara et al.’s (1994) computerised version of IGT will be used for the 
purpose of this study. The IGT involves virtual money and participants will not risk their 
own money. Healthy students will be recruited via the university website and student 
forums. Participants under the age of 18 years old will not be allowed to participate in this 
study. Participants will be asked for general demographic information. Participants with the 
history of cardiovascular disorders or history of high blood pressure will not be allowed to 
participate. Furthermore, if a participant has a very high blood pressure before (e.g., higher 
than the operational definition for exclusion) or during the experiment they will be informed 
about this, advised to stop, or not to participate in the experiment, and informed that they 
might want to visit their GP as a precaution (See Appendices). Since the exact cause of the 
increase in blood pressure can be hard to pin down (e.g., smoking, lack of physical activity, 
genetics, too much alcohol or salt consumptions) and it is beyond the expertise of the 
researcher, participants will only be advised not to take part in the study, and possibly visit 
their GP as a precautious measure. The researcher will also emphasize that there may be no 
reason for a major concern, and that his advice should only be considered as a safeguard 
measure. Following briefing and informed consent the researcher will explain the rules of 
the task, what is involved and what kind of measurements are taken during the performance. 
Continuous, non-invasive cardiovascular measure by Finometer (Finapres Medical System) 
with the interval of four minutes will be used in the study. The Finometer will measure 
blood pressure and heart rate variability. In addition, eye-movements will be recorded using 
the Eye-gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30).  Participants will be asked to sit for five 
minutes (resting period), baseline blood pressure and heart rate variability measurements 






will measure participants’ tendency to engage in reflective thinking followed by REI, AOT, 
CFC and ASI. REI will measure participants’ rational and experiential thinking styles while 
AOT will tap into participants’ tendency to weigh new evidence against a favoured belief 
and to consider carefully different options in forming a decision. CFC measures the extent 
to which people consider distant versus immediate consequences of potential behaviour. 
ASI measures beliefs that anxiety experiences have negative implication. The order of the 
administrated task will be counterbalanced by using the ABCD, ACDB, ADBC, ... DABC 
layout. After that the participants will engage in IGT. During the IGT performance, 
participants will be asked questions related to cognitive awareness, after the first 20 trials 
and then every 10 trials. At the end a post cardiovascular measurement will be undertaken 
to make sure they are back to normal task followed by debrief.  If the blood pressure shows 
further increase or doesn’t show any sign of decreasing, the participant will be informed 
and possibly advised to contact their GP or even University doctor (in the cases of 
immediate concern).     
     
 
This study will assess the importance of reflective thinking and intuitive responses among 
healthy participants completing the IGT. A between-group (intuitive vs. reflective) design 
will measure participants' cognitive abilities, abilities to inhibit emotional reaction and type 
of processing during the IGT performance. The study will comprise 110 participants who 
will perform the task once. The IGT involves four decks of cards (e.g., A, B, C and D) and 
the game consists of 100 trials. In the IGT, following each selection, a specified amount of 
fictitious money is awarded. However, at certain times, losses of different fixed amounts 
occur. Two decks of cards, C and D, are advantageous, as they result in small immediate 
gains, but also very small losses and will therefore return more money in the long run, than 
that which is given out. The other two decks (decks A and B) produce high immediate gains, 
however, because very high losses occur at certain times, more money will be lost than 
gained (disadvantageous decks). Because it is impossible to calculate the best option from 
the beginning of the task, subjects have to learn to avoid bad decks by following their 
hunches and guesses, and by using feedback from previous trials. The IGT involves virtual 
money and participants will not risk their own money. Cumulative scores for the gambling 
task will be calculated by adding the total net scores from all trials.   
The IGT task will be extended to 140 trials to pin down learning and performance phases 
during the task. It is predicted that in healthy subjects, the performance in the latter trials of 
the IGT, will be more strongly correlated with measures of analytic thinking. 
 
The dependent variable in this study is the cumulative score on IGT and it is hypothesised 
that participants who are more reflective, critical and plan strategically will learn more 
quickly and perform better on IGT than participants who are less reflective, critical and rely 
on intuition. BP reactivity will be calculated by subtracting the of the performance 
measurements from the average of baseline measurements. Then ANOVA will be used to 
determine if systolic, diastolic BP and heart rate variability increased between the baseline 






a relationship between the physiological measurements (e.g., eye movement), anxiety 
sensitivity index (ASI) and thinking style. Separate ANOVA’s will be used to determine 
the effect of reflective thinking (CRT), thinking style (REI) planning (AOT) consideration 
of future consequences (CFC) on IGT scores during the learning and performance phase. 
Finally, multiple regression will be conducted to determine to what extent CRT scores, REI 
scores AOT scores CFC scores, ASI scores, blood pressure and heart rate variability will 
predict IGT scores in the learning and performance phases of the IGT 
 
 
10. Sample: Please provide a detailed description of the study sample, covering 
selection, number, age, and if appropriate, inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Participants will be recruited at the University by using e-mails and by contacting various 
student groups.  GPower software was used in order to determine the number of participants 
needed to detect medium effect sizes. Thus for moderate effect sizes (d= 0.5, Alpha= 0.05, 
Power= 0.80) a total number of 110 participants is sufficient (both males and females). 
Participants under the age of 18 years old will not be allowed to participate in the study. 
Participants with the history of cardiovascular disorders or history of high blood pressure 
will not be allowed to participate in the study. Furthermore, if a participant has a very high 
blood pressure during the experiment they will be informed about such event advised to 







11. Are payments or rewards/incentives going to be made to the participants?  If so, 
please give details below. 
 
There will be two rewards offered to the participants. Participants can choose if they want 
to receive 4 participation points or 2 participation points and a £5 voucher for participation 
in this study. This will be explained in the invitation to participate.    
 
 







12. What resources will you require?  (e.g., questionnaires, equipment, for example video camera, 
specialised software; if questionnaires are to be used please give full details here). 
 
 
Five quantitative tests will be used for the purpose of this study: 
 
Extended version of the Cognitive Reflection Test will be used (CRT, Toplak, West & 
Stanovich, 2014). This will offer a measure of reflective thinking that can evaluate 
individual differences in reflective processing among participants engaging with the IGT. 
This test is constructed to measure peoples’ aptitude to engage in reflective thinking 
whereby the more reflective you are the more likely you are to inhibit initial response to a 
problem (heuristically derived) and engage in finding an alternative solution to a problem. 
 
Pacini et al., (1996) Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), measures rational and 
experiential thinking styles. The REI measures the two independent processing modes with 
two factors: Need for Cognition (rational measure) and Faith in Intuition (experiential 
measure). Several studies have confirmed that the REI is a reliable measure of individual 
difference in information processing, and that the two independent thinking styles measured 
account for a substantial amount of variance that is not addressed by other personality 
theories (i.e. Norris, & Epstein, 2011). 
 
Haran et al., (2011) Active Open-minded Thinking Scale (AOT) is based on Stanovich 
and West’s  (2007) scale and is designed to capture thinkers’ desire to be more informed 
before making an estimate or prediction, and their higher attention to information already 
acquired may further improve their estimation performance.  
 
Strathman et al., (1994) consideration of future consequences (CFC) measures the 
extent to which people consider distant versus immediate consequences of potential 
behaviour. This may be very important for the participants engaging in the IGT, since in 
order to maximize their profit participants’ need to encompass into strategy future 
consequences (punishment/reward).  
 
Reiss et al., (1986) Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI), measures beliefs that anxiety 
experiences have negative implication. People who believe that anxiety has few or no 
negative effects may be able to cope with a relatively high level of exposure to anxiety-
provoking stimuli. In contrast, people who believe that anxiety has terrible effects, tend to 
have anxiety reactions that grow in anticipation of severe consequences. Anxiety sensitivity 
therefore implies a tendency to show exaggerated and prolonged reactions to anxiety-






characterized by substantial individual variability whereby individual choices are driven by 
frequency of losses rather than the long-term outcome of the decks. However, one of the 
reason for the participants’ non-optimal performance may be sensitivity to punishments and 
rewards that may lead anxiety sensitive participants to a disadvantageous decision making.   
 
Maia & McClelland (2004) Test of Awareness, measures raise of the conscious 
knowledge of the advantageous strategy as early as participants behave advantageously in 
the IGT. This sensitivity test encompasses 5 questions in total with question 3 having 4 
additional sub questions.  
 
These scales are available and there are no copyright issues. 
 
Bechara et al., (1994) computerised Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is frequently used as an 
experimental task in the decision making research, and the University holds a copy of the 
IGT that will be used in this study.  
 
The use of the Finometer (Finapres Medical System) will be undertaken after supervised 
training and the equipment used will be located in psychology laboratories. Research will 
be conducted during office hours and the researcher will adhere to the BPS Guidelines for 
Ethical Practice for conducting laboratory experiments. 
 
The use of the Eye gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30) will be undertaken after 
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14. Ethical Considerations Please indicate how you intend to address each of the following in your 
study. Points a-i relate particularly to projects involving human participants.  Guidance to completing 










a.  Consent 
The participants will be informed about the goals and purpose of the study, as well as known 
and unknown risks attached. The participants will be asked to fill out formal consent form, 








c. Debriefing  
At the end of the experiment the participants will be provided with full written debrief where 
they will be informed about the purpose of the study, what to do if they experience higher 
blood pressure than usual after the study (i.e. contact their GP) and they will be provided 
with contact information for future correspondence and additional information’s (i.e. 
researcher email, student service centre). 
 
 
d. Withdrawal from the investigation 
Prior to the experiment, the participants will be fully informed that their participation is 
voluntary, and that they are allowed to withdraw from the experiment at any time and any 
answers they had given up to that point would be deleted (email address of the researcher 
will be provided with the debrief document). If they decide to withdraw their data after they 
had taken the experiment, they will be allowed to do so within the time limit of four weeks 








To provide anonymity and confidentiality participants will be asked to create a unique code, 
which will be a combination of the last two letters of their favourite film and the last two 
digits of their mobile number. 
They will be asked not to reveal any personal details. Participants will be asked to leave 
their email addresses for contact purposes if they are eligible for a reward.  However, it will 
be explained that the email address is only for contacting the highest scorers on the gambling 
game and that it will be deleted immediately upon data summary and prize been rewarded.  
The experimental data will be password protected and stored on external drive The data 
collected will be accessible only to the researcher and his supervisors. All paper data 
collected will be stored in a secure locked cabinet, in a locked room 
 
f. Protection of participants   
There is no deception involved and participants will be assured anonymity. ’No lasting harm 
will occur as a result of this experiment’. Participants under the age of 18 years old will not 
be allowed to participate in the study. Participants with the history of cardio vascular 
disorders or history of high blood pressure will not be allowed to participate in the study. 
Furthermore, if a participant has a very high blood pressure during the experiment they will 
be informed about such event advised to stop the experiment and informed that they might 
want to visit their GP.    
 
 
g. Observation research [complete if applicable]  
Not applicable 
 
h. Giving advice  
I will only be providing the relevant information in regards to the experiment and the 
phenomenon in question. If participants are concerned about anything else they will be 
advised to contact the student services at University of Derby. Furthermore, The researcher 
will act in accordance with both the BPS ethical principles and adhere to the codes of 
conduct outlined by the University of Derby to ensure ethical conduct and knowledge 
development 
 








j. Data protection 
The experimental data will be password protected and stored on external drive The data 
collected will be accessible only to the researcher and his supervisors. All paper data 




k. Animal Rights [complete if applicable] 
Not applicable 
 





15. Have/do you intend to request clearance from any other body/organisation ?   
Yes/No (please circle as appropriate) 
 




16. All projects have an element of risk which should be assessed before any project is 
undertaken. 
 
    Have the activities associated with this research project been risk assessed?  Yes 




17. Declaration: The information supplied is accurate to the best of my knowledge and 







all times in accordance with University of Derby Ethical Policy for conducting research 









B.2. Ethical Approval 
 
Approval Letter: Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
University of Derby 
 
Date: 15th October 2014 
 
Dr Frances A. Maratos  





Ethics Ref No:  25-14-BS 
 
Thank you for submitting this revised application to the Psychology Research Ethics 







I have now reviewed the revised documents you sent following the feedback you received 
on your initial application, and I am satisfied that all of the issues raised have been dealt 
with. The application can now therefore be approved. 
 
 The following documents have now been re-reviewed: 
 
1. Revised Ethics application form 
2. Revised IGT Instructions 
3. Revised invitation to participate 
4. Revised debrief 
 
  
If any changes to the study described in the application or supporting documentation is 
necessary, you must notify the committee and may be required to make a resubmission of 
the application.  
 




F. A .Maratos 
 














B.3. Materials  
Eye gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30).  
Finometer (Finapres Medical System, Amsterdam, Netherlands).  
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Strathman et al., (1994) consideration of future consequences (CFC). 
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of future consequences: Weighing immediate and distant outcomes of behavior. Journal 
of Personality and Social Psychology, 66, 742-752. 
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INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE  
My name is Boban Simonovic and I’m a postgraduate researcher at the University of Derby. 
As part of my research I’m interested in learning more about decision making under uncertain 
conditions. 
    
The aim of the present research is to explore people’s decision-making abilities under 
uncertainty. A computer gambling game is involved. If you decide to participate in this 
research, you will be asked to complete this gambling game and several questionnaires. Your 
blood pressure will be measured during this process and you may experience slight pressure 
and discomfort on your arm. In addition, we will use an eye tracker device as a monitoring tool 
that measure gaze direction. 
 
The experiment will take no more than 70 minutes. You will play the gambling game with 
virtual money. However, you are encouraged to play the game naturally to the best of your 
ability. You can also choose to receive four participation point or two participations and a £5 
voucher for participating in this study.  Participation is voluntary, and all information recorded 







other purpose than the study itself. Data will be stored in accordance with data protection laws 
and University of Derby data collection and storage policies. 
   
Please note that you may withdraw your participation at any time during the study without 
consequences. If you choose to withdraw your data after taking part please contact the 
researcher (see below) using your unique code. To provide anonymity of the data you will be 
asked to create your unique reference number. Once you have completed the experiment keep 
a note of your reference number and use it for any future correspondence. You will be asked 
to give your email addresses for contact purposes if you are eligible for a reward.  
Email addresses will be used only for contacting the highest scorers on the gambling game and 
it will be deleted immediately upon data summary.  Withdrawal from the study will result in 
all participant information being destroyed and not included in analysis. Participant withdrawal 
is available up to 4 weeks after participation.  
 
Please note no harm will occur as a result of this experiment. However, to avoid and reduce 
any unnecessary risks, if you feel depressed or anxious, be advised not to take part in the present 
research.  
 
Furthermore, people under the age of 18 years old and people who suffered from any 
form of cardiovascular disorders or high blood pressure are not allowed to take part in 
the experiment. 
Please note that if during the experiment we notice that your blood pressure is higher 
than normal you will be informed and possibly advised to contact your GP.  
Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time before during and after you made your decision 
to participate  
Researcher contact e-mail: B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk 














Personal Reference Number                                                                                                                            
 (Last two letters of your favourite film and last two digits of your mobile number): 
This research is about people’s decision-making abilities under uncertainty. Please note that 
you are under no obligation to complete the experiment and you are not going to be penalised 
if you decide to withdraw during the process. Participation is voluntary, and all information 
recorded will remain anonymous and confidential. Data recorded for this study will not be used 
for any other purpose than the study itself. Withdrawal from the study will result in all 
participant information being destroyed and not included in analysis. Participant withdrawal is 
available up to 4 weeks after participation. You will need to use your unique personal reference 
number in order to send the request for data deletion. Contact e-mail 
B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk,  
What will participation involve? - It involves computer gambling game and answering 
questionnaires, while having your eye-movements and blood pressure activity monitored. It 
will take approximately about 70 minutes to complete the experiment.   
As an informed participant of this research I understand that: 
4. My participation is voluntary, and I may cease to take part in this research at any time, 
without penalty. 
5. I am aware of what my participation involves. 
6. I understand that all my additional questions about the experiment will be satisfactorily 
answered. 
7. I’m aware that I can chose between the two rewards for this study: a) 4 participation 






Can you please select your reward by choosing between the two options? 
I would like to receive: 
a) 4 participation points 




I have read and understood the above and give consent to participate. 
Participant signature_________________________________ 
Participant email _________________________________ 
Researcher signature_________________________________  
Date____________________________________ 
 
 DEBRIEF               
 
Thank you for taking the time to participate in this experiment. Can you please confirm which 
of the two rewards you like to receive: a) 4 participation points or b) 2 participation points and 
a £5 voucher?   
 
The aim of this research was to investigate the uncertain context of decision making. Evidence 
suggests that decisions can be made based on strategic or intuitive assessments of risk and both 
are used interchangeably depending on the context of the situation.  In the case of the gambling 
game, that you have just completed the initial ambiguity of the task did not provide adequate 
cues for strategic decisions making, perhaps leading you to rely on your ‘gut feelings’. There 
is evidence that this gambling task is comprised of two phases (learning and performance) that 
differ on the involvement of either intuitive or strategic reasoning. The evidence is not 






study investigated the relationship between people’s thinking dispositions, thinking style, 
consideration of future consequences on gambling scores during the learning and performance 
phase.  
Your eye gaze was monitored during the experiment because an increase of pupil dilation may 
have an effect on decision making. This assumption is based on the Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
which postulate that affective somatic states may be associated with prior decisions outcomes 
that are used to guide future decisions. For example, if you made a choice followed by a 
negative outcome, an emotional reaction becomes associated with that choice. Once the 
emotional reaction is sufficiently well established, the reaction occurs before a choice is made. 
If your pupil was slightly dilated, it is plausible that intuitively, you ‘knew’ which decks were 
bad even if you didn’t have any conscious awareness of it.  Please bear in mind that your pupil 
dilatation will not have any effects on your health, and is completely normal.    
Your blood pressure was monitored during the experiment because of the previous suggestions 
that an increase of the blood pressure may have an effect on decision making. Please bear in 
mind that if your blood pressure was slightly higher than usual this will not have any lasting 
effects on your health.  However if you experience any unusual and persistent activity with 
your blood pressure (higher than normal) please contact your GP. 
 
Hopefully your participation will make significant contribution in further clarification of these 
phenomena.   
 
Please bear in mind that the data collected will only be used for this research, and will be stored 
and safeguarded on a removable disc by the researcher until after awarding of the academic 
degree (September 2016). Please keep your reference number safe for further correspondence, 
and bear in mind that you can withdraw your data up to 4 weeks after participation. For any 
further question please feel free to contact me or the Supervisor of this research Dr Edward 
Stupple 
Researcher contact e-mail: B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk 






If you are interested in this topic, the article below may provide more information regarding 
people’s thinking disposition on decision making, following link about the blood pressure.  
Steingroever, H., Wetzels, R., Horstmann, A., Neumann, J., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2013). 





Please bear in mind that you can always contact me or my supervisor if you have any 
additional questions or concerns about the study. 
 





This study involves blood pressure and eye-tracking measurements. Eye tracking involves 
a non-invasive tracking of your gaze that will in no circumstance cause you any harm. 
We will use the eye-gaze monitor in this study (shows the eye-tracker).  Before we start 
the device needs to be calibrated. Please follow the instructions as they appear on the 
computer screen and focus on the green dots as they appear. This should take no longer 
than 1 minute. Please let me know if you experience any discomfort? Before we start, let 
me provide you with information regarding blood pressure and inclusion/exclusion 
criteria for this study. This study will follow National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE, 2011) guidelines in order to have an operational definition for high 
blood pressure. According to NICE 120/80 mmHG is ideal blood pressure while 140/90 
mmHG and higher may be a reason for concern. People under the age of 18 years old and 
people who have suffered from any form of cardiovascular disorders or high blood 
pressure are not allowed to take part in the experiment. This is the Finometer that will 
be used for blood pressure measurement. Before we start I will take three baseline 
measurements. If the baseline measurements indicate that you have a very high blood 






experiment. Since the exact cause of the increase in blood pressure can be hard to pin 
down (e.g., smoking, lack of physical activity, genetics, too much alcohol or salt 
consumption) and it is beyond my expertise, you will be advised to visit your GP as a 
precautious measure. There may be no reason for concern, and the advice should be 
considered as a safeguarding measure. Please note that if during the experiment I notice 
that your blood pressure is higher than normal you will be informed and may be advised 
to contact your GP. Please note that there may be some increase in blood pressure during 
the experiment, but this will go back to normal at the end.  At the end of the study I will 
take measurements to make sure that your blood pressure is back to normal.   
 























C.1. Experiment 3, Ethics form 
 
This form is for University members of staff and PhD students making applications to the Psychology 
Research Ethics Committee (PREC). Complete this form and submit it by email to the Chair and Deputy 
Chair of PREC. Information about submission and approval processes, deadlines, and meeting dates is 
given at http://www.derby.ac.uk/science/psychology/psychology-ethics-committee/ 
Once approval has been given, you will be eligible to commence data collection. 
1. 
Name: 









Email:   B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk                                      Tel No. 07426322112 





Postgraduate researcher  
If applicable: 
5a. Name of supervisor (Director of Studies) if you are PhD student: Dr.  Edward Stupple 
5b. Supervisor (Director of Studies) signature of consent: 
I have reviewed this application and approve its submission:    
6. Title or topic area of proposed study 
Stress and risky decision making under ambiguous and uncertain conditions 
7. What are the aims and objectives of your study? 
The aim of the proposed study is to investigate decision making performances in healthy 
individuals by using Iowa Gambling Task (IGT). 
Objectives: 
To examine thinking attitude and disposition among healthy participants related to 






To examine physiological responses (i.e. blood pressure, heart rate variability) in 
relation to advantageous/disadvantageous decision-making patterns during the IGT 
performance under stress. 
To examine intuitive responses and conscious awareness during IGT performance by 




8. Brief review of relevant literature and rationale for study 
The complexity of everyday life compels quick decision making, often under stressful 
conditions and many situations that require decisions to be made elicit stress responses 
themselves. The decision whether to take a risky choice that may have extensive financial 
consequences or to choose between several alternatives that offer different rewards or 
punishment are stress-eliciting situations. In these situations it is of great importance for an 
individual to remain calm under pressure, with relatively sound judgment, to decide 
advantageously. Thus, stress and decision making are intricately connected and the influence 
that stress has on the quality of a decision is of special interest in decision making research. 
Stress often accompanies decision making tasks and research suggests that this may alter both 
the cognitive and emotional processes involved in risky decision-making (Schwabe & Wolf, 
2009). Bechara, Damasio, Damasio and Anderson (1994) developed The Iowa Gambling 
Task (IGT) that is often used as an experimental task and a clinical assessment tool in decision 
making research. It is argued that the IGT resembles decision making in real life and it is 
characterised by the uncertainty of punishment and reward outcomes. In the IGT participants 
have to choose among four decks of cards with different frequencies of gains and losses in 
order to learn to select from the most advantageous card decks to obtain the greatest gains. 
Research evidence from the patients with lesions of limbic structures, neurological diseases 
or psychological disorders have emphasised the importance of emotional processes in 
deciding advantageously during IGT performance. In contrast, analytic thinking was 
regarded as having much less importance. Early research indicated that implicit processing 
(e.g., processing the feedback of previous trials and associated emotional responses) may 
significantly contribute to advantageous decision making in the IGT (e.g., Bechara et al., 
1994). However, a dual process account of IGT performance, presented by Brevers et al., 
(2013) emphasises a deficit in “cool” reflective processes among pathological gamblers in 
contrast to healthy controls. They also argue that hyperactive emotional processing can 
‘hijack’ the reflective mechanism that detects problematic future outcomes from 
disadvantageous decks and thus lead to disadvantageous card selections. This suggestion 
needs further examination among healthy participants On the basis of dual-process model of 
self—regulation, executive functions depend on the integrity of ‘cool’ and ‘hot’ neural 
systems where a ‘cool’ executive function includes analytical thinking and problem solving 
disposition while ‘hot’ executive functions include regulation of emotional responses and 
inhibition of impulsive reaction. There is also a possibility that the learning mechanisms 
involved in the IGT provide a large number of sources for different types of intuition (i.e. 






‘gut feeling’ where critical thinking regulates emotional responses) (Glockner, & Witteman, 
2010). Furthermore, the core property of intuitive processes is that they partially operate 
automatically without conscious control and they ‘record’ a surprising amount of information 
(Evans, 2008).  Recent systematic review suggests that currently employed physiological 
measurements (e.g., skin conductance measurements) are not providing sufficient data in 
order to make a distinction between different types of intuitive responses (Simonovic et al 
2016 in prep). The review results suggested that the use of an eye-tracker may help to 
differentiate between somatic reactions during the task. This is particularly important because 
the anticipatory SCR captured during the IGT performance may represent a part of a broader 
response complex such as attentional orienting areas of focus or risk-taking behaviour that 
can be easily encapsulated by eye-tracking measurements.       
IGT studies have also shown that stress can interfere with the learning process in healthy 
controls, increase risk-taking behaviour and lead to disadvantageous card selections (e.g., 
Preston et al., 2007; Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012) 
Preston et al. (2007) induced stress by informing participants that they would deliver a speech 
while being videotaped and evaluated, and demonstrated that stressed participants showed a 
slower learning curve on the IGT than the control group. It has also been shown that 
behavioural changes, leading to disadvantageous card selection may occur from an increase 
in cortisol whereby such an increase affects neural circuits in the prefrontal cortex which are 
important for analytical thinking (e.g., Santos-Ruiz et al., 2012). This conclusion is based on 
studies that measured cortisol reactivity to stress but did not measure other physiological 
responses that may be relevant for decision making. For instance, the effect of blood pressure 
and heart rate variability on decision making whereby elevated blood pressure (BP) reactivity 
leads to decreased cognitive performance, remain unexamined but may offer a more dynamic 
measure of the physiological response during decision making. Additionally, behavioural 
strategies and executive functions in healthy participants are in need of strong methodological 
measures that can tease out the processes involved in decision-making. The proposed study 
will test aspects of dual process account of IGT performance in healthy participants, examine 
components of executive functions and examine critical thinking aptitude and disposition by 
using measures that can possibly explain types of processing in decision making, i.e. 
extended version of the Cognitive Reflection Test (Toplak,  West, & Stanovich, 2014),  
Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI, Epstein, Pacini, Denes-Raj & Heier  1996)  active 
open-minded thinking (AOT, Haran, Ritov, & Mellers, 2013), the consideration of future 
consequences (CFC, Strathman, Gleicher, Boninger, & Edwards, 1994) and Anxiety 
Sensitivity Index (ASI, Reiss, Peterson, Gursky, & McNally, 1986). In addition, this study 
aims to assess participants’ level of knowledge throughout the game, by using a sensitive test 
of awareness in the form of a structured questionnaire (e.g., Maia & McClelland, 2004). An 
eye tracker will measure number of fixation and mean fixation duration. Mean fixation 
duration refers to the average duration of single fixation in a decision. Research indicates that 
executive processes go along with longer fixations, whereas more intuitive processing is 
accompanied by shorter fixations (Horstmann, Ahlgrimm, & Glockner, 2009). Single 
fixations will be categorized according to Horstmann et al.’s suggestion in short (< 150 ms), 
medium (≥ 150 and < 500 ms) and long (≥ 500 ms) fixation durations resulting in the variable 






 In addition, blood pressure reactivity and heart rate variability measures will be taken, and 
Anxiety Sensitivity Index will be measured in order to examine physiological responses 
during decision-making processes and participants’ anxiety sensitivity level. This study will 
follow National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence (NICE, 2011) guidelines in order 
to have an operational definition for high blood pressure as an exclusion criterion for this 
study participation. According to NICE 120/80 mmHG is ideal RESTING blood pressure 
while 140/90 mmHG and higher may be a reason for concern. Thus, participants with a blood 
pressure higher than 140/90 mmHG will not be allowed to enter the study and advised to 
maybe visit their GP as a precaution. No guidance, however, exists for high blood pressure 
levels during mental stress studies but a systolic blood pressure of over 200mmHg is 
considered high during exercise (AHA, 2010) and so will be used to operationalize high BP 
during the study; it is very unlikely that any participant’s blood pressure will reach this level 
but the study will be stopped if it reaches this level. Heart rate variability (HRV) is calculated 
based on variation of time in milliseconds between two heartbeats. HRV is a relatively new 
method for assessing, for example, stress. What makes HRV interesting is the fact that it can 
reflect changes in stress while other physiological parameters, like blood pressure, are still in 
normal or accepted ranges. For the purposes of this study standards of measurements and 
physiological interpretation are adopted from the Task Force of The European Society of 
Cardiology and The North American Society of Pacing and Electrophysiology (1996). In the 
situation where HRV is related to emotional arousal the Task Force suggests the use of 
Frequency domain methods. This method assigns bands of frequency and then counts the 
number of NN (beat-to-beat) intervals that match each band. The bands are typically high 
frequency (HF) from 0.15 to 0.4 Hz, low frequency (LF) from 0.04 to 0.15 Hz and the very 





9. Outline of study design and methods 
 
The present study is a quantitative experimental research that will be conducted on-campus. 
The equipment and the material will be stored in room (T037) where the experiment will take 
place.   Bechara et al.’s (1994) computerised version of IGT will be used for the purpose of 
this study. The IGT involves virtual money and participants will not risk their own money. 
Healthy students will be recruited via the university website and student forums. Participants 
under the age of 18 years old will not be allowed to participate in this study. Participants will 
be asked for general demographic information. Participants with the history of cardiovascular 
disorders or history of high blood pressure will not be allowed to participate. Furthermore, 
if a participant has a very high blood pressure before (e.g., higher than the operational 
definition for exclusion) or during the experiment they will be informed about this, advised 
to stop, or not to participate in the experiment, and informed that they might want to visit 






pressure can be hard to pin down (e.g., smoking, lack of physical activity, genetics, too much 
alcohol or salt consumptions) and it is beyond the expertise of the researcher, participants 
will only be advised not to take part in the study, and possibly visit their GP as a precautious 
measure. The researcher will also emphasize that there may be no reason for a major concern, 
and that his advice should only be considered as a safeguard measure. Following briefing and 
informed consent the researcher will explain the rules of the task, what is involved and what 
kind of measurements are taken during the performance. Then, the experimental group will 
be informed that the whole process will be recorded on camera and that they will need to 
report their experience at the end of the experiment in front of the camera (based on Preston 
et al’s 2007 study).   Both groups will receive information’s about the procedure and context 
of the task. Continuous, non-invasive cardiovascular measure by Finometer (Finapres 
Medical System) with the interval of four minutes will be used in the study. The Finometer 
will measure blood pressure and heart rate variability. In addition, eye-movements will be 
recorded using the Eye-gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30), with remote binocular 
sampling rate of 30 Hz and an accuracy of about 0.45°. Participants will be asked to sit for 
five minutes (resting period), baseline blood pressure and heart rate variability measurements 
will be taken three times before the tasks engagement. The first administrated task (CRT) 
will measure participants’ tendency to engage in reflective thinking followed by REI, AOT, 
CFC and ASI. REI will measure participants’ rational and experiential thinking styles while 
AOT will tap into participants’ tendency to weigh new evidence against a favoured belief and 
to consider carefully different options in forming a decision. CFC measures the extent to 
which people consider distant versus immediate consequences of potential behaviour. ASI 
measures beliefs that anxiety experiences have negative implication. The order of the 
administrated task will be counterbalanced by using the ABCD, ACDB, ADBC, ... DABC 
layout. After that the participants will engage in IGT. During the IGT performance, 
participants will be asked questions related to cognitive awareness, after the first 20 trials and 
then every 20 trials). Participants in the experimental group will be informed that they do not 
have to report their experience after they finished all the tasks. At the end a post 
cardiovascular measurement will be undertaken to make sure they are back to normal task 
followed by debrief.  If the blood pressure shows further increase or doesn’t show any sign 
of decreasing, the participant will be informed and possibly advised to contact their GP or 
even University doctor (in the cases of immediate concern).  
This study will assess the importance of reflective thinking and intuitive responses among 
healthy participants completing the IGT. A between-group (stress vs. control) design will 
measure participants' cognitive abilities, abilities to inhibit emotional reaction and type of 
processing during the IGT performance. The study will comprise 110 participants who will 
perform the task once. The IGT involves four decks of cards (e.g., A, B, C and D) and the 
game consists of 100 trials. In the IGT, following each selection, a specified amount of 
fictitious money is awarded. However, at certain times, losses of different fixed amounts 
occur. Two decks of cards, C and D, are advantageous, as they result in small immediate 
gains, but also very small losses and will therefore return more money in the long run, than 
that which is given out. The other two decks (decks A and B) produce high immediate gains, 
however, because very high losses occur at certain times, more money will be lost than gained 
(disadvantageous decks). Because it is impossible to calculate the best option from the 
beginning of the task, subjects have to learn to avoid bad decks by following their hunches 






participants will not risk their own money. Cumulative scores for the gambling task will be 
calculated by adding the total net scores from all trials.   
The IGT task will be extended to 140 trials to pin down learning and performance phases 
during the task. It is predicted that in control group, the performance in the latter trials of the 
IGT, will be more strongly correlated with measures of analytic thinking. It is hypothesised 
that the stress manipulation will inhibit performance on the IGT and delay the elimination of 
disadvantageous deck selections. It was also predicted that stress would reduce participants' 
reflective ability as measured by the CRT.  
 
The dependent variable in this study is the number of disadvantageous card selection and it 
is hypothesised that participants in control group who are more reflective, critical and plan 
strategically will learn more quickly and perform better on IGT than participants in the stress 
group who are less reflective, critical and rely on intuition. BP reactivity will be calculated 
by subtracting the average of the performance measurements from the average of baseline 
measurements. Then ANOVA will be used to determine if systolic, diastolic BP and heart 
rate variability increased between the baseline measurement and task measurement. Separate 
linear regressions will be used to see is there a relationship between the physiological 
measurements (e.g., eye movement), anxiety sensitivity index (ASI) and thinking style. 
Separate ANOVA’s will be used to determine the effect of reflective thinking (CRT), 
thinking style (REI) planning (AOT) consideration of future consequences (CFC) on IGT 
scores during the learning and performance phase. Multiple regression will be conducted to 
determine to what extent CRT scores, REI scores AOT scores CFC scores, ASI scores, blood 
pressure and heart rate variability will predict IGT scores in the learning and performance 
phases of the IGT. Finally, multiple regression will be conducted to determine to what extent 
CRT scores number of fixation and periods of fixation will predict IGT scores in the learning 





10. Sample: Please provide a detailed description of the study sample, covering 
selection, number, age, and if appropriate, inclusion and exclusion criteria. 
Participants will be recruited at the University by using e-mails and by contacting various 
student groups.  GPower software was used in order to determine the number of participants 
needed to detect medium effect sizes. Thus, for moderate effect sizes (d= 0.5, Alpha= 0.05, 
Power= 0.80) a total number of 110 participants is sufficient (both males and females). 
Participants under the age of 18 years old will not be allowed to participate in the study. 
Participants with the history of cardiovascular disorders or history of high blood pressure will 
not be allowed to participate in the study. Furthermore, if a participant has a very high blood 
pressure during the experiment they will be informed about such event advised to stop the 












11. Are payments or rewards/incentives going to be made to the participants?  If so, 
please give details below. 
 
Participants will receive 4 participation points. All participants will have the option to be 
entered into a prize draw to win a £75 Amazon voucher This will be explained in the 
invitation to participate.    
 
 
Do you intend to give Participation Points for taking part in your study? Yes (Delete as 
appropriate) 
12. What resources will you require?  (e.g., questionnaires, equipment, for example video camera, 
specialised software; if questionnaires are to be used please give full details here). 
 
 
Five quantitative tests will be used for the purpose of this study: 
 
Extended version of the Cognitive Reflection Test will be used (CRT, Toplak, West & 
Stanovich, 2014). This will offer a measure of reflective thinking that can evaluate individual 
differences in reflective processing among participants engaging with the IGT. This test is 
constructed to measure peoples’ aptitude to engage in reflective thinking whereby the more 
reflective you are the more likely you are to inhibit initial response to a problem (heuristically 
derived) and engage in finding an alternative solution to a problem.  
 
Pacini et al., (1996) Rational-Experiential Inventory (REI), measures rational and 
experiential thinking styles. The REI measures the two independent processing modes with 
two factors: Need for Cognition (rational measure) and Faith in Intuition (experiential 
measure). Several studies have confirmed that the REI is a reliable measure of individual 
difference in information processing, and that the two independent thinking styles measured 
account for a substantial amount of variance that is not addressed by other personality theories 
(i.e. Norris, & Epstein, 2011). 
 
Haran et al., (2011) Active Open-minded Thinking Scale (AOT) is based on Stanovich 
and West’s  (2007) scale and is designed to capture thinkers’ desire to be more informed 
before making an estimate or prediction, and their higher attention to information already 







Strathman et al., (1994) consideration of future consequences (CFC) measures the extent 
to which people consider distant versus immediate consequences of potential behaviour. This 
may be very important for the participants engaging in the IGT, since in order to maximize 
their profit participants’ need to encompass into strategy future consequences 
(punishment/reward).  
 
Reiss et al., (1986) Anxiety Sensitivity Index (ASI), measures beliefs that anxiety 
experiences have negative implication. People who believe that anxiety has few or no 
negative effects may be able to cope with a relatively high level of exposure to anxiety-
provoking stimuli. In contrast, people who believe that anxiety has terrible effects, tend to 
have anxiety reactions that grow in anticipation of severe consequences. Anxiety sensitivity 
therefore implies a tendency to show exaggerated and prolonged reactions to anxiety-
provoking stimuli. Research indicated that the performance of healthy participants is 
characterized by substantial individual variability whereby individual choices are driven by 
frequency of losses rather than the long-term outcome of the decks. However one of the 
reason for the participants’ non-optimal performance may be sensitivity to punishments and 
rewards that may lead anxiety sensitive participants to a disadvantageous decision making.   
Maia & McClelland (2004) Test of Awareness, measures raise of the conscious knowledge 
of the advantageous strategy as early as participants behave advantageously in the IGT. This 
sensitivity test encompasses 5 question in total with question 3 having 4 additional sub 
questions.  
 
These scales are available and there are no copyright issues. 
 
Bechara et al., (1994) computerised Iowa Gambling Task (IGT) is frequently used as an 
experimental task in the decision making research, and the University holds a copy of the 
IGT that will be used in this study.  
 
The use of the Finometer (Finapres Medical System) will be undertaken after supervised 
training and the equipment used will be located in psychology laboratories. Research will be 
conducted during office hours and the researcher will adhere to the BPS Guidelines for 
Ethical Practice for conducting laboratory experiments. 
 
The use of the Eye gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30) will be undertaken after 
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14. Ethical Considerations Please indicate how you intend to address each of the following in your 
study. Points a-i relate particularly to projects involving human participants.  Guidance to completing 





a.  Consent 
The participants will be informed about the goals and purpose of the study, as well as known 
and unknown risks attached. The participants will be asked to fill out formal consent form, 








c. Debriefing  
At the end of the experiment the participants will be provided with full written debrief where 






blood pressure than usual after the study (i.e. contact their GP) and they will be provided with 
contact information for future correspondence and additional information’s (i.e. researcher 
email, student service centre). 
 
 
d. Withdrawal from the investigation 
Prior to the experiment, the participants will be fully informed that their participation is 
voluntary, about camera recording (experimental group) and that they are allowed to 
withdraw from the experiment at any time and any answers they had given up to that point 
would be deleted (email address of the researcher will be provided with the debrief 
document). If they decide to withdraw their data after they had taken the experiment, they 
will be allowed to do so within the time limit of four weeks from the day that they had 
completed the experiment 
 
e. Confidentiality 
To provide anonymity and confidentiality participants will be asked to create a unique code, 
which will be a combination of the last two letters of their favourite film and the last two 
digits of their mobile number. 
They will be asked not to reveal any personal details. Participants will be asked to leave their 
email addresses for contact purposes if they are eligible for a reward.  However, it will be 
explained that the email address is only for contacting the highest scorers on the gambling 
game and that it will be deleted immediately upon data summary and prize been rewarded.  
The experimental data will be password protected and stored on external drive The data 
collected will be accessible only to the researcher and his supervisors. All paper data collected 
will be stored in a secure locked cabinet, in a locked room 
 
f. Protection of participants   
There is no deception involved and participants will be assured anonymity. ’No harm will 
occur as a result of this experiment’. Participants under the age of 18 years old will not be 
allowed to participate in the study. Participants with the history of cardio vascular disorders 
or history of high blood pressure will not be allowed to participate in the study. Furthermore, 
if a participant has a very high blood pressure during the experiment they will be informed 
about such event advised to stop the experiment and informed that they might want to visit 








g. Observation research [complete if applicable]  
Not applicable 
 
h. Giving advice  
I will only be providing the relevant information in regards to the experiment and the 
phenomenon in question. If participants are concerned about anything else they will be 
advised to contact the student services at University of Derby. Furthermore, The researcher 
will act in accordance with both the BPS ethical principles and adhere to the codes of conduct 
outlined by the University of Derby to ensure ethical conduct and knowledge development 
 
i. Research undertaken in public places  [complete if applicable] 
Not applicable 
 
j. Data protection 
The experimental data will be password protected and stored on external drive The data 
collected will be accessible only to the researcher and his supervisors. All paper data collected 




k. Animal Rights [complete if applicable] 
Not applicable 
 





15. Have/do you intend to request clearance from any other body/organisation ?   











16. All projects have an element of risk which should be assessed before any project is 
undertaken. 
 
    Have the activities associated with this research project been risk assessed?  Yes 




17. Declaration: The information supplied is accurate to the best of my knowledge and 
belief. I understand my obligations and the rights of the participants. I agree to act at 
all times in accordance with University of Derby Ethical Policy for conducting research 






















C.2. Ethical Approval 
  
Approval Letter: Psychology Research Ethics Committee 
 
University of Derby 
 
Date: 30th May 2016 
 
Dr Frances Maratos 





Ethics Ref No:  42-15-BS 
 
Thank you for submitting this revised application to the Psychology Research Ethics 
Committee.   
 
I have now reviewed the revised documents you sent following the feedback you received on 
your initial application, and I am satisfied that all of the issues raised have been dealt with. The 
application can now therefore be approved. 
 
 The following documents have now been re-reviewed: 
 
1. Ethics application form 
2. Invitation to Participate 
3. Consent Sheet 
4. Debrief  
5. Questionnaire Materials 
 
If any changes to the study described in the application or supporting documentation is 








Please note ethical approval for application 42-15-BS is valid for a period of 5 years i.e. 30th 
May 2021.  
 






























C.3. Materials  
Eye gaze binocular system (Tobii-X2-30).  
Finometer (Finapres Medical System, Amsterdam, Netherlands).  
 






This is removed for copyright reasons Please see the original paper  
Toplak, M. E., West, R. F., & Stanovich, K. E. (2014). Assessing miserly information 


















This is removed for copyright reasons Please see the original paper  
Maia, T. V., & McClelland, J. L. (2004). A reexamination of the evidence for the 
somatic marker hypothesis: What participants really know in the Iowa gambling task. 











INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE  
 
My name is Boban Simonovic and I’m a postgraduate researcher at the University of Derby. 
As part of my research I’m interested in learning more about decision making under uncertain 
conditions. 
    
The aim of the present research is to explore people’s decision-making abilities under 
uncertainty. A computer gambling game is involved. If you decide to participate in this 
research, you will be asked to complete this gambling game and several questionnaires. Your 
blood pressure will be measured during this process and you may experience slight pressure 
and discomfort on your arm. In addition, we will use an eye tracker device as a monitoring tool 
that measure gaze direction. 
 
The experiment will take no more than 70 minutes. You will play the gambling game with 
virtual money. However, you are encouraged to play the game naturally to the best of your 
ability. You will receive four participation point for participating in this study. In addition, all 
participants have the option to be entered into a prize draw to win a £75 Amazon voucher. 
Participation is voluntary, and all information recorded will remain anonymous and 
This is removed for copyright reasons Please see the original paper  
Bechara, A., Damasio, A. R., Damasio, H., & Anderson, S. W. (1994). Insensitivity to 








confidential. Data recorded for this study will not be used for any other purpose than the study 
itself. Data will be stored in accordance with data protection laws and University of Derby data 
collection and storage policies. 
   
Please note that you may withdraw your participation at any time during the study without 
consequences. If you choose to withdraw your data after taking part please contact the 
researcher (see below) using your unique code. To provide anonymity of the data you will be 
asked to create your unique reference number. Once you have completed the experiment keep 
a note of your reference number and use it for any future correspondence. You will be asked 
to give your email addresses for contact purposes if you are eligible for a reward.  
Email addresses will be used only for contacting the highest scorers on the gambling game and 
it will be deleted immediately upon data summary.  Withdrawal from the study will result in 
all participant information being destroyed and not included in analysis. Participant withdrawal 
is available up to 4 weeks after participation.  
 
Please note no harm will occur as a result of this experiment. However, to avoid and reduce 
any unnecessary risks, if you feel depressed or anxious, be advised not to take part in the present 
research.  
 
Furthermore, people under the age of 18 years old and people who suffered from any 
form of cardiovascular disorders or high blood pressure are not allowed to take part in 
the experiment. 
Please note that if during the experiment we notice that your blood pressure is higher 
than normal you will be informed and possibly advised to contact your GP.  
Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time before during and after you made your decision 
to participate  
Researcher contact e-mail: B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk 







INVITATION TO PARTICIPATE (experimental group) 
 
My name is Boban Simonovic and I’m a postgraduate researcher at the University of Derby. 
As part of my research I’m interested in learning more about decision making under uncertain 
conditions. 
    
The aim of the present research is to explore people’s decision-making abilities under 
uncertainty. A computer gambling game is involved. If you decide to participate in this 
research, you will be asked to complete this gambling game and several questionnaires. Your 
blood pressure will be measured during this process and you may experience slight pressure 
and discomfort on your arm. In addition, we will use an eye tracker device as a monitoring tool 
that measure gaze direction. Please be aware that the whole process will be recorded on camera 
and you will need to report your experience at the end of the experiment in front of the camera.   
 
The experiment will take no more than 70 minutes. You will play the gambling game with 
virtual money. However, you are encouraged to play the game naturally to the best of your 
ability. You will receive four participation point for participating in this study. In addition, all 
participants have the option to be entered into a prize draw to win a £75 Amazon voucher  
Participation is voluntary and all information recorded will remain anonymous and 
confidential. Data recorded for this study will not be used for any other purpose than the study 
itself. Data will be stored in accordance with data protection laws and University of Derby data 
collection and storage policies. 
   
Please note that you may withdraw your participation at any time during the study without 
consequences. If you choose to withdraw your data after taking part please contact the 
researcher (see below) using your unique code. To provide anonymity of the data you will be 
asked to create your unique reference number. Once you have completed the experiment keep 
a note of your reference number and use it for any future correspondence. You will be asked 






Email addresses will be used only for contacting the highest scorers on the gambling game and 
it will be deleted immediately upon data summary.  Withdrawal from the study will result in 
all participant information being destroyed and not included in analysis. Participant withdrawal 
is available up to 4 weeks after participation.  
 
Please note no harm will occur as a result of this experiment. However, to avoid and reduce 
any unnecessary risks, if you feel depressed or anxious, be advised not to take part in the present 
research.  
 
Furthermore, people under the age of 18 years old and people who suffered from any 
form of cardiovascular disorders or high blood pressure are not allowed to take part in 
the experiment. 
Please note that if during the experiment we notice that your blood pressure is higher 
than normal you will be informed and possibly advised to contact your GP.  
Please do not hesitate to contact me at any time before during and after you made your decision 
to participate  
Researcher contact e-mail: B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk 















 (Last two letters of your favourite film and last two digits of your mobile number): 
This research is about people’s decision-making abilities under uncertainty. Please note that 
you are under no obligation to complete the experiment and you are not going to be penalised 
if you decide to withdraw during the process. Participation is voluntary, and all information 
recorded will remain anonymous and confidential. Data recorded for this study will not be used 
for any other purpose than the study itself. Withdrawal from the study will result in all 
participant information being destroyed and not included in analysis. Participant withdrawal is 
available up to 4 weeks after participation. You will need to use your unique personal reference 
number in order to send the request for data deletion. Contact e-mail 
B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk,  
What will participation involve? - It involves computer gambling game and answering 
questionnaires, while having your eye-movements and blood pressure activity monitored. It 
will take approximately about 70 minutes to complete the experiment.   
As an informed participant of this research I understand that: 
8. My participation is voluntary, and I may cease to take part in this research at any time, 
without penalty. 
9. I am aware of what my participation involves. 
10. I understand that all my additional questions about the experiment will be satisfactorily 
answered. 
11. I’m aware that I can chose between the two rewards for this study: a) 4 participation 
points or b) 2 participation points and a £5 voucher.  
Can you please indicate if you would like to enter the prize draw: 












Participant email _________________________________ 
Researcher signature_________________________________  
Date____________________________________ 
 








Personal Reference Number                                                                                                                            
 (Last two letters of your favourite film and last two digits of your mobile number): 
This research is about people’s decision-making abilities under uncertainty. Please note that 
you are under no obligation to complete the experiment and you are not going to be penalised 
if you decide to withdraw during the process. Participation is voluntary, and all information 
recorded will remain anonymous and confidential. Data recorded for this study will not be used 
for any other purpose than the study itself. Withdrawal from the study will result in all 
participant information being destroyed and not included in analysis. Participant withdrawal is 
available up to 4 weeks after participation. You will need to use your unique personal reference 
number in order to send the request for data deletion. Contact e-mail 
B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk,  
What will participation involve? - It involves computer gambling game and answering 
questionnaires, while having your eye-movements and blood pressure activity monitored. It 
will take approximately about 70 minutes to complete the experiment.   
Please be aware that your performance will be recorded during the experiment and by 






As an informed participant of this research I understand that: 
a) My participation is voluntary, and I may cease to take part in this research at any time, 
without penalty. 
b) I am aware of what my participation involves. 
c) I understand that all my additional questions about the experiment will be satisfactorily 
answered. 
d) I’m aware that I will be recorded during the experiment. 
e) I’m aware that I can chose between the two rewards for this study: a) 4 participation 
points or b) 2 participation points and a £5 voucher.  
 
Can you please indicate if you would like to enter the prize draw? 





I have read and understood the above and give consent to participate. 
Participant signature_________________________________ 
Participant email _________________________________ 














Thank you for taking the time to participate in this experiment. Can you please confirm which 
of the two rewards you like to receive: a) 4 participation points or b) 2 participation points and 
a £5 voucher?   
 
The aim of this research was to investigate the uncertain context of decision making under 
stress. This experiment had two conditions (stress vs no stress). It was hypothesised that the 
stress manipulation would inhibit performance on the IGT, and would delay the elimination of 
disadvantageous deck selections. The stress manipulation will reduce participants' reflective 
ability and both strategic and intuitive assessments of risk during the game. In the case of the 
gambling game, that you have just completed the initial ambiguity of the task did not provide 
adequate cues for strategic decisions making, perhaps leading you to rely on your ‘gut feelings’. 
If you were under stress, you were more likely to misinterpret and learn very slowly the 
contingencies of the decks. Furthermore, this study investigated the relationship between 
people’s thinking dispositions, thinking style, consideration of future consequences on 
gambling scores during the learning and performance phase.  
Your eye gaze was monitored during the experiment because an increase of pupil dilation may 
have an effect on decision making. This assumption is based on the Somatic Marker Hypothesis 
which postulate that affective somatic states may be associated with prior decisions outcomes 
that are used to guide future decisions. For example, if you made a choice followed by a 
negative outcome, an emotional reaction becomes associated with that choice. Once the 
emotional reaction is sufficiently well established, the reaction occurs before a choice is made. 
If your pupil was slightly dilated, it is plausible that intuitively, you ‘knew’ which decks were 
bad even if you didn’t have any conscious awareness of it.  Please bear in mind that your pupil 
dilatation will not have any effects on your health, and is completely normal.    
Your blood pressure was monitored during the experiment because of the previous suggestions 
that an increase of the blood pressure may have an effect on decision making. Please bear in 
mind that if your blood pressure was slightly higher than usual this will not have any lasting 
effects on your health.  However if you experience any unusual and persistent activity with 







Hopefully your participation will make significant contribution in further clarification of these 
phenomena.   
 
Please bear in mind that the data collected will only be used for this research, and will be stored 
and safeguarded on a removable disc by the researcher until after awarding of the academic 
degree (September 2016). Please keep your reference number safe for further correspondence, 
and bear in mind that you can withdraw your data up to 4 weeks after participation. For any 
further question please feel free to contact me or the Supervisor of this research Dr Edward 
Stupple 
Researcher contact e-mail: B.Simonovic@derby.ac.uk 
Supervisor contact e-mail: E.J.N.Stupple@derby.ac.uk 
If you are interested in this topic, the article below may provide more information regarding 
people’s thinking disposition on decision making, following link about the blood pressure.  
Steingroever, H., Wetzels, R., Horstmann, A., Neumann, J., & Wagenmakers, E. J. (2013). 





Please bear in mind that you can always contact me or my supervisor if you have any 
additional questions or concerns about the study. 
 





This study involves blood pressure and eye tracking measurements. Eye tracking involves 
a non-invasive tracking of your gaze that will in no circumstance cause you any harm. 






the device needs to be calibrated. Please follow the instructions as they appear on the 
computer screen and focus on the green dots as they appear. This should take no longer 
than 1 minute. Please let me know if you experience any discomfort? Before we start, let 
me provide you with information regarding blood pressure and inclusion/exclusion 
criteria for this study. This study will follow National Institute for Health and Clinical 
Excellence (NICE, 2011) guidelines in order to have an operational definition for high 
blood pressure. According to NICE 120/80 mmHG is ideal blood pressure while 140/90 
mmHG and higher may be a reason for concern. People under the age of 18 years old and 
people who have suffered from any form of cardiovascular disorders or high blood 
pressure are not allowed to take part in the experiment. This is the Finometer that will 
be used for blood pressure measurement. Before we start I will take three baseline 
measurements. If the baseline measurements indicate that you have a very high blood 
pressure it is my duty to inform you about this and advise you not to participate in the 
experiment. Since the exact cause of the increase in blood pressure can be hard to pin 
down (e.g., smoking, lack of physical activity, genetics, too much alcohol or salt 
consumption) and it is beyond my expertise, you will be advised to visit your GP as a 
precautious measure. There may be no reason for concern, and the advice should be 
considered as a safeguarding measure. Please note that if during the experiment I notice 
that your blood pressure is higher than normal you will be informed and may be advised 
to contact your GP. Please note that there may be some increase in blood pressure during 
the experiment, but this will go back to normal at the end.  At the end of the study I will 
take measurements to make sure that your blood pressure is back to normal.   
 
Do you have any questions you would like to ask? 
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